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Mapping Digital Media
Th e values that underpin good journalism, the need of citizens for reliable and abundant information, and 
the importance of such information for a healthy society and a robust democracy: these are perennial, and 
provide compass-bearings for anyone trying to make sense of current changes across the media landscape. 
Th e standards in the profession are in the process of being set. Most of the eﬀ ects on journalism imposed 
by new technology are shaped in the most developed societies, but these changes are equally inﬂ uencing the 
media in less developed societies.
Th e Mapping Digital Media project, which examines the changes in-depth, aims to build bridges between 
researchers and policymakers, activists, academics and standard-setters across the world. It also builds policy 
capacity in countries where this is less developed, encouraging stakeholders to participate in and inﬂ uence 
change. At the same time, this research creates a knowledge base, laying foundations for advocacy work, 
building capacity and enhancing debate. 
Th e Media Program of the Open Society Foundations has seen how changes and continuity aﬀ ect the media in 
diﬀ erent places, redeﬁ ning the way they can operate sustainably while staying true to values of pluralism and 
diversity, transparency and accountability, editorial independence, freedom of expression and information, 
public service, and high professional standards.
Th e Mapping Digital Media project assesses, in the light of these values, the global opportunities and risks 
that are created for media by the following developments:
 the switch-over from analog broadcasting to digital broadcasting;
 growth of new media platforms as sources of news;
 convergence of traditional broadcasting with telecommunications.
Covering 60 countries, the project examines how these changes aﬀ ect the core democratic service that any 
media system should provide—news about political, economic and social aﬀ airs. 
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Th e Mapping Digital Media reports are produced by local researchers and partner organizations in each 
country. Cumulatively, these reports will provide a much-needed resource on the democratic role of digital 
media.
In addition to the country reports, the Open Society Media Program has commissioned research papers on a 
range of topics related to digital media. Th ese papers are published as the MDM Reference Series.
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Mapping Digital Media: France
Executive Summary
According to standard indicators, the transition to digital media in France has been a success. By the end of 
2011, digital switch-over of television was complete and more than two-thirds of the population was online. 
Earlier that year, however, a survey revealed that more people thought the quality of media output had 
declined in recent years compared to those who thought it had improved, and this tendency was still present 
in 2013. While the funding crisis in print is due to loss of advertising revenue, the funding crisis in public 
service broadcasting has been linked to increased politicization. Th e proliferation of niche outlets online, 
meanwhile, is overshadowed by their limited reach and uncertain future.
At the receiving end, audiences have demonstrated a strong appetite for new media delivery technologies. 
High-deﬁ nition television sets have reached three-quarters of households, while 13 percent of those listening 
to the radio now do so via the internet. But in contrast to a relatively painless and swift digital transition in 
television, the switch-over process for radio has stalled due to a lack of both political and commercial will. 
Th ere are encouraging signs that demographic divides are being dismantled when it comes to digital media 
uptake, with rapid growth among women, over-65s, and workers in recent years. But nearly a third of the 
population remains disconnected either voluntarily, or because of enduring access restrictions. Partly as a 
result of this, television remains the primary source of news and information (followed by radio). 
On one level, digitization has fostered a pluralization of the television landscape. It precipitated a threefold 
increase in the number of national channels available free-to-air, and allowed the development of over 50 
local television stations. As a result, consumption of television increased by an average of six minutes a day 
between 2005 and 2010. New digital terrestrial channels accounted for the majority of this growth (at the 
expense of incumbents), but this shift in viewing patterns has implications for the nature of news delivery and 
consumption. Th e majority of the new channels have adopted entertainment-based formats with a no-news 
format or an emphasis on short, regular news updates as opposed to the more in-depth output associated 
with traditional bulletins. Th e main public broadcaster—France Télévisions—remains the market leader in 
news and current aﬀ airs and has made the development of new media applications a strategic priority. But 
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it is facing a three-pronged decline in ratings, credibility, and ﬁ nancing. Twenty-four-hour news channels 
in France have a rather low general viewership of less than 3 percent, peaking at moments of unexpected or 
important political and social events.
Th e 2005 riots in Parisian suburbs sparked a burgeoning public debate about the extent to which the 
mainstream media are representative of French society. A number of prominent blogs and websites emerged 
seeking to promote alternative narratives about the unrest. One of these—the Bondy blog—established a 
partnership in 2009 with the School of Journalism in Lille to oﬀ er specialist training for online reporting. 
Nevertheless, blogging, commenting, and posting remain marginal pursuits and largely limited to a minority 
of already engaged citizens. But even within this stratum there is more diversity compared to mainstream 
media voices. Social networking sites have also helped to reinvigorate the public sphere to a limited extent. A 
third of respondents to a 2009 survey claimed to have engaged at least once in some form of political activity 
online. Participation has been somewhat pegged to election periods, however, and there is evidence to suggest 
it has stabilized or even waned since 2007.
Meanwhile, the promise of diversity in online news has yet to be fulﬁ lled. Th e sector remains largely the 
preserve of the dominant content aggregators and traditional media brands. Although “pure-play” online news 
sites are growing, their sustainability often hangs in the balance. Th is has resulted in minimal investments 
in operational journalism and a reliance on the same agency-based sources as traditional media. Recent 
legislation has included online news outlets among the potential beneﬁ ciaries of public subsidies, which may 
oﬀ er an important lifeline to this ﬂ edgling sector.
But the limits to diversity online are not prescribed by resource constraints alone. Th ere is a growing perception 
that the “googlization” of news has amounted to homogenization, tempting journalists to prioritize issues 
and topics that rank highest on search engines and content aggregators. Of course, homogenization is not a 
new phenomenon, and there is ongoing debate as to whether digital media are merely replicating rather than 
altering patterns of consumption observed in the analog era. 
Th e primary eﬀ ect on journalism as a profession seems to be a polarizing one. On the one hand, there exists 
a growing cadre of underpaid, desk-bound reporters. On the other, an elite tier has emerged consisting of 
celebrity journalists who have used the internet as a platform to establish their names as personal brands. 
Th e primary eﬀ ect on news output lies in dissemination rather than content. Th e explosion of platforms, 
devices, and social media has helped individual journalists to extend and diversify their audiences to some 
extent, and has certainly enhanced the user experience of news. But it has done little to stimulate investigative 
journalism, which has long been underdeveloped in France. Th ere remains an over-reliance on oﬃ  cial sources, 
and the growing speed of news dissemination has further diminished the space for in-depth and long-form 
reporting. 
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Th e few existing investigative journalists are also constrained by libel laws that, on balance, favor complainants 
over defendants. For example, Denis Robert, a journalist who exposed a tax avoidance scheme adopted by a 
number of prominent politicians in 1999, was ﬁ nally absolved of legal wrongdoing in 2011, after 60 lawsuits 
and 10 years of court battles. 
Th e autonomy of journalists has also been questioned in the context of growing personal ties between the 
media and political elites. Former president Nikolas Sarkozy was known to be a close friend of several media 
owners and CEOs, while the current administration has been accused of harboring entrenched links with the 
new owners of Le Monde newspaper.
Last, the teeth of watchdog journalism have been blunted by a growing culture of sensationalism that is 
particularly acute in online news. Th e competitive pressures unleashed by digital media are increasingly 
directing journalists toward scandals involving the misdemeanors and indiscretions of celebrities rather than 
complex and time-consuming stories about institutional corruption. 
Th ese pressures are not helped by the failure of both traditional and new entrants to monetize online news 
content. Many of the latter are still reliant on start-up funds, while the former are increasingly dependent on 
cross-subsidies and state aid. Television, radio, and the internet all experienced varying degrees of recovery 
after the global recession precipitated the sharpest fall in advertising expenditure on record. But there have 
been no such green shoots for the newspaper industry, and 2012 saw the closure of France-Soir, once a leading 
tabloid, which had faced declining circulation since the 1970s. 
Th ere are exceptional success stories, such as 20 minutes—a freesheet newspaper (with the highest print 
circulation) whose website was approaching proﬁ tability by 2010. But the majority of newspapers have 
concentrated eﬀ orts on political lobbying in a bid to force online aggregators and search engines to pay for 
their exploitation of news content. Th ey have argued that this practice cost the newspaper industry more 
than €1 billion (US$1.3 billion) between 2010 and 2012. But Google has since poured cold water on the 
prospect of paying newspapers for its appropriation of content by threatening to simply exclude them from 
its rankings. In 2012, Google ﬁ nally reached agreement with the French Publishers Association (Syndicat 
National de l’Edition, SNE), and other organizations representing editors and authors, for the digitization of 
print books. 
Th e Government ﬁ rst sought to address the funding crisis facing the newspaper industry in 2009 with a new 
law that ushered in a three-year public funding plan and tighter controls on copyright protection online. But 
contrary to its provisions, much of the new funding ended up being funneled into traditional business models 
rather than promoting new innovative approaches to news in the digital environment. Enhanced copyright 
protection measures have also been accused of undermining fair use of digital media and threatening the free 
ﬂ ow of information online.
Another controversial aspect of the new law was the power it vested in the president to appoint media 
regulators and public broadcasters alike. In combination with the reduced advertising time imposed on 
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public service television, this has in theory widened the opportunities for political interference. But there is 
no evidence that public service broadcasting has been editorially compromised as a result of these measures.
Meanwhile, the television market has been helped by the reduction of advertising in public service 
broadcasting, which has widened the pool of funding for commercial broadcasters. Contrary to government 
assurances, the shortfall for France Télévisions has not been fully covered by a concomitant rise in license fee 
and/or public subsidies. Th e latter increased by 19 percent in 2009, but plans to cross-subsidize public service 
media via a levy on telecommunications have been scuppered by the European Commission.
Overall, however, media policy and regulation have proved largely responsive and adequate to the challenges 
of digitization. Digital switch-over for television proceeded in a relatively timely and uncontested fashion, 
with appropriate support for disadvantaged households and an eﬀ ective public awareness campaign. Digital 
licensing has also been generally perceived as transparent and fair. On one occasion in 2004 when the award 
of licenses violated anti-concentration provisions, the courts stepped in and eﬀ ectively reversed the decision. 
But the new government faces a plethora of loose ends in digital media policy. It remains to be seen whether 
public subsidies aimed at regenerating good-quality journalism in both print and online sectors have been 
eﬀ ective; there is a signiﬁ cant shortfall in the funding of public service media as a result of their reduced 
advertising quotas, and the European Commission’s rejection of a planned levy on telecoms; political support 
for traditional media in their plight against online giants such as Google may backﬁ re if the latter carries 
out its threat to exclude their content; and public trust in the media is unlikely to be restored so long as 
entrenched links between political and media elites are maintained. 
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Context
France is one of the largest countries in Europe (643,427 km2). For the last 50 years it has enjoyed steady 
economic growth (apart from in 2009). Its population has increased over the past 30 years, from 55 million 
in 1982 to 65 million today, with a positive population growth (+0.5 percent).1
Th ere are 26.6 million households in the country. Households comprising two people are the most numerous 
(36 percent), followed by households with four or more members (26 percent). One- and three-member 
households constitute 18 percent each.
French citizenship is held by 94 percent of people living in France (however, the law forbids inquiry into 
ethnic origins: see section 4.3.2). Th e remaining 6 percent of the population consists of immigrants, of which 
the largest group (2.4 percent) comes from other European countries. Immigration from the Maghreb region 
of North Africa, which has a long tradition, constitutes only 1.7 percent of the population. However, this 
number may be lower than the number of French citizens with Maghreb origins or dual nationality. 
Most of the population lives in urban areas (78 percent), with the Paris metropolitan area being among the 
largest in Europe (more than 10 million inhabitants). Most people declare themselves as Catholic, with Islam 
being the second largest religion. Almost a third of French people are atheists.
Th e French economic situation worsened during 2012 after a slight improvement in 2011, which was the 
best year economically speaking since the start of the economic crisis in 2008. Unemployment grew from 
7.5 percent in 2008 (ﬁ rst quarter) to 9.9 percent in the second quarter of 2012.2 Out of a workforce of 28 
million, 2.8 million people had no work in August 2012.3
1. See http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=fr&v=24 (accessed 26 October 2012).
2. National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (L’Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, INSEE), “Nouvelle hausse 
du chômage au troisième trimestre 2012” (New growth in unemployment in the third quarter of 2012), at http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/
info-rapide.asp?id=14&date=20121206 (accessed 14 January 2013).
3. INSEE, “Active population,” at http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/document.asp?ref_id=T12F041 (accessed 14 January 2013).
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Social Indicators
Population (number of inhabitants): 65.4 million (2012)4
Number of households: 26.6 million5
Figure 1. 
Rural–urban breakdown (% of total population), 2007
Source: National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (L’Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, INSEE), 2007
Figure 2.
Ethnic composition (% of total population), 2009
Note: Th e ﬁ gures refer to national composition by nationalities according to the methodology used by INSEE to count the popula-
tion; “French by naturalization” includes all people who obtained their citizenship in any other way than by being born from 
at least one parent with French nationality; “Other nationalities” includes immigrants from all parts of the world other than 
Europe and the Maghreb
Source: INSEE, 2009  
French by naturalization, 4.4
Other nationalities, 1.8
French, 89.7
Immigrants from European countries, 2.4
Immigrants from Maghreb countries, 1.7
Urban, 78
Rural, 22
4. INSEE.
5. INSEE.
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Figure 3.
Religious composition (% of total population), 2012
Source: CSA Research, 2012, at www.csa.eu
Catholic, 58
Jewish, 1
Atheist, 31
Muslim, 6 Other, 2
Protestant, 2
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Economic Indicators
Table 1.
Economic indicators
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012o
GDP (current prices, 
US$ billion)
2,137.9 2,259.5 2,586.7 2,842.5 2,631.9 2,562.7 2,776.3 2,712.0
GDP (current prices, US$), 
per head
34,944 36,682 41,745 45,623 42,018 40,808 44,008 42,793
Gross National Income (GNI), 
(current US$), per head
29,910 31,880 33,600 34,640 34,170 34,770 35,650 n/a
Unemployment 
(% of total labor force)
9.2 9.2 8.3 7.8 9.5 9.8 9.6 9.9
Inﬂ ation (average annual rate, 
% against previous year)
1.9 1.9 1.6 3.1 0.1 1.7 2.2 1.9
Notes: o: outlook; n/a: not available
Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF) (GDP, unemployment, and inﬂ ation ﬁ gures); World Bank (GNI)
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1. Media Consumption: 
 The Digital Factor
1.1 Digital Take-up
1.1.1 Digital Equipment
Between 2005 and 2010, the proportion of French households with a television set was stable at around 97 
percent. Th e share of those households with a personal computer (PC) at home grew from 54 in 2005 to 69 
percent in 2009, with growth slowing somewhat in 2010.
Table 2.
Households owning equipment, 2005–2010
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
No. of 
HH 
(’000)
% of 
THH
No. of 
HH
(’000)
% of 
THH
No. of 
HH
(’000)
% of 
THH
No. of 
HH
(’000)
% of 
THH
No. of 
HH
(’000)
% of 
THH
No. of 
HH
(’000)
% of 
THH
TV set 24,490 96.8 24,541 97.0 26,270 97.2 26,725 97.1 26,992 97.4 27,100 97.8
PC 13,604 54.0 14,168 56.0 15,925 62.0 17,550 68.0 19,121 69.0 19,315 69.7
Notes: HH: Total number of households owning the equipment; THH: Percentage of total number of households in the coun-
try. Data on radio sets are not collected by INSEE (as the rate of radio ownership by households is close to 100 percent)
Sources: INSEE6 
According to a GfK France report,7 2011 saw a decrease in the total turnover generated by technological 
goods from €17.6 billion (US$22.9 billion) in 2010 to €16.8 billion (US$21.9 billion). One exception was 
the television set category (especially light-emitting diode (LED)-based sets), which grew from €8.5 million 
(US$11.1 million) to €8.7 million (US$11.4 million). Digital switch-over is primarily responsible for this 
growth.
6. See http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.asp?reg_id=0&ref_id=NATnon05140 (accessed 26 October 2012).
7. GfK, “Bilan GfK des ventes de biens technologiques: 2011, les marchés sont sous tension!” (Summary of GfK technology sales: 2011, markets 
under pressure!), at http://www.gfkrt.com/imperia/md/content/rt-france/cp_gfk_bilan_2011_et_perspetives_2012_march__s_biens_tech-
nologiques_france.pdf (accessed 25 October 2012).
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Other exceptions were laptops, tablets, and smartphones. Sales of laptops and tablets reached the levels 
of television sets with almost 8 million units. Th e market for mobile phones is outperforming any other 
technological equipment, with 23.6 million units sold in 2011 (including 11.4 million smartphones). It 
was expected that technology sales would be dominated in 2012 by 3D television sets, while sales of mobile 
phones would continue to surge, thanks also to strong competition among mobile operators.
1.1.2 Platforms
Th e digital transition of analog television started in March 2005, and was completed by 30 November 2011 
across the whole territory.8 In 2012, 97.3 percent of the country was covered by digital terrestrial signals, 
transmitted by 1,627 broadcasters.
A National Audiovisual Council (Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel, CSA) survey of home equipment in 2010 
showed that 92 percent of households received digital television and 69 percent of households were fully 
digitized, meaning they no longer owned an analog television set.9
Table 3. 
Platforms for the main TV reception and digital take-up, 2005–2010
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
No. of 
HH 
(’000) 
% of 
TVHH
No. of 
HH 
(’000) 
% of 
TVHH
No. of 
HH 
(’000) 
% of 
TVHH
No. of 
HH 
(’000) 
% of 
TVHH
No. of 
HH 
(’000) 
% of 
TVHH
No. of 
HH 
(’000) 
% of 
TVHH
Terrestrial reception 16,943 69.2 16,777 67.4 16,554 65.9 16,842 66.0 17,831 67.0 17,858 66.9
– of which digital 669 2.7 2,331 9.3 5,524 21.9 9,134 35.8 13,219 49.7 15,663 58.6
Cable reception 3,897 15.9 3,959 15.9 4,001 15.9 3,478 13.6 3,080 11.6 2,904 10.9
– of which digital 1,139 4.6 1,226 4.9 1,445 5.7 1,557 6.1 1,702 6.4 1,737 6.5
Satellite reception 6,416 26.2 6,513 26.2 6,581 26.2 6,645 26.0 6,808 25.6 6,876 25.7
– of which digital n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
IPTV 611 2.5 1,402 5.6 2,657 10.6 3,686 14.4 4,944 18.6 6,378 23.9
Total 24,497 100.0 24,879 100.0 25,129 100.0 25,515 100.0 26,612 100.0 26,706 100.0
– of which digital 5,367 21.9 6,277 25.2 7,506 29.8 16,193 63.5 21,357 80.3 24,386 91.3
Notes: HH: total number of households owning the equipment; TVHH: Total number of TV households in the country; 
n/a: not available
Source: Mediamétrie/Eurodata TV Worldwide, 2005–2010
8. National Audiovisual Council (Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel, CSA), “Recevoir la télévision” (Receiving television), at http://www.csa.fr/
Television/La-reception/Recevoir-la-television (accessed 20 October 2012).
9. See http://www.csa.fr/upload/communique/synthese_consultation_percent20ressource.pdf (accessed 15 July 2011; link no longer available).
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Internet and mobile telephony have grown steadily since 2005. In 2009, more than 30 percent of households 
had internet access, with more than 30 percent of those connections being broadband (growing to 33.6 
percent in early 2011).10 Access to mobile telephony is even higher: almost all households (95 percent) have 
a mobile service, with many of them being 3G and soon 4G. 
Table 4. 
Internet penetration (total internet subscriptions as % of total number of households) 
and mobile penetration (total active SIM cards as % of total population), 2005–2011
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Internet 21.6 24.8 27.9 30.3 32.6 35.0 37.0
 – of which broadband 71.7 83.4 91.3 94.7 96.6 97.1 97.2
Mobile telephony 79 84 90 93 93 92 95
 – of which 3G 2.6 8.0 15.3 25.2 n/a n/a n/a
Note: n/a: not available
Source: International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
In February 2011, the number of internet users in France stood at 38.2 million (71.4 percent of the population 
over 11 years old), according to Médiamétrie. Th is represented a growth of 22 million internet users between 
2001 and 2011, during which time the percentage of women online increased signiﬁ cantly. In 2010, 49 
percent of women used the internet, up from only 24 percent in 2001. People over 65 years of age have used 
the internet increasingly in the past decade, and workers are also more active (70 percent of them used the 
internet in 2010, up from 15 percent in 2001). According to TNS Sofres, 96 percent of children (8–17 years 
old) used the internet in 2010.11
Table 5.
Number of internet users, 2005–2010
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Number of internet users (’000) 27,210 29,961 31,243 33,560 34,738 38,266
Percentage of population 52.5 57.4 59.4 63.5 65.0 71.4
Change (year on year, %) 14.0 9.0 4.0 7.0 4.0 10.0
Source: Médiamétrie, “L’observatoire des usages Internet” (Study of internet usage), December 2005–December 2010
According to a 2010 CRÉDOC report, three factors signiﬁ cantly inﬂ uence internet usage: age, education, 
and income.12 Only 24 percent of those in the oldest age group (70+) used the internet that year (up from 18 
percent in 2009), compared with some 58 percent of those aged 50–70 (no change from 2009).
10. See http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/facts/2011/material/ICTFactsFigures2011.pdf (accessed 30 January 2013).
11. TNS Sofres, “L’usage des réseaux sociaux chez les 8–17 ans” (Usage of social networks by 8–17-year-olds), June 2010.
12. Research Centre for the Study and Monitoring of Living Standards (Centre de Recherche pour l’Étude et l’Observation des Conditions de Vie, 
CRÉDOC), “Conditions de vie et aspirations des Français” (Life conditions and aspirations of the French), 2009 (hereafter CRÉDOC, “Condi-
tions de vie”); “La diﬀ usion des technologies de l’information et de la communication dans la société française” (Spread of information and 
communication technologies in French society), 2010 (hereafter CRÉDOC, “La diﬀ usion des technologies”). Available at http://www.cgeiet.
economie.gouv.fr/Rapports (accessed 12 December 2012).
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Th ose with the least formal education (having not ﬁ nished high school) also used the internet notably less (50 
percent in 2009 and 52 percent in 2010—up 33 percentage points since 2002) than those with a high-school 
or tertiary education (84 percent in 2009 and 91 percent in 2010), according to the same report.
In 2009, the French most often connected to the internet from home (67 percent, up 27 percentage points 
from 2005), work (32 percent), and from public places (13 percent).13 Th ere has been a steady growth of 
respondents who use the internet daily (71 percent in 2009 and 75 percent in 2010).14 Th ose numbers are 
even higher for internet users only: in 2012, 32 percent said they were permanently online and 55 percent 
said they were online a few times a day.15
Most people who use the internet search for information (97 percent), buy goods/services or perform online 
bank transactions (57 percent), visit social networks (45 percent), and watch movies (38 percent). Roughly 
32 percent of the population have never used the internet or have stopped doing so. Th e main reasons cited 
were the lack of computer access, diﬃ  culty of use, or lack of ﬁ nancial means. We also ﬁ nd more personal 
reasons: too much time spent on surﬁ ng and the fear of being spied on. However, most who stopped using 
the internet (66 percent) intended to reconnect.16
1 .2 Media Preferences 
 1.2.1 Main Shifts in Media Consumption
Despite the changes in media consumption patterns, television remains the main source of political 
information (63 percent) and in 2012 may have even reinforced its primary position.17 Television is followed 
by radio (15 percent) and the internet (12 percent). Among internet users, television remains a main source 
for 55 percent of users, followed by the internet (20 percent) and radio (14 percent).18
According to research by NPA Conseil, French people aged 15–24 watch less television than before. Th eir 
ﬁ rst choice is one of the digital channels (especially TMC, W9, NRJ12, Virgin 17, and France 4). Between 
2008 and 2009, the new digital channels gained a combined 5 percent of the audience and their average daily 
watching time rose from 13 minutes to 18 minutes. In contrast, over the same period, traditional (former 
analog) channels lost a combined 12 minutes from 87 minutes to 75 minutes.19 
13. Numbers do not add up to 100 percent as it was possible to indicate more than one answer.
14. CRÉDOC, “Conditions de vie”; “La diﬀ usion des technologies.”
15. Mediapolis study 2009–2012, ANR project, Center for Political Research at Sciences-Po (CEVIPOF).
16. Mediapolis study 2009–2012, ANR project, Center for Political Research at Sciences-Po (CEVIPOF). 
17. Center for Political Research at Sciences-Po (CEVIPOF), Post-electoral survey, June 2012.
18. Mediapolis study 2009–2012 ANR project, Center for Political Research at Sciences-Po (CEVIPOF).
19. Rapid TV News, “Young French watching less TV, but more DTT,” at http://www.rapidtvnews.com/index.php/200909174750/young-french-
watching-less-tv-but-more-dtt.html (accessed 15 July 2012).
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Figure 4.
Main source of political information (% of total respondents), 2006, 2007, 2009, and 2012
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Note: Method: Computer Assisted Telephone Interview 
Source: CEVIPOF, Trust barometer, 2006, 2007; CEVIPOF, Electoral panel, 2007; Mediapolis, 2009; CEVIPOF, Post-electoral 
survey, 2012, at www.cevipof.com
Media consumption on the internet and television has grown during the past ﬁ ve years, while the importance 
of newspapers and radio has declined. Average television consumption grew by six minutes a day between 
2005 and 2010 (but not among young people: see above), and by an additional 15 minutes (for those 
over four years of age) in 2011. Th e completion of analog television digitization and the growth of digital 
terrestrial channels on oﬀ er, as well as the growth in households with high-deﬁ nition (HD) television sets 
(three-quarters of the population),20 were inﬂ uential factors. Among the new digital terrestrial channels, 
six now have more than 2 million regular viewers. Most of these channels show music and entertainment, 
catering in particular to younger viewers.
Th e radio lost 2 percentage points of its audience between 2005 and 2010, but it has slowly recovered since 
then. In 2011, listening among audiences over 13 years old was split between “listening in the car” (75 
percent), “listening at home” (74 percent), and “listening at work” (18 percent).21 In 2010, 13 percent of 
respondents listened via the internet (through a PC or mobile phone). Radio listeners tend to be young and 
better educated; they consume more new technologies and particularly appreciate cultural activities.22
20. Médiamétrie, “L’année TV 2011” (Television Year 2011), February 2012.
21. Médiamétrie, “Panel radio 2010–2011,” Report from 28 April 2011.
22. AFP, “La radio trouve un nouveau souﬄ  e sur internet” (Radio ﬁ nds a new life on the internet), at http://www.24heures.ch/radio-trouve-nou-
veau-souﬄ  e-internet-2011-01-21 (accessed 9 July 2011).
1 9O P E N  S O C I E T Y  M E D I A  P R O G R A M     2 0 1 3
Table 6.
Media consumption: national dailies, viewing time, and radio listenership, 2005–2012
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Circulation of national dailies (in ’000)*(1) 7,022 7,071 7,114 6,940 6,434 5,970 n/a n/a
Daily time spent on TV per individual(2) 3h26 3h24 3h27 3h24 3h25 3h32 3h47 3h48**
Percentage of people listening 
to the radio (daily on weekdays)(3)
83.6 82.8 83.6 82.3 81 81.8 82.4† 82.1†
Notes: * paid and unpaid press; ** for January–June 2012; † for January–March 2011 and January–March 2012; n/a: not 
available
Sources: (1) Ministry of Culture and Communication (Ministère de la culture et de la communication), “Chiﬀ res et statistiques” 
(Numbers and statistics), at http://www.ddm.gouv.fr/chiﬀ res.php3?id_mot=22 (accessed 2 October 2012); for 2010 
Report, Presse écrite Séries longues, 1985–2010, Direction générale des médias et des industries culturelles. (Re-
port Press. Longitudinal data 1985–2010. General directorate for media and culture industry), at http://www.dgmic.
culture.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/TSP_2010_1.pdf (accessed 10 October 2012).
 (2) Médiamétrie, Mediamat Annuel 2009–2011, TV viewers aged 4 and over
 (3) Médiamétrie, Xerfi700 report 2011, year average
1.2.2 Availability of a Diverse Range of News Platforms
Clearly the introduction of free internet news as well as the possibility to search for news globally (via 
international search engines, international press, etc.) has changed the availability of news. Th e last ﬁ ve years 
have brought a change among information providers and commentators, as new information portals have 
emerged. Th e most popular among such websites in France are Mediapart, Rue89, Bakchich, Slate, and Th e 
Huﬃ  ngton Post (the French version launched in January 2012). Th ey provide general information, mostly 
similar to that occurring in oﬄ  ine and online editions of traditional media, but they also try to establish their 
own independent editorials as well as comment on political, social, and economic issues. (See section 4.) 
However, the traditional media (television, radio, and press) also provide online platforms with constantly 
updated information, and links to video material or other websites. Th e internet makes it possible to link 
with sources of information and documents. As can be expected in a developed democracy, news provision 
is quite similar among most of the media; what diﬀ erentiates them is how they frame their information, 
meaning the way it is presented or commented on.
1.3 News Providers
1.3.1 Leading Sources of News
1.3.1.1 Print Media
Th e printed press declined by 5.7 percent between 2005 and 2009. However, this decline was smaller than 
in comparable markets (the UK 15.9 percent, United States 13.3 percent, and Germany 8.3 percent).23 Like 
23. See http://www.economist.com/node/18904136 (accessed 23 January 2013).
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other Europeans, the French still avow quite a strong attachment to print media as a source of information, 
with 57 percent declaring in 2012 that they used print media for this purpose, in line with the British (54 
percent) and Danish (57 percent) proportions, all of which are behind the Germans (68 percent) and ahead 
of the Americans (45 percent).24
A 2010 report by the Ministry of Culture and Communication (Ministère de la culture et de la communi-
cation) listed more than 4,500 titles published in France that year.25 Th ey included 88 national and 451 
regional dailies and magazines dedicated to general news and political issues. Th e most read were Le Monde 
(somewhat center-left) and Le Figaro (somewhat center-right); opinion-papers such as La Croix (center-
Catholic) and business newspapers Les Echos and La Tribune (which has been online only since January 
2012); and magazines with socio-political content (Le Nouvel Observateur or L’Express). Due to rather strong 
regional divisions in France, local newspapers and magazines enjoy popularity in particular areas, for example 
Ouest-France (the most read newspaper in France: see Table 7). Th e French market is missing a true tabloid 
daily, a gap covered to a certain extent by celebrity-oriented weeklies such as People, Voici, Closer, and Gala.
All print media outlets have lost readers since 2005, with the exception of the free dailies 20 minutes, Direct 
Matin (over 1 million copies distributed in 2011), and Metro (with over 755,000 distributed copies in 2011), 
which are gaining readers and advertising market shares (see section 6). Th e other print papers, being among 
the most read and representing the hard news press, restored their sales somewhat in 2011 after heavy losses 
in 2009.
Th e loss of readers and advertising revenues has had serious ﬁ nancial repercussions in the industry (see section 
6). Introducing changes such as moving to local printers, cutting editorial budgets, and downsizing staﬀ  (e.g. 
Les Echos ﬁ red 25 journalists in 2009)—and technical changes, such as opting for cheaper news providers 
(e.g. La Provence switching Agence France Presse (AFP) for Reuters) and printing formats—did not improve 
ﬁ nances enough or change the provision of news.26 
Th e introduction of the internet forced, however, most traditional print news providers to create online 
platforms with nonstop updated news, blogs written by their journalists/commentators, as well as mechanisms 
to better interact with their readers (comments and forums). Th ese platforms provide both free and paid 
content (for exclusive stories). Other strategies implemented by the editors include a concentration on 
regional and local angles and the provision of more exclusives.
24. Newman (ed.), “Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2012: Tracking the Future of News,” Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 
University of Oxford, at http://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/ﬁ leadmin/documents/Publications/Other_publications/Reuters_Institute_
Digital_Report.pdf (accessed 14 January 2013) (hereafter Newman, “Reuters Digital News Report 2012”).
25. Ministry of Culture and Communication, “Presse écrite Séries longues 1985–2010 Chiﬀ res déﬁ nitifs” (Summary for the print press 1985–
2010), at http://www.dgmic.culture.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/TSP_2010_1.pdf (accessed 10 October 2012).
26. Xerﬁ 700, Presse quotidienne nationale et régionale (National and regional newspapers report), July 2010.
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Table 7.
Distribution of the press (dailies, weeklies, and regional), number of sold copies, 2005–2011
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Dailies
20 minutes 695,998 740,101 716,648 788,653 709,518 769,503 977,354
Le Parisien/AEF 499,957 510,255 526,719 515,809 499,269 470,583 n/a
Le Figaro 337,118 332,818 338,618 330,382 323,991 325,393 329,367
Le Monde 360,610 350,039 354,316 336,101 318,805 314,627 321,251
Les Echos 118,722 119,178 121,630 123,564 123,860 118,017 121,729
Libération 142,557 133,270 137,831 128,331 115,634 116,717 123,114
Weeklies
Nouvel Observateur 536,397 537,502 535,604 536,162 525,547 524,239 525,040
L’Express 538,617 538,798 559,892 558,896 538,215 527,109 522,461
Le Point 394.027 406,241 441,213 440,002 431,838 426,900 427,396
Ouest-France (regional) 760,389 761,088 769,167 772,115 762,233 757,128 748,213
La Provence (regional) 156,342 153,257 147,928 145,282 142,063 137,233 129,874
La Voix du Nord (regional) 293,004 288,286 285,436 281,974 274,111 265,280 259,912
Note: n/a: not available
Source: Association pour le Contrôle de la Diﬀ usion des Médias27
1.3.1.2 Radio
In France, radio services can be divided into three groups: national, regional, and local independent. 
National and regional stations belong to public operators (Radio France) or the numerous private companies. 
Generalist stations (airing information and music) increased their audience share by 5 percentage points from 
2004 to 2010, while strictly music stations lost a similar percentage. RTL—an entertainment-focussed radio 
station—maintained a dominant share of listenership throughout the period (12.7 percent in 2010 and 11.9 
percent in 2011). Th e largest news and information station, France Inter, gained an audience share over that 
period of almost 10 percent, as well as an increase in the length of time listeners spent tuned in to the station.
Since 2011, a growing number of people have been listening to radio via podcasts. Th ese listeners average 
15.5 downloads a month (and listen to 78 percent of them). Most listen to the podcasts at home (68 percent) 
and via computer (62 percent), followed by those on the go (21 percent) and those listening via mobile 
phones (22 percent).28 
27. See http://www.ojd.com/adherent/3036 (accessed 26 October 2012).
28. Médiamétrie, “Étude sur l’écoute des podcasts” (Study on listening to podcasts), 2012; numbers do not add up to 100 percent as it was possible 
to indicate more than one answer.
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Table 8.
Audience share (%) and average number of hours of radio listenership, 2005–2012
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012*
hrs/
mins
Share hrs/
mins
Share hrs/
mins
Share hrs/
mins
Share hrs/
mins
Share hs/
mins
Share hs/
mins
Share hrs/
mins
Share 
Generalist 
stations
1h30 38.2 1h35 39.4 2h39 40.3 2h40 42.3 2h36 42.7 2h39 42.8 2h32 42.6 2h36 41.7
Europe1 2h07 8.0 2h01 7.5 2h04 7.5 2h05 8.4 2h03 8.6 2h 7.4 1h54 7.6 1h57 7.2
France Bleu 1h59 5.4 2h 5.4 2h06 5.5 2h07 5.8 2h06 6.3 2h08 6.7 2h04 6.2 2h08 6.3
France Inter 2h06 8.8 2h07 8.8 2h11 8.7 2h07 9.1 2h16 9.6 2h17 9.6 2h10 10 2h17 10.4
RMC 1h52 3.7 2h05 4.3 1h58 4.9 2h08 5.3 1h51 5.3 2h01 5.9 1h58 6.6 2h04 6
RTL 2h20 11.5 2h28 12.7 2h32 13.1 2h33 13 2h20 12.4 2h18 12.7 2h22 11.9 2h22 11.5
Music 
stations
n/a n/a 2h 36.9 2h 35.3 1h58 33.3 1h55 33.5 1h52 32.0 1h46 30.9 1h53 31.8
Thematic 
stations 
1h21 7.4 1h20 7.1 1h24 7.8 1h29 8 1h23 7.9 1h31 8.4 1h27 8.8 1h31 9
Local 
stations
n/a n/a 1h47 13.9 1h44 13.3 1h50 13.7 1h39 13.1 1h46 14.4 1h45 14.5 1h48 14.7
Notes: * For 2012 data from January–March; n/a: not available
Source: Médiamétrie, “L’audience de la radio en novembre–décembre 2005–2011, janvier–mars 2012” (Radio audience 
November–December 2005 to 2011, January–March 2012)
1.3.1.3 Online
At the end of 2012, the 30 most visited websites in France included three search engines but also news 
aggregators: Google (in ﬁ rst place with 16.9 million single users per day), Orange (in sixth place, with 5.7 
million single users per day), and Yahoo! (in 11th place, with 3.1 million single users per day). Th e online 
editions of traditional news providers also feature in the list: TF1 (private television channel, in 25th place, 
with 0.99 million single users per day), LeFigaro (in 27th place, with 0.91 million single users per day), and 
France Télévisions (aggregating all its channels, in 30th place, with 0.76 million single users per day).29 
Online news provision has gone through four main phases of development:30
 strong development (1996–2000 until the end of the internet bubble);
 breakdown of the market (2000–2002) and stagnation (2003–2005);
 slow recovery (2006–2008);
 uncertainty (2009 strong breakdown and 2010 recovery) with encouraging signs for the future.
29. Médiamétrie, “L’audience de la radio” (Radio audience), December 2012.
30. Ministry of Culture and Communication, “Presse en ligne @2010” (Online press at 2010), at http://www.dgmic.culture.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/
Enquete_SPEL_2010_-_premiers_resultats.pdf (accessed 31 October 2012) (hereafter Ministry of Culture and Communication, “Presse en 
ligne@2010”).
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Online news provision in France is dominated by the online versions of traditional media—among the top 
50 sites visited, they represented some 24 percent in mid-2012. Th e most popular news aggregator in France 
is Orange.fr (with 21.1 million unique visitors, the ﬁ fth most visited website in June 2012).31 However, as 
it is also the largest provider of internet and television in France, it is impossible to establish the number 
of visitors on Orange.fr searching for general news and those searching for other information and services. 
Th e same is true for Google.fr (which in June 2012 had some 38.4 million unique visitors and was the most 
visited page) or Yahoo! (with 16.4 million unique visitors in June 2012, the eighth most popular site), as it is 
not possible to distinguish news provision users from search engine users.
A signiﬁ cant trend is the constant or growing popularity of some media online: they include online pages of 
television channels such as France Télévisions and TF1 and dailies’ websites such as LeFigaro.fr and LeMonde.
fr. Th is shows the shift of audiences from traditional channels of reception to new ones that oﬀ er catch-up 
television and constantly updated news.
Table 9.
Traditional media website usage, single visits per month (’000), 2005 and 2007–2012
2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011* 2012**
Rank No. of 
visits
Rank No. of 
visits
Rank No. of 
visits
Rank No. of 
visits
Rank No. of 
visits
Rank No. of 
visits
Rank No. of 
visits
France 
Télévisions
22 2,505 22 4,430 23 6,973 23 7,434 22 8,595 17 8,326 15 10,445
Le Monde n/a n/a 27 2,982 41 3,878 35 5,347 39 5,123 26 6,874 20 9,012
Le Figaro 38 848 35 2,480 26 5,732 33 5,364 27 7,103 22 7,577 19 9,310
20 minutes n/a n/a 41 2,186 49 3,100 44 3,699 44 4,890 30 6,066 24 8,447
Skyrock 13 3,950 12 6,841 15 8,632 24 7,357 34 6,005 38 5,199 36 5,988
TF1 14 3,917 n/a n/a 10 10,094 15 10,452 14 11,867 11 11,378 14 10,825
Canal+ n/a n/a 31 2,816 27 5,579 32 5,817 37 5,423 34 5,441 39 5,362
M6 16 3,305 n/a n/a 37 4,308 47 3,387 48 4, 401 45 3,902 45 4,223
Le Nouvel 
Observateur 
29 1,262 n/a n/a 48 3,146 42 4,164 50 4,103 29 6,146 30 7,557
L’Express n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 43 3,823 38 5,260 37 5,303 28 7,704
Liberation 36 941 n/a n/a n/a n/a 45 3,649 n/a n/a 49 3,740 50 4,006
Le Parisien n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 42 5,059 32 5,637 22 8,566
Notes: * For October 2011; ** for June 2012; n/a: not available
Source: Médiamétrie, “L’audience de l’Internet en France, le top 50 des sites supports de publicité” (Internet audience in France; 
the top 50 commercial websites), December 2005–2010, October 2011, June 2012 (2006 not available)
31. Médiamétrie, “L’audience de l’Internet en France, le top 50 des sites supports de publicité” (Internet audience in France; the top 50 commercial 
websites), June 2012.
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1.3.1.4 Television
In France during the past ﬁ ve years a signiﬁ cant change in television channel preferences has occurred. 
Traditional terrestrial channels (those present before the introduction of digital television) steadily lost 
audience share. Canal+ maintained a stable subscription rate and gained new subscribers in the ﬁ rst half of 
2012. It commands around 3 percent of the total audience. Th e most dramatic audience losses were suﬀ ered 
by the two largest television channels—the private TF1 and the public France 2. Audience preferences have 
turned to the new general digital televisions (general or thematic) whose combined market share grew to 23.1 
percent in 2010, up 17 percentage points since 2007. However, the most popular new digital channels are in 
the hands of the largest traditional private channels: TMC, for example, is owned by TF1, and W9 by M6.
Table 10.
Annual average audience for TV channels (%), 2005–2012
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012*
TF1 32.3 31.6 30.7 27.2 26.1 24.5 23.7 22.7
France 2 19.8 19.2 18.1 17.5 16.7 16.1 14.9 14.9
France 3 14.7 14.7 14.1 13.3 11.8 10.7 9.7 9.7
Canal+ 3.6 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.1 3.1 3.1 2.9
M6 12.6 12.5 11.5 11.0 10.8 10.4 10.8 11.2
France 5 6.9 6.8 6.5 5.5 5.1 4.7 3.3 3.5
Arte 3.4 3.1 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.1 1.5 1.8
Other TV 12.1 13.8 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Free-to-air digital televisions, in detail: n/a n/a 5.9 11.1 15.2 19.7 23.1 n/a
Direct 8 n/a n/a 0.2 0.7 1.4 2.0 2.3 2.3
W9 n/a n/a 0.9 1.8 2.5 3.0 3.4 3.2
TMC n/a n/a 1.2 2.1 2.6 3.3 3.5 3.6
NT1 n/a n/a 0.6 1.0 1.4 1.6 1.9 2.1
NRJ12 n/a n/a 0.4 1.0 1.5 1.9 2.3 2.4
France 4 n/a n/a 0.4 0.9 1.1 1.6 2 2.1
BFM TV (24h news) n/a n/a 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.4 1.8
i>Télé (24h news) n/a n/a 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.8
Virgin17 n/a n/a 0.4 0.5 0.7 1.0 n/a n/a
Gulli n/a n/a 0.8 1.5 1.8 2.2 2.1 1.9
Other (local, thematic) n/a n/a 11.6 12.6 12.7 12.2 11.7 n/a
Notes: * For 2012 the average from January–June 2012; n/a: not available
 Th e category of “Other TV” also includes digital TV stations in 2005 and 2006
Source: Médiamétrie, L’Année TV (Th e TV Year) 2005 to 2011, at http://www.mediametrie.fr (accessed 12 January 2013). Meth-
odology: share of the national audience counted during one day of study (randomly chosen during a week, here showing 
the yearly aggregate). Survey of panel audience of more than 10,000 respondents aged four and over.
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Th e new digital channels are not very active in news and information, with the exception of the all-news 
channels, which for a long time struggled to reach more than 1 percent of the television audience. BFMTV, 
the most popular all-news channel, reached 1.8 percent of the audience in 2012. Television remains the most 
important source of political information in French society for 84 percent of respondents,32 with traditional 
(analog-era) channels still the most powerful, albeit declining (see section 1.3.2).
Catch-up television is of growing importance. In November 2011, 70 percent of internet users in France 
watched videos online: among those watched, 29 percent were websites belonging to television channels and 
the mean time spent watching videos online was 3 hours 25 minutes.33 Th ere is also a growth among the users 
of Video on Demand services (VoD): in November 2011, 21 percent of internet users watched videos via this 
service, with the most popular formats being television drama series and ﬁ lms.34
1. 3.2 Television News Programs
Th e most popular television newscasts remain the evening news. However, those aired by historically analog 
channels (TF1 with 6.3 million viewers and France 2 with 4.8 million viewers in September 2012)35 have 
suﬀ ered a serious decline in their audiences since 2007. In contrast, two emerging channels have achieved 
signiﬁ cant increases in their audience numbers. Th e M6 newscast (also an historical analog channel),36 a 
15-minute bulletin in the evening, has completely revamped its image since 2010 and become a serious 
competition to other newscasts. Th eir slogan is “Learn, understand and surprise.”37 It attracts an average 
audience of 3 million each evening. Th e second emerging player—due to digitization—on the news market 
is the 24-hour news channel BFMTV,38 with a program concept resembling international formats used by 
BBC News, CNN, etc. It concentrates mostly on general news with a political and economic focus, and 
rolling updates.
In 2012, 32 percent of those who responded declared that they watched substantially fewer television news 
programs than they used to.39
32. CEVIPOF, Post-electoral survey, 2012.
33. Médiamétrie, “Mediamat Annuel 2011, Audience consolidée” (Yearbook 2011, Consolidated audience), 9 January 2012, at http://www.
mediametrie.fr (accessed 12 January 2013).
34. Médiamétrie, “Video 360,” Report, 10 January 2012.
35. J. Lalande, “Audiences: bonne rentrée pour le 20h de TF1 présenté par Gilles Bouleau” (Audience: good return for the 20h journal at TF1, 
presented by Gilles Bouleau), Pure Médias, at http://www.ozap.com/actu/audiences-bonne-rentree-pour-le-20h-de-tf1-presente-par-gilles-bou-
leau/443124 (accessed 31 October 2012). 
36. M6, the third most popular French television channel by audience, belonging to the media group M6. It airs family programs, mostly series, 
ﬁ ction, and reality shows. Lately, it has specialized in Do-It-Yourself (DIY) shows.
37. Le Figaro, “Le 19.45 de M6 dans la cour des grands” (Journal 19.45 of M6 chasing the big players), at http://tvmag.leﬁ garo.fr/programme-tv/
article/people/65239/le-1945-de-m6-dans-la-cour-des-grands.html (accessed 4 October 2012).
38. BFMTV is a part of the media consortium Nextradio.fr, together with BFM Radio and RMC radio.
39. Harris Interactive, “Les Français s’expriment sur le journal télévisé de 20h” (Opinions of the French on the 20h TV news), at http://www.
harrisinteractive.fr/news/2012/CP_HIFR_Telestar_10022012.pdf (accessed 3 February 2013) (hereafter Harris Interactive, “Les Français 
s’expriment”).
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Table 11.
Main TV newscasts (%), 2009 and 2012
Channel Time (p.m.) December 2009 April 2012
TF1 8.00 32.1 23
TF1 1.00 9.5 9
France 2 8.00 20.8 18
France 2 1.00 4.3 4
France 3 7.00 6.4 4
M6 7.45 6.6 18
Canal+ 8.00 3.9 4
BFMTV Repeated 3.5 12
i>Télé Repeated 2.1 2
Note: Oﬃ  cial audience measurements for news programs are not publicly available in France
Source: Mediapolis study 2009–2012, ANR project, CEVIPOF Sciences-Po
1.3.3 Impact of Digital Media on Good-quality News
New digital media outlets, particularly newly licensed television channels, are not concentrating on providing 
news, with the exception of the new all-news channels whose audience is not, however, comparable with 
entertainment-focussed or generalist channels. Some newly licensed digital channels do not even air news. 
Private channels air signiﬁ cantly less news and information programming (21 hours per week on average) 
compared with public channels (46 hours—see section 2). 
Although there is no perceptible change in the quality of news provided by media, digitization—and 
especially the introduction of the internet—oﬀ ered more opportunity for news consumers to gain access to 
source material. Links to amateur videos (ﬁ lmed during an unexpected event) or to original documents are 
widely available and accessible. Th e internet has also become an important source of information about the 
most recent news (for 69 percent of the French audience), just ahead of radio (68 percent) and comfortably 
ahead of television on 48 percent. However, French people are not satisﬁ ed with the quality of their television 
news: 72 percent of respondents claim that news and journalists are not independent from political inﬂ uence, 
that they do not explain events properly (62 percent), that they are not educational enough (56 percent), and 
that they are boring (45 percent).40 In September 2011, trust in political information content was highest for 
the internet (33 percent), followed by the press (29 percent), radio (21 percent), and television (15 percent).41 
40. Harris Interactive, “Les Français s’expriment.”
41. Harris Interactive, “Les Français s’expriment sur l’indépendance des journalistes de télévision à l’égard des politiques” (Opinions of the French 
on the independence of TV journalists regarding politics), at http://www.harrisinteractive.fr/news/2011/07102011c.asp (accessed 3 February 
2013).
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Online news provision also encourages and allows for more interactivity with the audience. However, French 
society does not seem to be very active in writing comments and participating in forums and chats. According 
to the French Institute of Public Opinion (Institut français d’opinion publique, IFOP), only 7 percent of all 
internet users participated in online political discussions during the 2007 presidential elections, dropping 
to 3 percent in the oﬀ -campaign period in 2009. During the 2012 elections, 64 percent of French declared 
they had a Facebook proﬁ le and 13 percent had a Twitter account, but only around one-third of those with 
Facebook and Twitter accounts were commenting on political events on social networks.42 Other studies show 
a growing interest in commenting on more general news stories, not necessary political ones, as 21 percent 
comment on the news on social networks, 11 percent upload photographs, and 15 percent engage in one-to-
one conversations about the news.43 Th ere are some news websites that allow for more engaged interactions 
with the audience; besides comments and chats they may also provide information (e.g. Agoravox.fr), where 
the role of journalists is limited mostly to validating the content provided by internet users.44
1.4 Assessments 
Th e internet has broadened access to real-time news, but there are few independent information providers, 
as the most accessed online news services belong to the traditional media. News aggregators such as Google, 
Yahoo!, and Orange.fr are among the most visited in France, but it is not clear how much they are used 
speciﬁ cally for news and information, given the range of services they provide.
Th e main information providers (traditionally, morning newspapers, morning radio news, and evening 
television services) have to a certain extent maintained their audiences, but new forms of information and 
news have been emerging. Th e most signiﬁ cant change in media consumption is likely to be the media-
on-demand system, where customers choose the type of content they want. Th e second most signiﬁ cant 
change is the emergence of the hypermedia system with content available for consumption in diﬀ erent forms 
practically everywhere: through various devices (television sets, radios, computers, mobiles, and tablets) and 
dissemination platforms (websites, social network platforms, blogs, and microblogs).
One of the most important changes in the French news landscape over the last seven years is the emergence of 
pure players and 24-hour news services. Pure players provide online-only information, editorials, comments, 
and sometimes news stories based on investigative journalism (see section 4.2). Non-stop news stations, even 
though they are not making much impact in terms of ratings (BFM, the most popular one, reaches around 2 
percent of the audience), have changed the media landscape. For they have obliged other media platforms to 
adapt to their constantly updated news, often provided directly by the journalist on location. 
42. Mediapolis study 2009–2012, ANR project, CEVIPOF Sciences-Po.
43. Newman, “Reuters Digital News Report 2012.”
44. J. Charon, “De la presse imprimée à la presse numérique. Le débat français” (From print to digital press, the French debate), Réseaux No. 2, 
2010, pp. 160–161.
M A P P I N G  D I G I T A L  M E D I A     F R A N C E2 8
It is questionable, however, whether constantly updated news is strengthening the quality of news, the in-
depth investigation of topics, or the breadth of perspective and presentation of circumstances and points of 
view. Th at having been said, however, neither of the 24-hour news stations is trying to attract viewers with 
celebrity-oriented content; rather, they try to focus on political, economic, and social issues, with coverage of 
national and key international events. 
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2. Digital Media and Public or 
 State-administered Broadcasters
2.1 Public Service and State Institutions
2.1.1 Overview of Public Service Media; News and Current Affairs Output
France completed the switch-over to digital terrestrial television (DTT) across its entire territory in November 
2011.45 Th is has been the most drastic change since the introduction of color television in 1967.46 It allows 
people to get access to 18 free-to-air television channels, six of which are provided by the public service 
broadcaster: the most popular are France 2, France 3, France 5, and Arte.
Public television channels remain the most important sources of information. Even though a private news 
channel—TF1—attracts the largest audience for a single program (around 23 percent; see section 1.3.2), 
it is public service broadcasting as an agglomerate that is most viewed (around 26 percent of the audience). 
Perhaps more signiﬁ cant is that the decline in viewership between 2009 and 2012 was deﬁ nitely more marked 
for private channels than for any public channel. Public television news programs sustain a high standard 
of information, concentrating on national and regional events, taking pains to show and explain diﬀ erent 
points of view, and originating reportage about the most severe problems facing the country. It is also public 
television that produces the most popular political talk shows and debates (often hosting not only politicians 
but also experts and specialists). Th e high supply of political programs is visible in the number of hours aired 
each week (see Table 12).
In 2011, some 16 percent of all air time for public channels combined was devoted to news and information, 
17 percent to documentaries, 32 percent to ﬁ lms and series, 1 percent to sport, and 17 percent to music 
and shows.47 However, the public broadcaster’s central role as a news provider is challenged by all-news 
45. CSA, “La couverture de la TNT” (DTT coverage), at http://www.csa.fr/TV_numerique/tv_numerique_recevoir_avec_antenne.php (accessed 4 
July 2011).
46. Télérama, “La réception TNT” (DTT reception), at http://www.telerama.fr (accessed 4 July 2011).
47. CSA, “Guide des chaînes numériques, 10e édition” (Guide to digital channels, 10th edition), March 2012, at http://www.dgmic.culture.gouv.
fr/IMG/pdf/GUIDE_2012_web-_part_1.pdf (accessed 4 July 2011).
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channels: Euronews (established in 1993), LCP/Public Sénat (1994), iTele (1999), and BFMTV (2005). 
Public television also established, in 2006, its own nonstop news service, France 24, airing in French, Arabic, 
and English. But despite mounting competition, public television has remained the leader among generalist 
stations for programs with information on current political and social events. On average, there are twice as 
many hours of news content on public channels as on private generalist channels.
Table 12.
Information provision by public and private television (hours of programming a week), July 2011
Public channels Private channels
France 2 France 3 France 5 Arte TF1 M6 TMC NT1 Canal+
10h 28min 24h 25min 7h 5min 4h 15min 10h 55min 3h 35min 1h 45min 1h 35min 3h 40min
General 46h 13min General 21h 30min
Note: Randomly chosen week of news provision (2 July 2011 to 9 July 2011)
Source: Télérama, at http://www.telerama.fr
Th e most popular channels owned by the public broadcaster produce diverse information programs such as 
newscasts, debates, and interviews. Most of these programs are aired in the evening on television, whereas the 
public radio stations concentrate them in the morning schedules. Generally, both public radio and television 
have managed to defend their audience share during the past three years.
During the 2012 French presidential and parliamentary elections, one of the most popular platforms for 
political debate was France 2’s program “Des paroles et des actes” (Words and Deeds),48 which aired 26 hours 
of programming between January and April 2012. Th e presentations and interviews with all 10 presidential 
candidates, produced by the most prominent journalists from various television channels, drew an average 
of 4.4 million viewers. Th e last show, which brought the ﬁ nal two candidates together for a debate, was 
watched by 6.2 million people on 26 April 2012. Th e program continues to be aired as an independent, non-
electoral program, though less often and with a diﬀ erent format: some of the most prominent politicians are 
interviewed by both their political opponents and by journalists.
48. For more about this program, see http://www.francetv.fr/2012/emissions/des-paroles-et-des-actes (accessed 4 July 2011).
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Table 13.
Public media (TV and radio), news and current aﬀ airs output, 2010–2012
Channel General orientation49 Audience (%)50 Examples of popular or signiﬁ cant 
news or current affairs programs
May 
2010
May 
2011
May 
2012
Television
France 2 Generalist, concentrates on diversity 
of programs: information, sport, 
entertainment, series, and ﬁ lms. 
Focussing on French and European 
productions
16.4 17.1 15.1 1 p.m. News
8 p.m. News
12.30 a.m. Night news
“Ce soir (ou jamais!)” This Evening 
(Or Never!))—debate with invited 
guests concentrating on social and 
cultural issues
“Envoyé spécial” (Special 
Correspondent)—magazine about 
current, mostly social, issues
France 3 General public but with focus 
on regional issues. It provides 
information, documentaries, and 
talk shows on social and economic 
issues. This channel is produced 
mainly locally in 24 regional ofﬁ ces
10.6 12.1 9.6 6 a.m. Euronews
11.45 a.m. 12/13 News
6.45 p.m. 19/20 News
10.35 p.m. Soir 3 News
Other: “Des racines et des ailes” (Roots 
and Wings)—program dedicated to 
recognition of French heritage
France 4 General public with focus on the 
“young and the new generation.” 
Created in 2005 to reach a new 
public using DTT (changed from 
Festival channel, established in 
1996)
1.7 2.4 2.3 No news
France 5 Educational, created to share and 
transmit knowledge, ideas, and 
values. Interested in national and 
international culture and societies
3.3 4.0 3.5 5.35 p.m. “C l’info”
Other:
“C dans l’air” (It’s in the air)—debate 
with invited guests (journalists, 
politicians, researchers, and other 
specialists) concentrating on current 
affairs, politics, and economics. During 
the program the audience is invited to 
participate in discussion via internet or 
SMS
France Ô Dedicated to cultural diversity, it 
offers documentaries, talk shows, 
debates, and live shows (theater, 
music). It focusses on the culture of 
French populations outside Europe
n/a n/a n/a
49. CSA, “Les chaînes de télévision” (Television channels), at http://www.csa.fr/infos/operateurs/operateurs_television_publiques.php (accessed 
4 July 2011).
50. Médiamétrie, Médiamat mensuel (Médiamat: Monthly edition), May 2010, 2011, 2012. 
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Channel General orientation49 Audience (%)50 Examples of popular or signiﬁ cant 
news or current affairs programs
May 
2010
May 
2011
May 
2012
France 24 Rolling news—external service. 
Distributed in French, English, 
and Arabic.
n/a n/a n/a Non-stop news
France 1ère Created in 2010 to diminish the 
differences in TV access between 
the continental and overseas French 
public. It distributes programs from 
other public channels
n/a n/a n/a
LCP/Public 
Sénat
Channel created in 1999 to 
distribute programs about the 
National Parliament and Senate 
(and ﬁ nanced by those two 
institutions). It has an educative 
character, showing programs on 
parliament, politics, and citizenship
n/a n/a n/a Non-stop news
Arte International television created 
in 1990 by an agreement 
between France and Germany. It 
concentrates on cultural, historical, 
and societal issues concerning 
mostly Europe. Airs programs with 
translations into French or German
1.6 1.7 1.6 12.45 p.m. Arte News
7 p.m. Arte News
Radio
July
2011
July 
2012
Radio France 5 radio stations: France Inter, France 
Music, France Culture, France 
Info, and France Blue (43 regional 
stations) 
Blue
Inter
Culture 
Info
Music
6.4
9.5
1.4
3.9
1.1
7.9
8.8
1.3
3.9
0.9
Newscast every hour
News, morning edition (7–9 a.m.)
France Info—all-day news provision
RFO Belongs to French Télévisions. 
Delivers programs mostly to 
overseas regions of France
n/a n/a
RFI Its mission is to diffuse French 
politics, culture, science, and 
language outside the country
n/a n/a
Note: n/a: not available
Sources: Médiamétrie, “Médiamat mensuel TV” (Monthly TV Report), May 2010, 2011, 2012. Methodology: share of the na-
tional audience counted during one day of study (randomly chosen during a week, showing the monthly aggregated data). 
Survey of panel audience representative of French people from more than 10,000 respondents aged 4 and above.
 Médiamétrie, “Grilles Radio” (Monthly Radio Report), July 2011 and 2012. Methodology: survey of a random sample of 
more than 13,000 respondents aged 13 and above.
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2.1.2 Digitization and Services
French public television has not launched any new channels for DTT. It has, however, adapted some of its 
existing channels to be more attractive and concurrent with commercial channels: France 5 became a 24-hour 
channel instead of being only a few hours on air, France 4 now targets younger audiences, and there are new 
regional editions of France Ô.
France Télévisions is also launching new services available due to digitization.51 In September 2011 (with the 
emergence of television sets with the HbbTV standard), France Télévisions launched a platform—constantly 
updated and available through DTT—that oﬀ ers international, national, and regional information, sports 
news and weather forecasts in video format, as well as a television channel guide. In November 2011, France 
Télévisions launched a special information service (Francetvinfo.fr) available on all platforms: web, mobile, 
tablet, and connected television sets. 
In the context of this general information platform, public television has ﬁ rmly established its place in the online 
community by providing web services of very high standards for each channel. France Télévisions’ main website 
is a mother-platform for separate websites dedicated to each of its channels. All the websites have a similar 
design. Diﬀ erences are visible mostly in design-related details such as color. On top of the main news content, 
each channel has its own rubrics for specialized information (e.g. France 3 has rubrics for all regions in France, 
whereas France Ô covers foreign news). All the websites oﬀ er catch-up television (Pluzz.fr does it free of charge, 
but has advertising banners) launched in July 2010 and VoD (where paid series and ﬁ lms can be watched).
Th e catch-up television service has been growing in consumption: by the end of 2011, 14.5 million people 
had used this service in France, the majority still via computers but an increasing number also through their 
television sets. Th e television-internet mix is to take oﬀ  signiﬁ cantly in coming years. Alexandre Fourmond, 
Marketing Manager of the consumer electronics maker LG Electronics France, said:
matching television and internet is a real opportunity to open towards a “new world of usage,” 
convergence and content that will revolutionize the usage of television. For the audience, this 
match is achieved through Smart TV where the menu, ergonomics, remote control and force 
have been totally reinvented. If today only 18 percent of the TV sets are connected to the 
internet, in 2015 they will constitute 80 percent.52
All content on France Télévisions’ websites is well organized, most often by channel and type of program. 
It consists of written content, pictures, online short videos, or streams of programs. Visitors can participate 
in forums dedicated to each program, leave their comments under each entry, and visit the blogs of various 
programs or journalists. Th e station’s online platform also oﬀ ers users the possibility to play online games, 
both free of charge and commercial.
51. CSA, “Bilan de la société France Télévisions Année 2011” (France Télévisions Balance Sheet 2011), August 2012, at http://csa.fr/Etudes-et-
publications/Les-bilans/Les-bilans-des-chaines-de-television-publiques-et-privees/Bilan-de-la-societe-France-Televisions-Annee-2011 (accessed 
3 February 2013).
52. Médiamétrie, “La TV dans tous ses états” (Television in all its stages), February 2012.
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All of France Télévisions’ websites have an active presence on Facebook and Twitter.53 Th ey oﬀ er a newsletter 
subscription and RSS feed, as well as applications for mobile phones. Live streaming was introduced in 2012.
In terms of news content online, France Télévisions delivers a greater amount of news than any of the 
commercial channel websites, with the exception of TF1. Websites run by commercial channels such as 
Canal+ and M6 concentrate more on their own non-news programs. All nonstop news services, such as 
BFM, LCP, and i>Télé, oﬀ er live streaming and constantly updated information on their websites, both in 
text and short video formats.
Table 14.
Number of likes on Facebook proﬁ les and number of followers and tweets on Twitter proﬁ les, 
July 2011 and September 2012
Facebook Twitter
No. of likes No. of followers No. of tweets
2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012
Public TV
France 2 33,199 181,992 75,714 254,188 7,940 12,699
France 3 10,626 75,302 4,258 20,492 2,107 3,718
France 4 8,100 56,468 4,798 22,527 1,244 4,325
France 5 8,298 60,047 19,546 90,223 2,045 4,908
France 1ère 3,742 8,418 n/a n/a n/a n/a
France Ô n/a 35,704 n/a 7,290 n/a 2,411
Arte 342,911 573,910 34,833 97,440 2,414 4,968
France 24 391,651 848,915 20,441 94,361 20,434 32679
LCP/Public Sénat 8,154 6,825 4,000 26,597 1,951 7,005
Private TV
TF1 35,411 1,055,453 52,966 363,409 7,916 14,056
Canal+ 117,810 414,573 n/a 121,128 n/a 11,573
M6 1,747 970,858 8,082 111,493 1,965 5,288
BFM 41,417 88,622 16,610 198,072 5,967 22,160
i>Télé 18,257 29,124 13,489 56,697 5,441 28,514
Note: n/a: not available
Sources: Facebook; Twitter; reporters’ own data
53. According to a CSA letter to its staﬀ  dated 6 June 2011, French television stations, both public and private, are asked not to promote any social 
network websites. From that day on, instead of saying “You will ﬁ nd the latest news on Facebook,” television anchors in France have said, “You 
will ﬁ nd the latest news on our social network website.” See http://www.csa.fr/actualite/communiques/communiques_detail.php?id=133577 
(accessed 5 July 2011).
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Public television channels led in new social media connections in 2011, with France 24 and Arte enjoying 
the highest number of likes on Facebook and France 2 leading in numbers of followers on Twitter. However, 
a year later later (in December 2012) the situation changed completely: commercial channels gathered the 
largest communities both on Facebook (M6) and Twitter (TF1). Th ey are followed by Arte and France 24 
on Facebook and France 2 on Twitter. Combined, all France Télévisions’ accounts on social networks now 
number almost 4.5 million.
2.1.3 Government Support
Th e new media regulation for France Télévisions adopted in 2009 emphasized the special role of the public 
broadcaster in the new digital era.54 Article 21 stipulated that digital technologies present an opportunity for 
France Télévisions to enrich its programs and make them more accessible. Interactive technologies should be 
developed in order to improve the relationship with the public. France Télévisions was also required by this 
law to play an active role in the switch-over to digital television by airing educational/informational programs 
about this process. Article 22 of the law required France Télévisions to provide television services on demand, 
including catch-up television, to allow viewers to access programs at any time. Since 2011, France Télévisions 
has made the opportunities oﬀ ered by digitization (such as catch-up television and connected/interactive 
television) one of the pillars of its strategy. As a consequence, its budget for the development of a new hyper-
media strategy increased by 59 percent in 2011 over the previous year.55
To be able to complete the digital switch-over in November 2011, informational campaigns were run. Th e 
website Tousaunumerique.fr was launched to provide information and support for older people. At the same 
time, France Télévisions has broadcast advertisements educating and encouraging people to make that change.
Th e 2009 Law was meant to reinvent the identity of French public television based on a richer and more 
innovative oﬀ ering that would attract a larger audience.56 Following the recommendation of the president 
of France, Mr Sarkozy, public television was required to reduce its dependence on advertising by abolishing 
commercials between 8 p.m. and 6 a.m. Th e state committed to covering all the losses that France Télévisions 
would incur as a result of removing advertisements from its programs.
Th e same act gave the President of the Republic the power to nominate the president of France Télévisions 
after consultations with the CSA and the cultural commission in Parliament. Both those changes were strongly 
criticized by the parliamentary opposition and the media, which accused the government of cementing its 
political inﬂ uence on public television.57
54. Decree No. 2009-796 of 23 June 2009 on Fixing the speciﬁ cations for the national program group France Télévisions, Journal oﬃ  ciel, 25 June 
2009. 
55. France Télévisions, “Rapport annuel (Annual Report) 2011,” p. 13, at http://www.francetelevisions.fr/groupe/bdRapportAnnuel_DP.pdf 
(accessed 25 October 2012) (hereafter France Télévisions, “Annual Report 2011”).
56. Ministry of Culture and Communication, “La reforme de l’audiovisuel public” (Reform of the public audiovisual service), at http://www.ddm.
gouv.fr/article.php3?id_article=1447 (accessed 25 October 2012).
57. Mouvement démocrate, “Nomination de Rémy Pﬂ imlin à France Télévisions: François Bayrou dénonce ‘un processus malsain’” (Nomination 
of Rémy Pﬂ imlin as CEO of French Televisions: Francois Bayrou claims this was “not a fair process”), at http://www.mouvementdemocrate.fr/
actualites/bayrou-reaction-nomination-france-televisions-pﬁ mlin-050710.html (accessed 5 July 2011).
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In 2011, 85 percent of public television was ﬁ nanced from public sources, mostly through license fees, to 
the tune of €2.464 billion (US$3.209 billion), down from €2.472 billion (US$3.219 billion) a year before.58 
Th e subsidies are to be lowered again in 2013 (probably by 2.3 percent year on year),59 along with staﬀ  
reductions.60
Th e Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste, PS), which has been in government since the 2012 elections, has 
announced its willingness to amend the state supervision of public media.61 According to Aurélie Filippetti, 
responsible for media within the PS before the 2012 parliamentary elections, and subsequently Minister of 
Culture and Communication, the CSA should become responsible for nominating the presidents of each of 
the media within the group, in order to assure the full independence of the public media.
Th e new president, François Hollande, has also proposed changes within the CSA. Up to now, the head of 
state has been able to nominate three of the nine members; President Hollande suggests that this authority 
should be transferred to the Cultural Commission in Parliament. However, in January 2013, Mr Hollande 
nominated Olivier Schrameck to lead the CSA, a close co-worker of Lionel Jospin (PS prime minister from 
1997 to 2002) and a candidate in the presidential elections of 2002 with no experience in television or radio. 
Th is nomination triggered a public debate about Mr Hollande’s supposed abandonment of his campaign 
promise to change the process for nominating the highest oﬃ  cials.62 However, the Minister of Culture and 
Communication still argues for the necessity of changing the nomination of CSA members.
2.1.4 Public Service Media and Digital Switch-over
In 2009, the combined audience share of France Télévisions was 32.7 percent, some 2 percentage points 
down from 2008. It sank further to 29.9 percent in 2011.63 Th e decline was triggered exclusively by the fresh 
competition posed by newly licensed digital channels, according to a report by France Télévisions.64
DTT allowed France Télévisions to reach new audiences; for example, according to their report the launching 
of the new regional channel of France Ô (overseas channels) attracted a younger audience (with a mean 
age of 44, three years younger than for other channels, and with a goal of reaching audiences aged 35–37). 
58. France Télévisions, “Annual Report 2011.”
59. Agence France Presse (AFP), “Grève dans les médias publics français” (Strike in the French public media), Le Figaro, at http://www.leﬁ garo.fr/
ﬂ ash-eco/2012/10/02/97002-20121002FILWWW00408-greve-dans-les-medias-publics-francais.php (accessed 5 July 2011).
60. “La part du ﬁ nancement public dans le budget de France Télévisions va diminuer en 2013” (Part of the budget of France Télévisions will 
go down in 2013), L’Express, at http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/media-people/media/la-part-du-ﬁ nancement-public-dans-le-budget-de-france-
televisions-va-diminuer-en-2013_1153615.html (accessed 15 February 2013).
61. “Chambardement en vue dans l’audiovisuel public” (Facing changes in the public audiovisual), Le Figaro, at http://www.leﬁ garo.fr/medias/
2012/05/07/20004-20120507ARTFIG00387-chambardement-en-vue-dans-l-audiovisuel-public.php (accessed 29 January 2013).
62. Ouestfrance.fr, “Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel: des nominations politiques?” (CSA, political nominations?), at http://www.ouest-france.
fr/ofdernmin_-Conseil-superieur-de-l-audiovisuel-des-nominations-politiques-_6346-2151680-ﬁ ls-tous_ﬁ lDMA.Htm (accessed 15 February 
2013). See also “Hollande dans l’audiovisuel: curieuses nominations au CSA” (Hollande and audiovisual: strange nominations for CSA), at 
http://medias.blogs.challenges.fr/archive/2013/01/17/surprises-et-prise-de-bec-le-pouvoir-s-empetre-au-csa.html (accessed 15 February 2013).
63. Télévisions, “Annual Report 2011.”
64. France Télévisions, “Rapport ﬁ nancier annuel (Annual Financial Report), 2010,” at http://www.francetelevisions. fr/groupe/FTV_RapportFi-
nancier_2010.pdf (accessed 3 February 2013) (hereafter France Télévisions, “Annual Financial Report 2010”). 
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Another channel aiming for the youngest audience (15–35 years old) is France 4, which is enjoying a growth 
of audience share (while other channels have a negative balance).
Table 15.
Audiences of public and private TV channels (average % of total audience), 2009–2010
Channel Mean audience share 2009 % change (year on year) 2010
France 2 16.7 –0.8 16.1
France 3 11.8 –1.5 10.7
France 4 1.1 0.2 1.6
France 5 3.1 0.1 3.2
France Télévisions (combined) 32.7 –2.0 31.6
TF1 26.1 –1.1 n/a
M6 10.8 –0.2 n/a
Canal+ 3.1 –0.2 n/a
Arte 1.7 0.0 n/a
Other (combined) 27.9 4.2 n/a
Note: n/a: not available; the numbers do not add up to 100 percent since they are mean values
Source: France Télévisions, “Rapport ﬁ nancier annuel (Annual Financial Report) 2009, 2010”65 
Th ere has been a long-standing and continuing commitment by successive governments to disseminate French 
culture and values across the world. Previously, a branch of the ORTF (then of Radio France), Radio France 
International (RFI), was set up in 1986 as an independent company to broadcast radio programs in French 
and 13 other languages. It has a strong presence in francophone countries in Africa, where it provides an 
alternative source of news. Th e channel TV5 was set up in 1984 as a joint venture between French, Belgian, 
Canadian, and Swiss public broadcasting companies; however, most of its funding has come from the French 
authorities. It broadcasts a selection of programs, including main newscasts, from its parent companies. 
France 24 was started at the end of 2006 as a sort of French equivalent to CNN, but publicly funded. It 
has three channels broadcasting in French, English, and Arabic. In April 2008, the government decided to 
group the diﬀ erent parts of the French external broadcasting service under a new umbrella organization, the 
External Audiovisual of France (Audiovisuel Extérieur de France, AEF).
France Télévisions strives to represent a wide variety of the French population.66 In 2009, a commission was 
established under the chairmanship of Hervé Bourges to assess diversity within France Télévisions structures.67 
Its task is to supervise the coverage of diﬀ erent groups in society and a variety of issues concerning news, 
65. See http://www.francetelevisions.fr/downloads/FTV_rapport_ﬁ  nancier_annuel_2009.pdf (accessed 5 July 2011).
66. France Télévisions, “Annual Financial Report, 2009.”
67. France Télévisions, “Annual Financial Report, 2010.”
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documentaries, ﬁ lms, series, and shows. Th e commission ensures that the diverse groups that make up French 
society receive equal treatment during all stages of production, from the choice of topics, scripts and their 
implementation, to the role and distribution of tasks within the production team.
Diversity is visible at France Télévisions in the topics covered, which include national and sexual minorities, 
the disabled, people with health problems like Alzheimer’s or AIDS, city and village life, productions for 
and about children (e.g. about adopted children), or music programs presenting various genres and types of 
music, for 90 minutes a week.
France Télévisions also employs staﬀ  from diﬀ erent cultures and origins. France Ô is almost entirely dedicated 
to making programs about the cultural diﬀ erences among French citizens living abroad. In 2011, France 
Télévisions also started a more intense recruitment drive aimed at disabled people.68 
Since 2011, France Télévisions has also committed to setting up a social and environmental responsibility 
division to cover the following: 
 environment (with a special focus on energy saving, CO2 emissions, eco-friendly and responsible 
shopping);
 social (with a focus on the development of an equal opportunities policy);
 economic (with a focus on achieving the best ﬁ nancial outcomes while respecting the environment and 
ethics).
Th e division has not yet been set up.
2.2 Public Service Provision
2.2.1 Perception of Public Service Media
In a CEVIPOF public opinion poll about the trust in public institutions, the media scored one of the lowest 
trust rates: 27 percent in January 2010 and the same in January 2011 among all public services, including 
hospitals (which scored 86 percent) or schools (83 percent).69 Only political parties scored worse than the 
media, with 23 percent of the French trusting them.
A 2011 TNS Sofres survey of trust in the media found that 40 percent of French people believe that the 
quality of the media has worsened; while just over 27 percent said that it had improved in recent years.70 A 
total of 56 percent of respondents in this survey believed that the media represented impartially the policies 
68. France Télévisions, “Annual Report, 2011.”
69. CEVIPOF, “Le baromètre de la conﬁ ance politique” (Barometer of political trust), July 2011, at http://www.cevipof.com/fr/le-barome-
tre-de-la-conﬁ ance-politique-du-cevipof (accessed 5 July 2011).
70. TNS Sofres, “Baromètre de conﬁ ance dans les médias” (Barometer of trust in the media), January 2011 (hereafter TNS Sofres, “Baromètre”).
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proposed by both the political left and right, but a quarter of the respondents believed that the media in 
general favor the political parties on the right. Th e highest trust was put by the respondents in radio (57 
percent), followed by the press (49 percent), television (46 percent), and the internet (35 percent). In a 2013 
study by TNS Sofres asking the French about the credibility of the media, the internet scored worst with 
only 35 percent of respondents claiming high credibility, while television and press scored 48 percent and 49 
percent, respectively, behind radio, which received the highest credibility rating with 54 percent.71 
Another TNS Sofres study from 2011 showed that more viewers appreciated the new free-to-air digital 
channels (59 percent) than they did the historical (pre-digital) national channels (55 percent).72 In general, 
the programs on the new digital channels were perceived as being less banal than those on public television 
(62 percent said they were banal on digital channels, and 69 percent on the public television). However, 
viewers appreciated the historical national channels, including the public broadcasters, in categories such as 
documentaries, series and ﬁ ction, cultural programs, sports, and ﬁ lms. Nevertheless, news and information 
programs were judged to be of the same quality on both the historical channels and the new digital ones (72 
percent and 70 percent, respectively), which is probably due to the all-news television stations available freely 
after digitization. Most people (71 percent) would have liked to see further development of free-to-air digital 
terrestrial channels.
In order to adapt to the digitization of television and the arrival of new, commercial channels, public television 
has reorganized one of its thematic channels into France 4, aimed at younger audiences; a similar policy was 
employed for France 5 and France Ô. Even if the concurrent commercial channels, more oriented toward 
pure entertainment, gained more audience (W9 and TMC, see section 1.3.1.4), France 4 is most appreciated 
for its content (among the 15+ age group) and ranks second with the 15–35-year-old audience.73
Institutional control by the president and ﬁ nancial governmental support are the only formal ways of 
inﬂ uencing the public broadcaster. However, although these two forms of interference have been criticized by 
the opposition, especially before the last election, they do not seem to have had a real impact on the content 
of the political programs aired by the public broadcaster.
Politicians may sometimes, however, have an impact on the personal history of journalists. In 2009, Jérôme 
Bourreau-Guggenheim, head of innovation at the TF1 department of new media, the largest private television 
channel in France by audience share, emailed his local MP and a member of the then ruling Union for a 
Popular Movement (Union pour un Mouvement Populaire, UMP), opposing the idea of creating an institution 
that would disconnect French citizens from the internet if they illegally download internet content (see 
section 5). Th is message was transferred by its recipient to the Minister of Culture, herself strongly in favor of 
the bill and institution. Th e Minister forwarded the message to TF1’s senior management, which promptly 
71. TNS Sofres, “Baromètre.”
72. TNS Sofres, “Les Français et la télévision. Satisfaction et attentes à l’égard des chaînes existantes” (Th e French and television. Satisfaction and 
expectations from existing television channels), April 2011.
73. France Télévisions, “Annual Financial Report, 2010.”
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ﬁ red Bourreau-Guggenheim, alleging “strategic diﬀ erences.”74 Th e Minister professed herself “shocked and 
alarmed” by this dismissal, as TF1 was seen as abusing its political connections.
In 2008, a year after Mr Sarkozy’s election as president, many journalists and commentators expressed concern 
about media freedom in France. It was claimed that the president was over-represented in the media—less 
as head of state than as a celebrity, due to his relationship with the singer Carla Bruni. Concerns were also 
expressed about the very close friendship between Mr Sarkozy and media owners and publishers of glossy 
magazines such as Paris Match and Le Journal du Dimanche.75 Mr Sarkozy was also blamed for trying to exert 
excessive inﬂ uence over the choice of the president of French Public Television—a process ﬁ nalized in 2010 
with the appointment of Mr Pﬂ imlin—as well as for inﬂ uencing the employment policy of French Public 
Radio (two satirical journalists, Stephane Guillon and Didier Porte,76 were ﬁ red from France Inter after they 
were characterized by Mr Sarkozy as “insulting, vulgar and nasty”).77 
It should also be remembered that President Hollande and his inner circle have close relations with media 
owners and journalists (see section 6.1.3). 
2.2.2 Public Service Provision in Commercial Media
Private television and radio channels are obliged to sign a convention about their planned programs with the 
regulator, the CSA. Private and public broadcasters are to a large extent bound by the same obligations aimed 
at fulﬁ lling public service goals of pluralism and freedom of expression.
Journalists from all stations are obliged to present diﬀ erent political views in comparable conditions on their 
programs, and television stations must respect the presumption of innocence, respect the anonymity of 
minors, privacy, and limit comments on criminal sentences. Article 9 of the convention requires broadcasters 
to not encourage delinquent behavior; to respect political, cultural, and religious diﬀ erences; to not broadcast 
any opinions that are discriminating due to race, gender, religion, or nationality; to promote national 
integration and values of solidarity; and to take into consideration the diversity of the origins and cultures of 
society in their programming.78
Commercial broadcasters have to air a certain amount of content covering the diverse groups in French 
society. No quotas for news or current aﬀ airs output are imposed on commercial channels. Th ere have been 
no signiﬁ cant changes in the past ﬁ ve years as far as the dissemination of public service content is concerned.
74. R. Andrews, “TF1 ﬁ res web boss for opposing ‘three-strikes’,” 11 May 2009, at http://paidcontent.co.uk/article/419-tf1-ﬁ res-web-boss-for-
opposing-three-strikes (accessed 11 July 2011).
75. BBC, “Sarkozy strategy under scrutiny,” 17 January 2008, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7192638.stm (accessed 11 July 2011).
76. “Guillon et Porte virés de France Inter, mais largement soutenus” (Guillon and Porte ﬁ red from France Inter but highly supported), Libération, 
23 June 2009, at http://www.liberation.fr/medias/0101643026-stephane-guillon-vire-de-la-matinale-de-france-inter (accessed 29 October 2012).
77. K. Willsher, “How Nicolas Sarkozy inﬂ uenced French media,” Th e Guardian, 5 July 2010, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/jul/05/
nicolas-sarkozy-french-media (accessed 11 July 2011).
78. CSA, “Convention de la chaîne TF1” (Convention for the TF1 channel), at http://www.csa.fr/infos/textes/textes_detail.php?id=8169 (accessed 
5 July 2011).
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2.3 Assessments 
Public media during the last ﬁ ve years have lost some of their public: their average audience for the two 
historic television channels, France 2 and France 3, lost 4 percentage points. But they gained audience 
through the new digital channel targeted at young people, France 4, which has gained 1.6 percentage points 
since 2007. Th e station, however, claims that the goal of a public television service is not to ﬁ ght for market 
share but to provide the public with high-quality programming.79
Th e growth of the internet and completion of the digitization process has forced public television to change 
its programming strategy and increasingly invest in new formats, such as catch-up television and online 
broadcasting. It is also more active in promoting its programming on social networks, such as Facebook and 
Twitter. Online promotion and interaction has been carried out intensively and has led to the creation of a 
substantive group of supporters and followers.
Th e public broadcaster still outdoes its commercial peers in the provision of news, and economic, social, 
and political programs. It also gives more extensive coverage than commercial stations to regions and smaller 
communities, and played an important role during the 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections by 
providing platforms for discussions among actors representing diﬀ erent political ideologies.
79. “France TV: ‘pas d’obsession d’audience’” (French Television: “no obsession with audience”), Le Figaro, at http://www.leﬁ garo.fr/ﬂ ash-
eco/2012/10/03/97002-20121003FILWWW00426-france-tv-pas-une-obsession-d-audience.php (accessed 25 October 2012).
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3. Digital Media and Society
3.1 User-Generated Content (UGC)
3.1.1 UGC Overview
Facebook and MSN Windows are the most popular user-generated content (UGC) sites in France. Although 
blogs are less popular (see Table 17), their hosts are still among the 20 most popular websites in the country. 
Among the top 10 French sites with the highest number of visitors per month, half can be considered as 
featuring UGC. Five of them are known worldwide: Facebook, MSN, YouTube, Wikipedia (not in the 
ranking in 2012), and Yahoo!. Th ey allow people to set their own proﬁ les, share videos, and participate in 
forums and live chats, or create their own content.
Table 16.
Th e 10 most popular websites by number of visitors, 2010 and 2012
Name of site No. of visitors a month (’000) Main area and function Type of UGC content
2010 2012
Rank No. Rank No.
Google 1 36,093 1 38,464 Search engine None
Facebook 2 27,182 2 30,126 Social network Proﬁ le and entries
MSN/Windows 3 22,589 3 28,224 Chats
Orange 4 22,019 5 21,158 Internet access provider/ 
telecommunications
Comments
YouTube 5 20,869 4 26,993 Video platform Video-sharing
Wikipedia 6 17,697 n/a n/a Wiki Wiki
PagesJaunes 7 17,638 7 16,620 Telephone directory None
Free 8 17,205 6 17,206 Internet access provider/telco None
Yahoo! 9 17,141 8 16,445 General information portal, 
search engine
Comments
SFR 10 14,363 10 12,256 Internet access provider/telco None
Leboncoin — — 9 16,349 Classiﬁ eds Classiﬁ eds posted directly by people
Note: n/a: not available
Source: Médiamétrie, NetRatings, December 2010, June 2012
4 3O P E N  S O C I E T Y  M E D I A  P R O G R A M     2 0 1 3
Four of these sites are not UGC websites: they are search engines, phone number search engines, or internet 
communication providers. One French website, which attracts numerous visits as it belongs to a major 
internet telecommunications provider (Orange), also plays a signiﬁ cant role as a news and information 
platform covering politics, news, sports, and weather; Orange.fr allows for comments and forums. In 2012, 
Leboncoin.fr, a portal for classiﬁ ed ads and listings, joined the top 10 websites.
Typical French UGC websites are rare and rank lower. Two are general blogging building websites (Overblog, 
Blogger), one is a service open to discussions among women (auFeminin.fr), and the last a video-sharing 
service, Dailymotion (similar to YouTube, but created in France). Th eir popularity has been quite steady over 
the past three years.
Table 17.
Ranking of the most popular UGC websites, 2010 and 2012
Name of site No. of visitors a month (’000) Main area and function
2010 2012
Rank No. Rank No.
Overblog 14 10,640 18 11,257 Blog provision platform divided into many themes 
auFeminin 16 10,217 14 11,406 Service dedicated to women
Blogger 19 9,461 17 11,286 Blog provision platform divided into many themes
Dailymotion — — 19 11,001 Own video posting site, French equivalent of YouTube
Source: Médiamétrie, NetRatings, December 2010, June 2012
3.1.2 Social Networks
Some 78 percent80 of French internet users are members of at least one social network site (32 percent of 
whom have more than four proﬁ les and 29 percent two or three proﬁ les). Th ese numbers have not changed 
much since 2009. Ownership of a social network account is more common among young people. However, 
the number of active account owners in the age group above 65 years is surprisingly high, at 66 percent 
(among those who use the internet). Th e highest rate, close to 94 percent, is found among 18–24-year-olds.
Th ere has been a shift among the most popular social networks used by the French. Windows Live, which in 
2009 was the most popular, was dethroned by Facebook by the end of 2011. Today, the top 10 most popular 
social networks in France include two local ones (Copains d’avant and Trombi), both attracting mostly 
old school friends. Both are more popular among older internet users (35.5 percent of whom use Copains 
d’avant).
80. French Institute of Public Opinion (Institut français d’opinion publique, IFOP), “Observatoire des réseaux socieux” (Study of social network 
usage), October 2010.
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Table 18.
Top 10 social network sites by members, ranking changes, 2010–2011
2011 2010
Rank % of usersa Rank % of users*
Facebook 1 49 3 43
Windows Live 2 40 1 52
Copains d’avant 3 37 2 46
YouTube 4 30 5 21
Trombi 5 18 4 22
Picasa 6 14 6 16
Google+ 7 12 n/a n/a
Dailymotion 8 8 7 12
Twitter 9 8 11 7
Viadeo 10 9 8 10
Note: n/a: not available; numbers do not add up to 100 percent as it is possible to name more than one social network
Source: French Institute of Public Opinion (Institut français d’opinion publique, IFOP), ‘“Observatoire des réseaux sociaux” (Mon-
itoring social networks), November 2010, 2011
Among internet users, 65 percent had a Facebook proﬁ le in April 2012, and 13 percent had a Twitter 
account.81 According to a June 2011 TNS Sofres study,82 some 79 percent of French children aged 13–17 
had a Facebook account, as did 18 percent of children aged 8–13 (Facebook forbids children under 13 from 
having an account).
Twitter has also gained popularity in recent years. Th e number of French who “have heard about it” grew 
from 2 percent in 2007 to 80 percent in 2010 and further to 85 percent in 2011. Twitter membership 
remains low, however: it grew from 2 percent in 2009 to 7 percent in 2010 and a mere 8 percent in 2011.83 
It is most popular among young people, students, managers, and people with higher education. It is also very 
popular among supporters of the extreme right-wing party, le Front National. According to a study from 
2011 published by Moursouin.org, which mapped out the actual usage of social network sites,84 70 percent 
of people do not update their accounts at all.
81. Mediapolis study 2009–2012, ANR project, CEVIPOF Sciences-Po.
82. TNS Sofres, “L’usage des réseaux sociaux chez les 8–17 ans” (Usage of social networks among 8–17-year-olds), June 2011.
83. Mediapolis study 2009–2012, ANR project, CEVIPOF Sciences-Po.
84. J. Tremenbert, “Point sur les usage de l’Internet” (Usage of the internet), 12 October 2010, at http://www.marsouin.org/spip.php?article385 
(accessed 5 July 2011).
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3.1.3 News in Social Media
Th ere are not many studies available on users’ activity on social network sites. A Mediapolis85 study showed 
that in 2009, among those who had a social network account, some 33 percent posted some political 
information “ever” and only 4 percent did so “often.” In 2012, the numbers were more or less the same: some 
30 percent said that they read or posted political information on social networks.
A 2009 TNS Sofres study showed that 45 percent of internet users (or 30 percent of the French population) 
have taken political action online on at least one occasion.86 However, only 3 percent had promoted a 
politician on a social network, blog, or website and only 4 percent had posted any political information on 
such websites. Some 11 percent of respondents said that they commented on news websites or on political 
blogs, and 5 percent that they participated in political forums and debates. According to the Reuters Institute 
for the Study of Journalism’s 2012 report, 40 percent of French people have voted in an online poll, 21 
percent have commented on a news story on social media, 16 percent have commented on a news story on a 
website, 15 percent have participated in a one-to-one conversation about a news story, and 11 percent have 
posted or sent in a news-related image or video.87
3.2 Digital Activism
3.2.1 Digital Platforms and Civil Society Activism
In France there is almost unlimited freedom (except for abusive content: see section 4) for publishing on blogs, 
regardless of the opinions and political ideology of contributors. Many popular bloggers bring attention to 
political, economic, or societal issues. Among the most interesting ones are Les decodeurs (Th e Decoders), 
a blog hosted by LeMonde.fr, where the content is partially delivered by readers. Its aim is to get the help 
of readers in catching and exposing the inconsistencies of politicians, their unfulﬁ lled promises, and unclear 
messages. Another is Le Bondy blog, created in 2005 by the Swiss daily L’Hebdo as an online platform, which 
featured real-time news updates about the riots in the suburbs (banlieues) of Paris. Th e blog now cooperates 
with other media: the telecoms company SFR published their content on mobiles, 20 minutes takes their 
material, and Yahoo! takes their content as well. Le Bondy reached around 2 million unique visitors in the 
ﬁ rst ﬁ ve months of 2012. While it has slightly generalized its content, it remains a social minorities’ hub, 
covering stories on politics, social issues, or cultural events from outside the mainstream media coverage. It 
also hosts young activists’ blogs.
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) often use their websites as a primary means of disseminating 
information, and social networks to promote their work and interact with supporters. We present below 
some of the most popular forms of activism online orchestrated by civil society groups.
85. Mediapolis study 2009–2012, ANR project, CEVIPOF Sciences-Po.
86. TNS Sofres, “Le baromètre des usages sociaux et politiques du web” (Barometer for the social and political usage of the web), September 2009.
87. Newman, “Reuters Digital News Report 2012,” p. 17.
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Campaign before the Constitutional Referendum of 25 May 2005
Some observers of the online political scene argue that the referendum campaign to change the 
constitution was started by the French online civil society.88 Numerous websites and blogs created to 
support the “yes” or “no” vote in the referendum allowed people to bypass the traditional channels 
of political communication, such as through traditional media or party activism, and to express their 
points of view directly to the public.
Anonymous individuals created websites and blogs to promote their own points of view and to 
inﬂ uence people or to give them arguments to vote accordingly (it seems that the group of “no” 
voters, who ﬁ nally won the vote, was more active online). Also politicians engaged in public discourse 
on their websites, providing arguments, showing campaigning volunteers or broadcasting videos.
NGO and party websites were also a popular source of information (though not very interactive): the 
Robert Schuman Foundation received 1.7 million hits a month, the Union for a Popular Movement 
(Union pour un Mouvement Populaire, UMP), the governing party at the time, received 70,000 hits 
over two weeks and the Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste, PS) some 15,000 hits a day.
Clearstream Scandal: From Online to Ofﬂ ine
In 2009, France was experiencing the Clearstream scandal which included the former prime minister 
Dominique de Villepin among those accused. The case was very controversial and received signiﬁ cant 
coverage in the traditional media.
The scandal involved the Luxembourg-based Clearstream Banking, the clearing and settlement 
division of Deutsche Börse, that allegedly helped a number of prominent politicians and companies 
to avoid state taxes. Clearstream denied the accusations.
Supporters of Mr de Villepin created two supporting websites and a proﬁ le on Facebook. Brigitte 
Girardin, who was apparently a major player in the supporting organization, claimed that the website 
had 10,000 visitors a day and that 4,000 joined the support movement thanks to the site, as well as 
helped to gather ofﬂ ine support. The movement drew the attention of the traditional media, where it 
was presented as a new form of political engagement—via online sources.
In 2011, Mr de Villepin was back on the political scene, building a new center-right party, République 
Solidaire (Solidarity Republic), and he ran for president in the 2012 election: in the end, his campaign 
could not gather the necessary 500 signatures from elected ofﬁ cials of various ranks to register a 
candidacy. He also gathered 17,500 likes on Facebook.
88. B. Heraud, “Referendum: Comment le ‘oui’ et le ‘non’ s’aﬀ rontent sur Internet” (Referendum: how the “yes” and “no” camps faced one another 
online), 27 April 2005, at http://lexpansion.lexpress.fr/economie/referendum-comment-le-oui-et-le-non-s-aﬀ rontent-sur-internet_109210.
html (accessed 5 July 2011).
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Social Network Accounts for Workers and Students
When in 2010 the government wished to reform the law on retirement, the proposed changes were 
strongly contested by many labor unions and student organizations, among others. Some protests 
were organized via Facebook and Twitter, social networks that also played an important role in 
informing and recruiting demonstrators.
However, the main trades unions that participated in centrally organized rallies argued that actions 
supported by these social networks had a local character and lacked the real support of the unions. 
Often striking workers were informed about the time and place of action by SMS or through other 
forms of online communication than social networks, they say.89 The demonstrations could be 
followed live on websites, where self-made videos, pictures, and short messages were posted.
“Pigeons” on the Web90
In 2012, following an announcement of the government about an increase in tax and social 
contributions, a group of business people (especially from internet start-ups) organized an online 
protest. It drew 68,000 “likes” on Facebook and was widely followed on Twitter (8,600 followers) in 
just a few days. The movement, established on 28 September 2012, has managed thus far to block 
the introduction of some parts of the planned taxation reform.91
3.2.2 The Importance of Digital Mobilizations
One major trend is the feedback eﬀ ect: the traditional media are following events in the new media (mainly social 
media), while new media are following the more traditional media and often comment on content in them.
Studies show that the most popular political online activities are relatively passive.92 Th ey include the search 
for information (29–35 percent of internet users) and for political humor (27–31 percent), watching political 
videos (20–24 percent), and visits to political or civic blogs and forums (12–14 percent). Th e forms of more 
active online political engagement are fairly weak: resending information (18 percent) and participation in 
political discussions (7–9 percent of internet users). Online political activists are in the minority: however, 
89. “Les blocages des lycées et des raﬃ  neries s’organisent aussi sur le Net” (Blockades of high schools and reﬁ neries are also organized on the 
net), Le Monde, at http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2010/10/22/les-blocages-des-lycees-et-des-raﬃ  neries-s-organisent-aussi-sur-le-net_
1429437_823448.html (accessed 20 July 2011).
90. See http://www.facebook.com/lespigeonsentrepreneurs, http://defensepigeons.org (accessed 20 July 2011).
91. “Loi de ﬁ nances 2013: les ‘pigeons-entrepreneurs’ se rebiﬀ ent” (Th e budget 2013: start-up businessmen ﬁ ght back), Le Point, 2 October 2012, at 
http://www.lepoint.fr/economie/loi-de-ﬁ nances-2013-les-pigeons-entrepreneurs-se-rebiﬀ ent-01-10-2012-1512259_28.php (accessed 10 Octo-
ber 2012).
92. Mediapolis study 2009–2012, ANR project, CEVIPOF Sciences-Po.
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the political information spread through the internet does reach broader groups of society. Women and 
those without higher education (with no visible age gap) are less engaged in the passive activities outlined 
above; among active participants, however, gender and education are not deﬁ ning factors, while engagement 
increases with age. As a consequence, even if active online political engagement does not appeal to all segments 
of the society, it may spur on those groups that were traditionally not active (women, young people, and the 
less educated).
Oﬄ  ine political participation is no longer possible without support from online hubs of information, online 
places for exchanging news on events as well as practical information. Although it is impossible to estimate 
the impact of online mobilization in contrast to oﬄ  ine actions, they overlap one another. Th e importance 
of digital mobilization is most visible in spreading information and broadening audiences, and possibly in 
building a community of supporters. However, even though social and political actions are often supported by 
the internet community (“pigeons”), and the internet does clearly facilitate the dissemination of information 
by bypassing the oﬃ  cial or traditional media (EU referendum 2005), it is impossible to measure their real 
potential or their eﬀ ects, since it is often not possible to separate oﬄ  ine and online actions. 
3.3 Assessments
Th e internet has increased the opportunities to access news and information. It allows for access to constantly 
updated information via the websites of traditional media and their Twitter and Facebook proﬁ les. It permits 
citizens to participate in news creation by either publishing content on their own blogs and social network 
pages, or by contributing comments on the websites run by traditional media. Th e internet also oﬀ ers civil 
society organizations the possibility to disseminate information about their actions more broadly, or to engage 
in discussions with diﬀ erent groups of people often dispersed across many French regions.
Even though the French online sphere has a broad oﬀ er of diverse independent blogs and pure-player media, 
the public seems to prefer the content of general information servers such as Orange and Yahoo! to the 
websites of the traditional media, both press and television, and to blogs or other UGC platforms.93 Most 
UGC is dedicated to everyday issues.
It is questionable whether the internet has signiﬁ cantly changed the quality of the news and information 
content. Th e hypermedia strategy of the traditional media—consisting essentially of establishing a presence 
on all possible platforms—brings wider access to information but does not necessarily inﬂ uence its content.94 
French people seem to believe that French media focus on scandalous and domestic events rather than 
providing adequate coverage of the most important international aﬀ airs.95 
93. Mediapolis study 2009–2012, ANR project, CEVIPOF Sciences-Po.
94. See, for example, CSA, “Bilan de la société France Télévisions Année 2011” (France Télévisions Balance Sheet 2011), August 2012, at http://
csa.fr/Etudes-et-publications/Les-bilans/Les-bilans-des-chaines-de-television-publiques-et-privees/Bilan-de-la-societe-France-Televisions-An-
nee-2011 (accessed 3 February 2013).
95. TNS Sofres, “Baromètre de conﬁ ance dans les médias” (Barometer of trust in the media), January 2013.
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Observers noticed that President Hollande’s arrival in oﬃ  ce marked a slight change in media coverage of 
politics, characterized by what is called a “less dramatic style of governing.” Pierre Haski, co-founder and 
editor of the website Rue89, one of the most prominent pure players, claims: “We had ﬁ ve years that were 
pretty exceptional; we had a man who was the center of everything. All of a sudden, we’ve gone from the 
overload to an underload. Sarkozy was good for sales, Hollande is not good for sales.”96
96. “Where ‘in bed with media’ can be taken more literally,” New York Times, 23 November 2012, at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/24/world/
europe/in-france-in-bed-with-media-can-be-taken-more-literally.html?_r=0 (accessed 12 February 2013).
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4. Digital Media and Journalism
4.1 Impact on Journalists and Newsrooms
4.1.1 Journalists
France is well known for its journalism schools at prestigious universities such as the Sorbonne and the 
grandes écoles (Sciences-Po). A debate is taking place about to what extent “old-style journalism” is still valid 
in the digital era of massive news production and de-professionalization of news producers. However, the 
expansion of online news has not substantially enlarged the volume of valuable information, as most content 
is still based on the same sources as before digitization: press agencies, press conferences, or internal sources 
of information. It is rather a system of dissemination of the news (the hypermedia system) that has changed, 
as similar content is now delivered on the main websites, commented on blogs, and promoted on Twitter and 
Facebook. According to editors of online press editions, 50 percent of political content is updated constantly, 
and 41 percent at least once a day.97
A visible change has been brought about by the online pure players (e.g. Huﬃ  ngtonpost.fr, Mediapart.fr, 
Rue89.fr, and Agoravox.fr). Th ese outlets publish articles by traditional journalists, but also comments from 
politicians and celebrities, often in the form of blogs. Th ey also oﬀ er provocative editorial comments and 
allow for content creation by readers. Th ey are engaged in watchdog journalism and are much less involved 
in the left–right ideological identiﬁ cation in which the traditional French media may be involved.
Most journalists and media use mainly the same sources and utilize most often the same search engines, which 
are already ﬁ ltering the news they obtain. Th is could result in a standardization of news. Th ere is a continuing 
debate in France about the place and role of the Google search engine and the provision of news. In her book 
Google-moi, la deuxième mission de l’Amérique (Google Me: America’s Second Mission), Barbara Cassin argues 
that Google claims to be the “champion of cultural democracy,” but the “democracy of clicks” has nothing 
to do with real democracy. Generally, news provision lacks a collective examination to determine through 
discussion and confrontation what information is better and/or more reliable. Journalists may be tempted to 
cover public aﬀ airs and write their articles prioritizing topics that rate high on Google news or another search 
97. Ministry of Culture and Communication, “Presse en ligne@2010.”
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engine.98 For many journalists the ﬁ rst thing they do in the morning is to monitor Google news in a move to 
determine which topics covered by their competitors most interested the public (which is most probably also 
advertising and marketing-oriented behavior). According to the investigative and data journalism website 
Owni.fr, some news websites use search engine optimization (SEO) strategies (e.g. making minor changes in 
online articles) in order to appear at the top of Google news listings.
However, others disagree with the thesis that the standardization of news content is a product of digitization. 
Standardization in information provision is not a novel phenomenon: it may have been a product of the 
schools of journalism that give students similar education. Before Google news, many journalists in the print 
or audiovisual media would (and still do) use the same primary source, namely Agence France Presse wire 
stories. More generally, it is not the technology that drives news standardization but the marketplace and the 
structural organization of the news media.99
According to Bernard Poulet, “digitization has the same eﬀ ects on journalism that globalization has on the 
middle class. Digitization means the death of the middle class of journalists.”100 By this Mr Poulet means 
that the profession of journalism will split into two distinct groups: a majority of “blue-collar” underpaid 
journalists, performing routine tasks and feeding the machine, and a few high-ranking journalists with great 
expertise and a unique personal style, whose names might even become a brand.
Francis Benett, an American journalist, who analyzes the contemporary French press, said: “Th e Blog is 
the future for the press.”101 He argues that journalists in the internet era have to be much more creative, as 
internet users searching for news will go where they can ﬁ nd exclusive information.
Th e dawn of this new, more interactive journalism was made possible by new forms of online communication. 
News articles can be made more attractive by embedding videos or podcasts, with links to other materials; 
they can be instantly commented upon by readers; widely spread by viral marketing; “liked” on social network 
proﬁ les; or widely disseminated and discussed via microblogging sites. Most of the news and information 
providers have used those possibilities to reach a more diverse and widely dispersed audience. 
However, it is claimed that the online French pure players are still in a worse position than the traditional 
media, as they lack a similar system of subsidies given to the traditional media (see section 6). Even the 
managers of printed newspapers are still not sure of the possibilities oﬀ ered by the new online market, as 
98. A. Westbrook, “Les journalistes écrivent-ils pour Google ?” (Do journalists write for Google?), 16 September 2010, at http://owni.fr/2010/09/16/
les-journalistes-ecrivent-ils-pour-google (accessed 29 October 2012).
99. See P. Bourdieu, “Circular circulation of information,” On Television, Th e New Press, New York, 1998, at http://www.nytimes.com/books/
ﬁ rst/b/bourdieu-television.html (accessed 29 October 2012).
100. “Bernard Poulet s’explique sur ‘La Fin des journaux’” (Interview with Bernard Poulet about his book Th e End of Newspapers), Le Nouvel Obser-
vateur, 16 February 2009, at http://bibliobs.nouvelobs.com/essais/20090216.BIB2969/bernard-poulet-s-039-explique-sur-la-ﬁ n-des-journaux.
html (accessed 29 October 2012).
101. See http://www.francisbenett.info (accessed 5 July 2011).
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most online news platforms are unproﬁ table. As a consequence, they do not provide suﬃ  cient returns for 
reinvestment in employment, technologies, or innovations. 
French traditional journalists are very conservative, neglecting the necessity or possibility of being present on 
a constantly updated Twitter account or via social networks, even though there is an increasing trend of using 
social media among them. In September 2010, the Ministry of Culture and Communication decided for the 
ﬁ rst time to run a survey102 among the most prominent online news providers in France. In its conclusion, 
it states that the online services, especially those oﬀ ered by the traditional press, do not generate much 
new employment. Th e average number of journalists is nine for political news portals, 12 for more general 
information portals, and ﬁ ve for specialized portals (taking into account both permanent and freelancing 
journalists).
4.1.2 Ethics
Digitization has not had visible consequences on the ethical behavior of journalists. Online journalists are 
bound by the same rules as their oﬄ  ine counterparts. Besides the general legislation on the press (covering 
freedom of information and speech), the ethical behavior of journalists is protected and constrained by a 
number of speciﬁ c laws and codes of conduct. Journalists must respect the presumption of innocence (Article 
9-1 of the French Civil Code); abstain from defamation and insults; and comply with the right of individuals 
to privacy and to the control of their own image. More recently, in addition to laws and legal obligations, 
French journalists refer to codes of “good practice.”
In 2006, a debate took place among photo journalists and civil society organizations regarding the digital 
modiﬁ cation of photos. On 5 August 2006, Charles Johnson, from a website called Little Green Footballs 
(Littlegreenfootballs.com), and many other bloggers accused Adnan Hajj, a Lebanese photographer based in 
the Middle East, of manipulating the photos of an Israeli air raid on Beirut that he took for Reuters.103 On 8 
August 2006, Reuters admitted that “photo editing software was improperly used on this image,” withdrew 
the photos, and suspended Hajj. Th is case fueled a virulent debate in France, where major photo agencies 
have been historically based and where the coverage of the Middle East conﬂ ict is often a controversial issue. 
In an opinion column entitled “Guerre, mensonges et vidéos” (War, Lies, and Videos), published by the 
newspaper Libération, Shmuel Trigano, head of the Observatoire du monde juif (Jewish World Observatory), 
stated that “manipulated, the media have reactivated the anti-Semite myth of Jews—killers of children.”104  
102. Ministry of Culture and Communication, “Presse en ligne@2010.”
103. “Bloggers drive inquire on how altered images saw print,” New York Times, 9 August 2006, at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/09/technolo-
gy/09photo.html?_r=1&pagewanted=2&fta=y (accessed 29 October 2012).
104. S. Trigano, “Guerre, mensonges et vidéos” (War, lies, and videos), Libération, 31 August 2006, at http://www.liberation.fr/tribune/010158940-
guerre-mensonges-et-videos (accessed 29 October 2012).
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4.2 Investigative Journalism105
4.2.1 Opportunities
While in general highly lauded, investigative journalism is not much developed in France.106 French 
journalists, especially in the print media, are more ready to comment and express opinions than to engage in 
long, in-depth investigations. According to Erik Neveu:
professional excellence is based on the mastery of style and panache. Editorial content, 
highlighting opinion columns and chronicles, reﬂ ects the weight of the commentary and of 
a meta-discourse on the news that favors the expression of views, and considers events as an 
opportunity for bright, cavalier exercise styles.107
Gerard Davet, a journalist with Le Parisien and Le Monde, adds: “France has no tradition of investigative 
journalism.”108
Th is does not mean that investigative journalism is non-existent. News magazines do publish articles based 
on lengthy research and data collection, but some of them are routine articles devoted to the life of politicians 
(internal party games, particular behavior of diﬀ erent party members) or social issues (health care, education, 
or other public services). In France, investigative journalism109 is rather based on oﬃ  cial reports (not widely 
distributed for the public) than on real “boots-on-the-ground” journalistic research. Investigative journalists 
often depend on oﬃ  cials, who produce such reports, as a primary source of information. Th is may produce 
a bizarre relationship among journalists and their sources (who are often notionally the targets of journalistic 
investigations).
Internet portals also kept alive the “ﬂ ying aﬀ airs” of  Yves Jégo (in 2009)110 and Mr Sarkozy (in 2008),111 
by revealing the questionable accumulation of frequent ﬂ yer miles and the use of private jets, as well as the 
Bettencourt aﬀ air (based on illegal ﬁ nancing of Mr Sarkozy’s party before the 2007 elections).112 However, 
105. In this report, investigative journalism is understood as a form of journalism that investigates in depth a topic of public interest. It is character-
ized by lengthy research and preparation, involving primary sources (legal documents, tax records, government and regulatory reports), analysis 
of social and legal issues, and a signiﬁ cant number of interviews on and oﬀ  the record. Key areas for investigative journalism include crime, 
corporate wrongdoing, political corruption, and public policy of all kinds.
106. D. Marchetti, “Th e Revelations of Investigative Journalism in France,” Global Media and Communication, 2009, no. 5, pp. 368–388 (hereafter 
Marchetti 2009).
107. E. Neveu, Sociologie du journalisme (Sociology of journalism), Paris: La Découverte—Repères, 2004.
108. Deutsche Welle, “French discover investigative journalism and how to muzzle it,” 19 January 2011, at http://www.dw.de/french-discover-inves-
tigative-journalism-and-how-to-muzzle-it/a-14773845 (accessed 15 February 2013) (hereafter Deutsche Welle, “French discover investigative 
journalism”).
109. Marchetti 2009.
110. Rue89, “Yves Jégo a-t-il plus de miles que Nicolas Sarkozy?” (Has Yves Jégo accumulated more air miles than Nicolas Sarkozy?), 20 February 
2009, at http://eco.rue89.com/2009/02/20/yves-jego-a-t-il-plus-de-miles-que-nicolas-sarkozy (accessed 11 July 2011).
111. J. Martin, “Sarkozy en Egypte: trois avions pour un séjour” (Sarkozy in Egypt: three planes for one stay), 17 January 2008, at http://www.rue89.
com/2008/01/17/sarkozy-en-egypte-trois-avions-pour-un-sejour (accessed 11 July 2011).
112. Deutsche Welle, “French discover investigative journalism.”
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these revelations cannot be attributed to online journalism, but rather to the general interest from any kind 
of media (print, television, or online). 
In 2010, the French platform OVH agreed to host the WikiLeaks site,113 notwithstanding the risk of cyber 
attacks or government pressure (the government tried to stop this hosting in the courts, in vain).114 Le Monde 
also participated in launching some of the WikiLeaks information and established Lemonde.fr/wikileaks-
france and Lemonde.fr/documents-wikileaks for this purpose. After the ﬁ rst ﬂ ush of enthusiasm,115 however, 
use of the documents was rather limited and did not aﬀ ect French investigative journalism substantially. Th e 
websites dedicated to the issue do not seem to be constantly updated (last updated in February and December 
2011), nor to host investigative articles based on the documents provided. Moreover, Le Monde was accused 
of not publishing all the documents, especially one concentrating on the French media (note by the U.S. 
embassy about the French press) with a rather negative opinion about the independence of French journalists 
from political spheres.116 
4.2.2 Threats
Th e speed of news dissemination and the demand for real-time news have been catalyzed by digitization. 
Th ey may also have an impact on the quality of investigative journalism, as journalists, in their struggle to be 
the ﬁ rst to publish the news online, are often reluctant to recheck the gathered data and sources and “draw 
hasty conclusions from minimal material.”117
Another threat for investigative journalists is their dependence on oﬃ  cial or governmental institutions 
(police, auditors, etc.) as their main source of information. Journalists may be used to playing an instrumental 
role (e.g. as an echo chamber): they are often leaked sensational material to be publicly discussed, while in 
fact it is being used in internal factions among political elites or as an attempt to inﬂ uence other public 
institutions.118
Th e ease of legal action against journalists in respect of libel is another threat to investigative journalism. 
Even if journalists who are accused of inaccuracy and lies are acquitted, the procedure may take a long time 
until it is ﬁ nished. One well-known example is that of investigative journalist Denis Robert who revealed 
the Clearstream scandal in 1999 (see section 3.2.1). In 2011, after 60 lawsuits and 10 years of court battles, 
113. LePoint.fr, “Expulsé d’Amazon, WikiLeaks trouve refuge en France” (Expelled from Amazon, WikiLeaks has found refuge in France), at http://
www.lepoint.fr/high-tech-internet/expulse-d-amazon-wikileaks-trouve-refuge-en-france-02-12-2010-1270137_47.php (accessed 13 February 
2013).
114. Associated Press, “French company allowed to keep hosting WikiLeaks,” at http://www.businessweek.com/ap/ﬁ nancialnews/D9JVNO8O0.htm 
(accessed 13 February 2013).
115. France24.com, “France’s top daily highlights Sarkozy in WikiLeaks release,” at http://www.france24.com/en/20101129-wikileaks-le-monde-
france-diplomatic-cables-sarkozy-un-spying (accessed 15 February 2013).
116. Acrimed.org, “LeMonde ‘oublie’ un document WikiLeaks sur … les médias français” (Le Monde “forgot” to publish a WikiLeaks document 
about the French media), at http://www.acrimed.org/article3498.html (accessed 15 February 2013).
117. Marchetti 2009.
118. Marchetti 2009.
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Robert was cleared of all accusations. He was found to have acted in the public good and not to have crossed 
the limits of free speech, even though some risky interpretations were made.119
In the digital era, investigative journalism is threatened by amateur journalists and paparazzi, who search for 
scandals involving politicians and celebrities, endangering the ethics and honor of the profession. New non-
journalists seem not to fully understand the topics they cover, concentrating instead on shocking aspects of 
the news, while investigative journalists are rather perceived as “crusaders for justice.”120 
4.2.3 New Platforms
Digitization probably has not made any signiﬁ cant changes to the work of investigative journalists. In France 
there are a few large players in the purely online journalism sector, known as “pure players.” Th ese include 
Rue89 (with 1.479 million unique visitors a month), LePlus (1.262 million unique visitors), Atlantico (1.258 
million), Slate France (966,000), and Mediapart (578,000). Even though their websites are not as popular 
as those of traditional media, they manage to gather a sizable public around their own content provided by 
journalists, experts, independent writers, or “non-professionals” (most often their own active readers).
Mediapart is a portal created in 2008 by two ex-journalists from Le Monde, Laurent Mauduit and Edwy 
Plenel, who felt stiﬂ ed at their old newspaper. A vast part of the website is reserved to subscribers (which 
stood at €9 (US$11.7) a month in 2012). Th is model of funding is supposed to give journalists ﬁ nancial 
independence. Mediapart’s journalists played an important role in unveiling the Woerth–Bettencourt scandal 
in 2009 and 2010 (involving allegedly illegal connections between members of the French government 
and large businesses giving illegal political donations). In April 2011, they revealed a scandal in the French 
national football team whereby quotas on French players with African origins were to be introduced. Th e 
methods used by these journalists (accused of using unreliable witnesses or surreptitious recordings)121 came 
under heavy criticism from the political and traditional media world.122 Nevertheless, the publication of 
controversial news brought to Mediapart 1,000 new subscribers on the day when the story broke (and 5,000 
during June 2009, when the football scandal was widely covered in other media). Membership reached 
58,000 subscribers by the end of 2011.123
Another important independent pure player is Rue89, created in 2007 by an ex-journalist from Libération, 
Pierre Haski, in a move to gather on one website the work of traditional journalists, experts, and internet 
users who actively participate in writing articles. Th e content is free.
119. M. Bouchart, “French landmark case: A new dawn for investigative journalism?”, 11 January 2012, at http://www.journalism.co.uk/news-fea-
tures/french-landmark-case-a-new-dawn-for-investigative-journalism-/s5/a547334/ (accessed 10 October 2012).
120. Marchetti 2009, p. 379.
121. “‘Méthodes fascistes’: Mediapart va attaquer Xavier Bertrand en diﬀ amation” (“Fascist methods”: Mediapart is to attack Xavier Bertrand for 
defamation), L’Express, at http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/methodes-fascistes-mediapart-va-attaquer-xavier-bertrand-en-diﬀ amation_
904570.html (accessed 9 July 2011).
122. M. Deprieck, “Mediapart, cible de toutes les attaques” (Mediapart, target of all the attacks), at http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/medi-
apart-cible-de-toutes-les-attaques_991779.html (accessed 9 July 2011).
123. SuBMoJour, “Case Study: Mediapart (France),” at http://www.submojour.net/archives/752/case-study-mediapart-france/ (accessed 10 October 
2012).
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Owni.fr is an information website created in 2009 and based on data journalism. One of their ﬁ rst widely 
manifested works was the creation of an application that helped with reading the documents from the 
controversial “whistleblower” site WikiLeaks relating to Afghanistan.
In January 2012, Huﬃ  ngton Post launched its French version. It gained high publicity in the media as Anne 
Sinclair (the wife of Dominique Strauss-Kahn, a disgraced one-time presidential front runner embroiled in a 
sexual assault scandal in 2011) became the main editor.124 It was launched in cooperation with Le Monde and 
replaced its previous platform Lapost. By July 2012, it had become the most popular pure player in France, 
with 1,916 million unique visitors.125, 126
4.2.4 Dissemination and Impact
Pure-media and independent news blogs are gaining in popularity. However, it is still the websites of the 
traditional media that have the highest visibility and visitation. A Mediapolis study in 2009 conﬁ rmed this; 
57 percent of respondents said that to obtain information they visit general news portals such as Yahoo.fr or 
Orange.fr, and 24 percent said that they did so by visiting traditional media websites. Only 6 percent visited 
independent portals, and 13 percent said they did not visit any other information websites.127 
In a separate development, Le Canard enchaîné,128 a satirical political newspaper with virtually no online 
presence,129 published information in early 2011 about the French Minister of Foreign Aﬀ airs, Michèle 
Alliot-Marie, using an airplane that belonged to a supporter of the deposed Tunisian dictator Ben Ali for 
private trips. In response to these accusations, the politician denounced the internet for causing trouble and 
complained about a permanent search for scandal among online writers (as in the gutter press); however, she 
never clearly denied the accusations. Her unsubstantiated attacks on internet journalism were widely derided 
by commentators in the media. Th e controversy eventually forced Ms Alliot-Marie, a heavyweight right-wing 
politician, to step down and she has yet to return to politics.
124. France24, “‘Le Huﬃ  ngton Post’ launches in Paris,” at http://www.france24.com/en/20120123-huﬃ  ngton-post-launches-french-edition-dsk-
strauss-kahn-anne-sinclair-arianna-huﬀ po, 23 January 2012 (accessed 10 October 2012).
125. WAN-IFRA, “Le Huﬃ  ngton Post becomes No. 1 in France,” at http://www.sfnblog.com/2012/09/27/le-huﬃ  ngton-post-becomes-no-1-in-
france (accessed 10 October 2012).
126. Cross Médias Consulting (CMC), “Le Top 50 des sites d’infos en septembre” (Top 50 websites for information in September), at http://www.
erwanngaucher.com/article/24/10/2011/le-top-50-des-sites-dinfos-en-septembre/735 (accessed 10 October 2012) (hereafter CMC, “le Top 50 
des sites d’info”).
127. Mediapolis study 2009–2012, ANR project, CEVIPOF Sciences-Po.
128. “Ollier s’estime ‘sali en permanence’ et s’en prend au Web” (Ollier claims to have been permanently “sullied on reputation” and accuses the 
web), Le Monde, 24 February 2011, at http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2011/02/24/ollier-s-estime-sali-en-permanence-et-s-en-prend-
au-web_1484805_823448.html#ens_id=1473787 (accessed 9 July 2011).
129. Le Canard enchaîné has a website at http://www.lecanardenchaine.fr, with a declaration that it has no intention to go online with current issues, 
but rather has reserved the domain name so that nobody else can take it, and with the likely plan to publish archive material in the future 
(accessed 3 February 2013). 
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Table 19.
National news and information online platforms by visits a year (million), September 2011–September 2012
Name Genre No. of visits
L’Equipe Sports daily 70
Le Monde General/political daily 57
Le Figaro General/political daily 51
Le Parisien General daily 26
Le Nouvel Observateur General/political weekly 27
Libération General/political daily 19
20 minutes General/political free daily 19
L’Express General/political weekly 16
Le Point General/political weekly 16
Les Echos Economical/political daily 10
Rue89 Pure player 8.8
Le Hufﬁ ngton Post Pure player 7.7
Télérama Cultural/TV weekly 4.4
La Tribune General/political daily 4.1
Sports.fr Sports pure player 3.8
Challenges Economic weekly 3.5
Paris Match General/celebrity weekly 3.1
France Info News radio (public) 2.9
Source: Oﬃ  ce de Justiﬁ cation de la diﬀ usion (OJD)130
4.3 Social and Cultural Diversity
4.3.1 Sensitive Issues
French public opinion is preoccupied with a few topics that continuously reappear in the public debate. Most 
relate to ethnic or religious minorities and on the economic problems the country is facing:
 Th e French national identity: this is a discussion initiated by Mr Sarkozy during his 2007 presidential 
campaign on what is and what should be the state of integration of immigrants, and what “French” 
values, citizenship, and civil society entail.131
 Illegal and legal immigration: this topic has been heatedly debated in France since the strong immigration 
from the Maghreb and North Africa began. It was again discussed within the public sphere when the 
problem of the expulsion of Roma (“Gypsies”) from Romania began in 2010. Th e deportations were 
130. CMC, “le Top 50 des sites d’info.”
131. C. Bonal and L. Equy, “L’identité nationale selon Sarkozy” (National identity according to Sarkozy), 2 November 2009, Libération, at http://
www.liberation.fr/politiques/0101600818-l-identite-nationale-selon-sarkozy (accessed 11 July 2011).
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strongly criticized by other EU countries.132 It was followed by the emerging issue of illegal immigrants 
from the Arab revolution countries, mainly Tunisia.133 Again, it was present in the public debate during 
the 2012 presidential elections.134
 Muslim customs in the public sphere: a particularly controversial topic in 2010 and 2011 was the issue 
of banning the burqa and the niqab in public places.135, 136 It began as a discussion about the place of 
religion, republican law, and Muslim rights.
 Unemployment: due to delocalization and externalization of industrial activities, and the world economic 
crisis, unemployment is seen as the ﬁ rst and most important problem facing French society.137 It is 
especially stressed as a problem for young people.
4.3.2 Coverage of Sensitive Issues
Th e French constitution considers all citizens as equal, whatever their origin. Ethnic groups must not be 
identiﬁ ed as such and cannot be counted, for example, in public statistical studies.138 Consequently, policies 
on positive discrimination cannot be implemented and are opposed by many political parties as they are 
considered a ﬁ rst move toward a “communitarian” society at odds with the French republican ideal. From a 
legal perspective, only negative discrimination, for instance, denying a person a job on the grounds of their 
origin, can be fought, which is often diﬃ  cult since evidence can rarely be gathered.
However, many media observers and NGOs would admit that the diversity of French society is poorly reﬂ ected 
in the French media, especially in television.139 Although this opinion is not shared by the general public,140 the 
issue was put on the policy agenda at the end of 2005 at the moment of the riots in the Parisian suburbs. In 2006, 
the Law of 31 March on Equality of Opportunity amended Article 3.1 of the 1986 Law on Communications 
and gave the CSA a monitoring role with respect to discrimination on French television and radio.
132. BBC, “Q&A: France Roma expulsions,” 19 October 2010, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11027288 (accessed 11 July 2011).
133. Radio France Internationale (RFI), “France will not tolerate illegal Tunisian immigration, says minister,” 14 February 2011, at http://www.
english.rﬁ .fr/africa/20110214-france-will-not-tolerate-illegal-tunisian-immigration-says-minister (accessed 11 July 2011).
134. B. Inzaurralde, “Why French far-right candidate Marine Le Pen is attracting youth,” Christian Science Monitor, 11 April 2012, at http://www.
csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2012/0411/Why-French-far-right-candidate-Marine-Le-Pen-is-attracting-youth (accessed 10 October 2012).
135. CNN, “French senate approves burqa ban,” 14 September 2010, at http://articles.cnn.com/2010-09-14/world/france.burqa.ban_1_burqa-
overt-religious-symbols-ban-last-year?_s=PM:WORLD (accessed 11 July 2011).
136. “France begins ban on niqab and burqa,” Th e Guardian, 11 April 2011, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/11/france-begins-burqa-
niqab-ban (accessed 11 July 2011).
137. TNS Sofres, “Baromètre des préoccupations des Français, Bilan de l’année 2010” (Barometer of the preoccupations of the French, Annual 
Report, 2010).
138. Any mention of ethnic origin, color, or religion in oﬃ  cial documents and reports of private or public companies is illegal according to the French 
Penal Code. For example, a company is not allowed to keep records of its employees’ national or ethnic origin, even for private purposes.
139. See, for example, the conference “Ecrans pâles” (Colorless screens) organized on 26 April 2004 in Paris by the CSA, along with the High Council 
for Integration (Haut conseil à l’intégration, HCI) and the Action and Support Fund for Integration and against Discrimination (Fonds d’action 
et de soutien pour l’intégration et la lutte contre les discriminations, FASILD).
140. In June 2009, France Télévisions commissioned an online survey among a sample of 1,576 individuals, representative of French TV viewers 
aged 15 and over. A total of 12 percent of interviewees said that they fully agreed and 44 percent that they somewhat agreed with the statement: 
“Television takes into account the diversity of origins of the population living in France.” Interviewees said also that public television stations 
better represented the ethnic diversity of the French population than private ones (62 percent and 46 percent, respectively): see more at http://
www.francetelevisions.fr/actualite_spip/IMG/.../Etude_Diversite.pdf (accessed 30 October 2012).
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In 2007, the CSA set up a working group on diversity in the audiovisual media and held hearings with the 
executives of the main television channels and radio stations.141 In March 2008, it established an observatory 
of audiovisual diversity, comprising mostly media professionals, to pilot studies and make suggestions for 
action. In 2009, this observatory started to produce a barometer on diversity, which is to be conducted 
twice a year. Th is barometer surveys the representation of ethnicity, gender, and the disabled on French 
television channels.142 According to the study, which was primarily based on content analysis, from 2011 
highly educated managers and intellectual professionals are over-represented (appearing in 70 percent of 
programs although their representation in the total population is at a level of 19 percent), with the opposite 
being true for the economically inactive (appearing in 9 percent of programs although they represent 55 
percent of society). 
Women are in general an under-represented group (35 percent in broadcasting time while they account for 
51 percent of the population). In 85 percent of the programming time white people are represented, with 
15 percent of the time remaining for those of other ethnic origins (6 percent black, 4 percent Arabic, and 5 
percent Asian and others).143 Disabled people are not shown in almost any aired programs: they constituted 
only 0.6 percent (which grew from 0.2 percent in 2010) of all the ﬁ ctional characters present on television 
during the four weeks of study. 
4.3.3 Space for Public Expression
After the riots in the French suburbs during the winter of 2005, questions were raised about how traditional 
media covered some sections of society, especially those areas predominantly populated by citizens with 
foreign origins. Traditional media were criticized for generally neglecting these areas, except when violent 
events took place there. Th ey were also accused of strong bias in their presentations through a negative 
coverage emphasizing unemployment, insecurity, and antisocial behavior, while paying too little attention 
to the more positive aspects, such as the burgeoning of small enterprises and many cultural and artistic 
initiatives. Finally, journalists were reproached for their poor understanding of the suburbs because they 
come from diﬀ erent social classes and live in more aﬄ  uent areas.
While there are probably dozens of French blogs or websites initiated by young “banlieusards” (grassroots 
activists), the Bondy blog144 has emerged as one of the most important and original. It was initially started 
in November 2005 by L’Hebdo, a Swiss weekly magazine, in an eﬀ ort to explore the potential of online 
journalism while providing a deeper coverage of the riots. Th e magazine established a permanent team of 
journalists reporting online from places where incidents happened. Th e Bondy blog’s managers tried to 
141. Summary at http://www.csa.fr/actualite/dossiers/dossiers_detail.php?id=126260&chap=3153 (accessed 30 October 2012).
142. CSA, “Les résultats de la quatrième vague du baromètre de la diversité à la télévision, 7 au 13 mai 2011” (Th e 4th round of the survey on diversity 
in television, 7–13 May 2011), at http://csa.fr/Etudes-et-publications/Les-observatoires/L-observatoire-de-la-diversite/Les-resultats-de-la-qua-
trieme-vague-du-barometre-de-la-diversite-a-la-television-7-au-13-mai-2011 (accessed 30 October 2012).
143. It is not possible to compare it with social diversity since a question about ethnic origins is not allowed to be asked in surveys.
144. See http://yahoo.bondyblog.fr (accessed 30 October 2012).
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diﬀ erentiate themselves from other pure players as being more independent from the traditional print media 
(however, now it has ties with Yahoo! and 20 minutes) and being more open toward content produced by 
ordinary citizens.
In September 2009, the School of Journalism in Lille established a partnership with the Bondy blog for 
training in new forms of journalism and for journalists specialized in online writing.145 Another new medium 
dedicated to a smaller audience group, Otoradio.com radio, launched in 2006 after the riots in 2005. It 
broadcasts mainly to young people living on the outskirts of Paris. Its mission is to show the importance of 
the cultural and social diversity of these places, as well as to promote young musical talent.
4.4 Political Diversity
4.4.1 Elections and Political Coverage
In October 2006, the Internet Rights Forum (Forum des droits de l’Internet, FDI), a consultative public 
organization, published a recommendation regarding the uses of the internet during electoral campaigns.146 
Th e institution, however, has not survived the ﬁ nancial crisis; it closed in 2010 after state subsidies were no 
longer available.147
An early change triggered by the internet concerns the publication of polls. Up to 2002, it was illegal to 
“publish, disseminate, or comment” on opinion polls during the week preceding election day, according to 
an electoral law from 1977. Th e law did not prohibit actual polling, but banned the public dissemination 
of the results in an attempt to protect voters from possible inﬂ uence and to allow a genuine personal vote. 
Th e development of the internet made this law more and more ineﬀ ective, as some foreign media (especially 
those based in neighboring French-speaking countries such as Belgium and Switzerland) published on their 
websites polls conducted during the week before the election as well as the exit polls or estimates on election 
day before voting closed. Th e internet gave the general public access to information that was previously 
restricted to political insiders. Additionally, the constitutionality of the law was questioned. Th is led the 
French Parliament to modify the law on polls. Under a law adopted in 2002, the ban on polls publication is 
limited to the day of the vote (Law 2002-214). 
145. N. Nabili, “Journalisme et diversité sociale, un partenariat ESJ Lille/Bondy blog” (Journalism and social diversity, partnership between ESJ Lille 
and Bondy blog), 9 March 2009, at http://yahoo.bondyblog.fr/200903090002/journalisme-et-diversite-sociale-un-partenariat-esj-lille-bondy-
blog (accessed 11 July 2011).
146. Le Forum des droits de l’Internet, “Recommandation, Internet et communication électorale” (Recommendations, internet and electoral com-
munication), 29 August 2002, at http://www.foruminternet.org/telechargement/documents/reco-ice-20061017.pdf (accessed 30 October 2012).
147. See http://www.foruminternet.org/institution/espace-presse/communiques-de-presse/suite-a-sa-dissolution-le-forum-des-droits-sur-l-internet-
partage-ses-contenus-3119.html (accessed 11 July 2011).
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Indeed, newspapers do publish, in an interactive way, surveys by diﬀ erent public opinion institutes. Th ey 
create their own tools aimed at inﬂ uencing the outcome (e.g. Voting Advice Application, VAA). For example, 
Laboussolepresidentielle.fr (VAA), co-sponsored by 20 minutes and Ouest-France,148 was visited by more than 
1.5 million people during the 2012 presidential elections.149
2012 changed the television debate among presidential candidates. Under CSA regulations, the campaign 
was divided into three periods: 1 January to 19 March, 20 March to 8 April, 9 April to 4 May. In the ﬁ rst 
period, all candidates were supposed to have equal access to the media; in the second and third periods, all 
candidates were supposed to have equal air time.150 Th e CSA monitored the air time across all media. Th e 
elections attracted quite high media interest, airing some 2,000 hours of information between January and 
May 2012—more than in 2007.
Except for individual interviews in diﬀ erent outlets, candidates were also supposed to appear together in a 
single program. However, since they did not agree to take part in a collective debate, it was decided that all 
ten candidates would be questioned by a group of journalists for around 15 minutes each, and the interviews 
broadcast in two transmissions of the France 2 program “Paroles et des actes” (Words and acts). A similar 
format (equal-time interviews rather than a debate) was held with the two front runners before the second 
round of elections on 26 April 2012, with a total audience of 6.2 million.151 Finally, a debate between the 
candidates took place on the Wednesday before the Sunday polling day, aired by private television channel 
TF1 and France 2 (with two journalists from each station moderating the debate), as well as transmitted 
by the 24-hour channels. Interestingly, the ﬂ ow of viewers’ comments on news websites meant that the 
information and arguments used by both politicians were fact-checked in real time.
4.4.2 Digital Political Communications
Th e constitutional referendum campaign in 2005 and the presidential elections in 2007 marked the points 
when French political life went online. Online political communication was introduced by all the political 
parties in the 2007 and 2012 presidential elections (12 and 10 parties, respectively) and by most parties 
contesting the 2009 European Parliament (EP) elections.
Studies of web content analysis during the 2007 presidential election and the 2009 EP elections showed three 
main ﬁ ndings concerning the online performance of candidates and parties: during the presidential election 
the online campaign was better prepared and implemented; major candidates and parties performed better 
148. CEVIPOF, “La boussole présidentielle 2012” (Presidential compass 2012), at http://www.cevipof.com/fr/2012/recherche/boussolepresidentielle 
(accessed 10 October 2012).
149. A. Jadot, B. Cautres, P. Lefébure, F. Chanvril, “Th e French 2012 ‘Boussole Présidentielle’: Exploring Issues and Personality Based Voting Th anks 
to a VAA,” paper presented at the IPSA General Conference, Madrid, 2012.
150. See CSA at http://www.csa.fr/Television/Le-suivi-des-programmes/Le-pluralisme-politique-et-les-campagnes-electorales/Election-presiden-
tielle-2012-temps-de-parole (accessed 15 February 2013).
151. “Hollande sûr de lui face à un Sarkozy pugnace sur France 2” (Hollande sure of himself facing an attacking Sarkozy on France 2), Le Monde, at http://
www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2012/article/2012/04/27/hollande-sur-de-lui-face-a-un-sarkozy-pugnace-sur-france-2_1692068_
1471069.html (accessed 15 February 2013).
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than their minor party opponents; and left-wing parties or candidates performed better than their right-wing 
counterparts.152 Th e last two ﬁ ndings were conﬁ rmed in studies on the French campaign before the 2009 EP 
election.153
In 2009, the main political parties launched their interactive social network sites, where they recruit supporters 
and activists: UMP (Lescreateursdepossibles.com), PS (Lacoopol.fr), and the Democratic Movement 
(Mouvement démocrate, MoDem) (Lesdemocrates.fr). In preparation for the 2012 presidential elections, all 
the main candidates wanted to mark their presence on the internet, often announcing their candidacy (e.g. in 
PS primaries) against a background with the logo of their website (e.g. Martine Aubry). However, the private 
social network websites did not survive the overwhelming competition from the already well-established 
Facebook (with more than 23.5 million users in France),154 and they became either a niche communication 
tool among the partisans (PS, MoDem) or were closed down (UMP).
At the beginning of 2010, the political parties, enticed by the success of Barack Obama’s presidential 
campaign, launched their own social network sites gathering supporters, volunteers, and all those potentially 
interested: they included the Socialist Party Lacoopol.fr, and the UMP’s Lescreateursdepossibles.com (closed 
at the beginning of 2012).
If during the 2007 presidential campaign supporters were gathered around the websites created by the 
candidates (e.g. Désirs d’Avenir by Ségolène Royal), this approach was abandoned in the 2012 campaign. 
All the candidates had websites, albeit with little interactivity but regularly updated, and nine out of ten 
were present on both Facebook and Twitter. Th ey collected a high number of “likes” and followers, which 
was proportionate to their actual share of the vote (the ﬁ rst two candidates attracted the highest number of 
supporters) in the ﬁ rst round of the elections.155 Candidates used two diﬀ erent techniques for disseminating 
information: via websites, where they gathered the most important news, downloads, and applications; and 
via social networks, where they concentrated on interactivity with the visitors or rather among the visitors, as 
it was rare that they directly responded to comments. However, it seems (as it is not possible to check this) 
that the discussion was not strongly moderated, as negative comments were often not removed.
On the other hand, studies on the demand side of online political communication (how citizens are using the 
internet for political engagement) show no obvious growing tendency toward online political engagement, 
which is rather stable with some ups (e.g. during the 2007 and 2012 presidential elections) and downs during 
the less politically interesting periods.156
152. T. Vedel and K. Koc-Michalska, “Th e internet and French political communication in the aftermath of the 2007 presidential election,” paper 
presented at the 5th European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) General Conference, Potsdam, 2009.
153. D. Lilleker, K. Koc-Michalska, et al., “Informing, engaging, mobilising or interacting: Searching for a European model of web campaigning,” in 
European Journal of Communication, 26(3) (September 2011), pp. 195–213.
154. See http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats4.htm (accessed 10 October 2012).
155. K. Koc-Michalska and D. Lilleker, “Interacting with your supporters: Interactive strategies in French Presidential election,” Center for Compa-
rative Studies in Political and Public Communication (Ceccopop) Conference, Paris 2012.
156. Data provided by the IFOP, from a representative sample of French internet users (N = 1,009). Surveys performed online November 2006, April 
2007, June 2009, and from a Mediapolis study 2009–2012, ANR project, CEVIPOF Sciences-Po.
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At the same time, however, the social network proﬁ les of the presidential candidates also functioned as a 
watchdog forum. For example, Mr Sarkozy had an account on Facebook where he showed news, photos, 
and videos covering his entire political career. However, some vigilant visitors found weaknesses in his 
communication. In November 2009, a photo that Mr Sarkozy claimed was taken beside the falling Berlin 
Wall on 9 November 1989 proved not to be genuine, as blogger Alain Auﬀ ray presented evidence that the 
president could not have known about the events in Berlin and participated in those events that early.157 
Th e internet has reached its potential in encouraging “new activists.” In fact, the peak during the 2007 
presidential election was more visible than during the 2012 presidential elections and the 2009 EP elections. 
Th e most popular political online activities in recent years have been the search for political news (35 percent 
in March before the 2012 elections, and 29 percent after the elections in May 2012), the search for satirical 
content, and watching political videos. Also, the number of people who are very active politically online did 
not change drastically (with the exception of the presidential elections): in 2006, 3.6 percent of respondents 
performed at least ﬁ ve activities, in 2007 that stood at 7 percent, in 2009 3.9 percent, and in 2010 3.1 
percent (a similar pattern can be found for those performing four activities). Th is may indicate that those 
who are the most active in online politics are equally engaged regardless of the electoral season; it is the less 
active or the “clicktivism” that is changing according to the importance and intensity of elections.
Figure 5.
Online political engagement, 2006–2012 (% of total respondents), 2006–2012
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157. L. Mandret, “Sarkozy sur Facebook, ou la ﬁ n du storytelling digital” (Sarkozy on Facebook or the end of online storytelling), 15 Septem-
ber 2009, at http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/sarkozy-sur-facebook-ou-la-ﬁ n-du-storytelling-digital_828510.html (accessed 20 July 
2011).
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4.5 Assessments
Digitization and widening access to the internet have brought positive and negative changes both for the 
work of journalists and for society as a whole (see section 4.3.3). Th e high volume and accessibility of 
diﬀ erent information sources oﬀ er a chance for people to choose according to their needs and political 
opinions; however, at the same time information provision has become even more standardized for everyone 
(see section 4.1.1).
Digitization brought to life new forms of journalism, sometimes pseudo-journalism, as anyone can publish 
their own information, pictures, or comments. Th e provision of news must necessarily become more 
interactive, as readers do want to participate in its creation or dissemination. Digitization has also oﬀ ered 
citizens the chance to act as watchdogs regarding what politicians are doing through the monitoring of their 
online communication and oﬄ  ine activity, a task hitherto reserved only for professionals. It has probably 
not inﬂ uenced the role of investigative journalism, which was not that present in the news-scape in the 
analog era. 
Digitization is changing the traditional model of journalism. However, this is primarily due to the change 
in business models, in response to decreasing revenues from the sale of print newspapers and advertising. 
Journalists and more generally media providers need to become hypermedia platforms that provide information 
through diﬀ erent online tools adding to traditional television, radio, and print (i.e. with internet, mobiles, 
or tablets). Th ey also need to be present through diﬀ erent services: websites, mobile applications, social 
networks, and microblogs.
In France, digitization has brought one signiﬁ cant type of player into the journalistic world: the pure players. 
Th ese are platforms providing information only online. Often established by journalists, pure players oﬀ er 
more independent content than the traditional media, but most of all they publish provocative comments 
and editorials. Th ey are often co-created by experts and readers.
Digitization has certainly changed the nature of political communication during and outside the election 
periods. Th e change was especially visible during the 2007 presidential election, when the internet tools 
were rather innovative and often used for the ﬁ rst time. Th is is probably why they also attracted so many 
people. Since then, most top politicians have an online presence on various platforms: websites, blogs, 
and social networks. Th e 2012 presidential elections did not bring any revolutionary changes into the way 
political actors were communicating with their potential voters. Th e exceptions were a higher degree of 
professionalization in relation to the use of online tools (often managed by professional companies) and 
probably higher spending allocated to their exploitation. Political actors had to change their online strategies 
and oﬀ er more interesting—and much more interactive—communication to their supporters. Th ey also 
had to be more accustomed to even more visible criticism and negative commenting, as information on the 
internet is always alive (“the internet never forgets”).
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Digitization has not (yet) made it possible for smaller and less important candidates to bypass the traditional 
media’s gatekeeping role, perhaps because—with few exceptions—they have not made any more use of the 
internet than their more prominent counterparts. 
Online communication has facilitated wider communication among marginalized groups and communities 
as a result of their online presence. However, studies on migrants show that they are not using the internet 
as much as expected.158 Th ere was no visible eﬀ ect of digitization on the coverage of minority groups in 
traditional media (e.g. television).
158. S. Strudel and K. Koc-Michalska, “France and its migrants,” Moveact Project (dir. Ettore Recchi), 2012, at http://www.moveact.eu (accessed 10 
October 2012).
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5. Digital Media and Technology
5.1 Broadcasting Spectrum
5.1.1 Spectrum Allocation Policy
In France, the electromagnetic spectrum constitutes inalienable public property. Frequencies are therefore 
allocated temporarily and are subject to request on the basis of license application. Th e management of the 
spectrum is collective and performed by institutions gathering “all interested bodies” and works within the 
logic of the open public services. Th e spectrum management functions are largely inspired by the reports 
of Pierre Huet159 on dismantling public broadcasting monopolies (1986) and telecommunications (1996). 
Legislative provisions160 are implemented by three diﬀ erent agencies, in accordance with European directives161 
and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) decisions. Th e national plan for the switch-over from 
analog to digital broadcasting as well as the management of the digital dividend was approved in 2008162 by 
the prime minister.
Th e National Frequencies Agency (Agence Nationale des Fréquences, ANFr)163 is a public state body that 
ensures the planning, management, and control of the usage of the public and commercial radio frequencies. 
It organizes the allocation of frequencies for all engaged bodies (see below). It also represents the French state 
within international organizations.
Th e CSA was created in 1989 (on the basis of the 1982 High Authority for Audiovisual Communication 
(Haute Autorité de la communication audiovisuelle) as a part of the deregulation process of the public 
broadcasting market, in order to facilitate the existence of private operators and to ensure the freedom of 
159. P. Huet, “Rapport sur l’organisation de la gestion des fréquences radioélectriques” (Report on the management of the radioelectric frequencies), 
February 1994 (report for the prime minister), at http://www.anfr.fr/?id=442 (accessed 17 February 2013).
160. Law on Post and Telecommunication, Law on Communication, at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr.
161. European convention, Television without Frontiers (TVWF) 1993; Audiovisual Media Service Directive, 10 March 2010; Telecoms package 
(Paquets telecom) 2002, 2009, 2011.
162. Order to approve national plan to stop analog broadcasting and for switch-over to digital broadcasting, Journal oﬃ  ciel, 23 December 2008.
163. See http://www.anfr.fr.
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communication.164 It manages and assigns frequencies for those broadcasters that are not network operators.165 
Th e CSA manages the frequencies that it allocates according to decisions taken at the international level.166 It 
has authority over terrestrial and satellite broadcasting service frequencies.
Th e French Electronic Communication and Postal Sector Regulator (Autorité de Régulation des Communications 
Electroniques et des Postes, ARCEP), created by law in 1996167 and amended in 2004, leases frequencies to 
network operators. It distinguishes three main categories of actors depending on: the equipment used (or the 
necessary transmission strength), the size of the area covered, and the bandwidths required for the activity. 
Th is procedure facilitates the entry of diﬀ erent operators, thus contributing to a wider diversiﬁ cation of the 
market. Access to the frequencies managed by ARCEP requires purchasing expensive rights of usage. To 
better regulate the market and protect consumers, ARCEP regularly organizes public consultations as well 
as controls, implementing strict competition rules and the application of services. However, ARCEP has no 
special role in protecting consumers of telecommunications services.
Th is division allows for transparency in spectrum allocation. At the global level it is ANFr that allocates the 
spectrum, and CSA and ARCEP at the lower levels. CSA is responsible for the management of broadcasting 
services (and their content) and ARCEP for the network operators (telephone and internet). As a result, there 
is a diﬀ erence in the costs of access to frequencies.
Radio and television broadcasters have to pay technical providers (TDF (formerly TéléDiffusion de France), 
Towercast, or VDL) for the access to frequencies. But telecoms operators must themselves purchase direct 
access to the spectrum, of which they never become owners. 
5.1.2 Transparency
Th e existence of two independent administrative authorities (CSA and ARCEP) and a state agency (ANFr) 
contributes to the transparency of the management of the frequency spectra. However, the allocation process 
seems to be fragmented and diﬀ erentiated for diﬀ erent beneﬁ ciaries. It is also often opaque, complex, 
and diﬃ  cult to understand,168 and lacks consistency. If ANFr is responsible for the general planning and 
management of the whole spectrum, then it has little control over how the spectrum is used, and is therefore 
unable to optimize its general usage. Th e digital switch-over did not improve this situation.
164. Law on Freedom of Communication from 1986 with modiﬁ cations in 1989.
165. Articles 21 and 22 of the Law on Freedom of Communication, Law no. 86-1067 of 30 September 1986: “Th e CSA authorizes, in respect of the 
national treaties and international agreements signed by France, the usage of the bands of frequencies and frequencies attributed or assigned for 
audiovisual usage. Th e CSA controls their usage. Th e CSA and the National Frequencies Agency will ensure the good reception of the signals, 
and to that end they will conclude among themselves all the necessary arrangements.”
166. European Conferences on the Post and Telecommunications (Conférences européennes des Postes et Télécommunications) and Regional Conferences 
on Radiocommunication (Conférences régionales de Radiocommunications).
167. See http://www.arcep.fr.
168. B. Ratailleau, “Dix ans après, la régulation à l’ère numérique” (Ten years later, regulation in the digital era), 2007, Report, Sénat, n° 350.
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To ensure the transparency of their procedures, the three institutions responsible for the spectrum allocation 
are obliged to publish each year an activity report and keep oﬃ  cial web pages updated.
Allocations of the frequencies are made through a public call for applications. All the documents required 
are made available to other players and the general public. Even though the conditions for the access to the 
network are clearly speciﬁ ed, the end choice of operators is not clear and is often criticized as being politicized 
(e.g. similar situations occurred when mobile telephone licenses were assigned to the SFR Group in 1989169 
and to Bouygues in 1994170—both had strong relations with the Rally for the Republic (Rassemblement 
pour la République, RPR), the party representing Jacques Chirac, the prime minister at the time and later 
the president). According to Article 26 of the Law of 30 September 1986, the CSA must give priority of 
frequency allocation to public media. Th e CSA grants frequencies for both national (very limited) and local 
(numerous in regions) digital channels.
In 2001 and 2002, three licenses for telephone operation were assigned to Orange (France Telecom), 
Bouygues Telecom, and SFR (Vivendi) for €619 million (US$ 806 million) combined. To limit the power of 
this oligopoly on mobile phone services, a second market for virtual operators (indirect recipients of wireless 
networks, such as NRJ Mobile or M6 Mobile) was organized in 2006. New entrants had to rent parts of 
bandwidth through unbundling and numerous agreements with the main operators (SFR, Orange, and 
Bouygues). 
Finally, in 2009 the market was opened for a fourth license, which was granted to Free (Iliad) for €240 million 
(US$ 312.5 million). Th is opening caused many protests by the three incumbent ﬁ rms (who complained that 
the license price was undervalued).171 Free (which has already played a crucial role in decreasing the prices 
of ﬁ xed line telephone, television, and internet access) has lowered the prices while introducing their mobile 
products in 2012 and aimed to capture 5–7 percent of the market. ARCEP estimates an investment from 
Iliad of up to €2 billion (US$2.6 billion) by 2018. Th is entry was eagerly anticipated by consumers, who 
hoped for a price war in mobile telephony, costs being among the highest in Europe (before 2012). 
Free has also launched new internet access packages (ﬁ xed telephony, internet, and television) including 
mobile telephony, which should encourage the growth of the mobile internet. In fact, in January 2012, 
Free revolutionized the market with the introduction of 3G mobile services with unlimited calls and text 
messages for only €19.99 (US$26), forcing other mobile operators to improve their oﬀ er. During the ﬁ rst 
three months of 2012, Free had a market share of 4 percent by number of subscribers.172 
169. R. Gilardin, “La ‘libéralisation’ des télécommunications en France” (“Liberalization” of telecoms in France), Mémoire de 4e année, sous la direc-
tion de Gilles Richard, Sc.Po, Rennes, thesis 2009–2010 (4th year dissertation, supervised by Gilles Richard, Sciences-Po, Rennes, 2009–2010).
170. “Une décision délicate pour le gouvernement: l’attribution du troisième réseau de téléphonie reste en suspens” (Sensitive decision for the govern-
ment: the suspension of the attribution of the third telephone network), Le Monde, 27 September 1994.
171. AFP, “Le Conseil d’Etat conﬁ rme l’attribution à Free de la quatrième licence 3G” (State Council conﬁ rms the allocation of the fourth license 3G 
to Free), 12 October 2010.
172. Analyssy Mason, “Free mobile’s successful entry in France driving structural changes in the market,” at http://www.analysysmason.com/About-
Us/News/Insight/French-mobile-market-Jun2012 (accessed 24 October 2012).
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5.1.3 Competition for Spectrum
Th e digital dividend was intensely discussed among the main players in the broadcasting market. Th e 
traditional French broadcasters have obtained the digital frequencies necessary to continue their activities. 
However, the switch-over also led to increasing competition in the audiovisual market. Th e newcomers (see 
section 1) caused major changes in audience shares and threatened the position of the major traditional 
broadcasters. Th e strongest opposition to new entries came from the two traditional operators and market 
leaders, TF1 and Canal+. However, during the ﬁ rst wave of the digital frequency allocation (2005–2006), 
the main media operators from radio (NRJ, Europe 1, NextRadio), television (TF1, AB Group, M6, Canal+, 
France Télévisions), and the press (Lagardère) all received an important share of the available frequencies.
Th e second wave of the digital frequency allocation (2011–2012) was an opportunity to redistribute 
frequencies173 to the historically dominant channels (TF1, M6, and Canal+) and enabled them to compensate 
for their loss of audience after the ﬁ rst wave.174 Th is new award was, however, blocked by the European 
Commission, and the six new frequencies were reassigned fairly among incumbents and new players such 
as L’Equipe (Amaury Group), the weekly Elle (Lagardère Group), or smaller players such as NRJ Group or 
Nextradio (BFM).
In June 2011, the prime minister and ARCEP announced the distribution of spectrum for 4G mobiles for 
2011 and 2012 (for 800 MHz and 2.6 GHz frequencies).175 Th e auction was expected to bring €2.5 billion 
(US$3.25 billion) into the state coﬀ ers.176 Th e conditions of distribution were widely criticized as favoring 
the biggest operators (the winners are supposed to cover 99.6 percent of the population of mainland France, 
and Long-Term Evolution (LTE) technology is supposed to be widely adopted). Xavier Niel, the main owner 
of Free, said that the “preemption for the spectrum will be given to old and rich operators,” and he found the 
procedure “cynical and absurd.”177 Th ese conditions were also oﬃ  cially contested by the trades unions, but 
the Council of State (Conseil d’Etat) rejected their claims.178 ARCEP redistributed the 2.6 GHz frequency 
among the four operators (Bouygues Telecom, Free Mobile, Orange France, and SFR) in September 2011 
and the 800 MHz ones to three operators (Bouygues Telecom, Orange France, and SFR) in December 
2011.179
173. Article 103 from the Law on the Freedom of Communication from 1986 with amendments from 5 March 2007.
174. G. Dutheil, “TNT: l’octroi des ‘chaînes bonus’ remis en cause” (DTT: granting of “bonus channels” questioned), Le Monde, 29 September 2011. 
175. ARCEP, “Attributions des fréquences 4G” (Award of the 4G frequencies), 15 June 2011, at http://www.arcep.fr/index.php?id=8571&tx_gs-
actualite_pi1[uid]=1386&tx_gsactualite_pi1[annee]=&tx_gsactualite_pi1[theme]=&tx_gsactualite_pi1[motscle]=&tx_gsactualite_pi1[back-
ID]=26&cHash=93d185f672 (accessed 10 July 2011).
176. M. Ricknas, “France invites mobile operators to 4G spectrum auction,” 15 July 2011, at http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/arti-
cle/230326/france_invites_mobile_operators_to_4g_spectrum_auction.html (accessed 10 July 2011).
177. “Free demande un report de l’attribution des licences 4G” (Free demands a report on 4G license allocation), Les Echos, 11 April 2011, at http://
archives.lesechos.fr/archives/2011/lesechos.fr/04/11/0201294657222.htm (accessed 24 October 2012).
178. Conseil d’Etat (Council of State), Decision No. 351929, 23 July 2012, at http://www.arcep.fr/ﬁ leadmin/reprise/textes/recours/dec-conseil-etat-
4g-230712.pdf (accessed 24 October 2012).
179. ARCEP, “4G—très haut débit mobile” (4G—high-speed mobile), at http://www.arcep.fr/index.php?id=8649 (accessed 24 October 2012).
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Th e delay in the introduction of digital audio broadcasting (DAB), or terrestrial digital radio, reﬂ ects the 
economic challenges particular to this medium.180 Th e ﬁ rst call for applications to cover 20 cities (including 
Paris) was announced by the CSA in June–July 2011. However, before granting any frequencies, the CSA 
decided to ask the government for its opinion about the ﬁ nancing and pre-empting the frequencies for 
the public French Radio and RFI.181 Th e government decided not to participate in the allocation of DAB 
due to the high costs of double broadcasting during the installation process. Th e CSA then turned to the 
commercial radio groups. But their positions remain ambivalent, as they are concerned that the digitization 
of radio threatens an even more profound fragmentation of the market and audience, which may further 
reduce dwindling advertising revenues. Regardless of the unfavorable economic situation, the deployment of 
DAB is now scheduled for early 2013.
5.2 Digital Gatekeeping
5.2.1 Technical Standards
Th e public debate during switch-over is not focussed on the frequency allocation but rather on the 
implementation of strong competition in broadcasting (mostly television) or mobile markets.
Discussion of the digital dividend and its distribution has been framed largely in the context of new players 
arriving on the market (see section 5.1.2) and how this situation might challenge the position of already 
dominant operators.
In France, it is the CSA182 that has the authority to select the technical standards for audiovisual programs 
with the consent of the government and the supervision of the European Commission. Th e adoption of 
a technical standard begins with a preliminary study in the form of public consultations launched by the 
CSA and the conclusions are published in public reports.183 Th e recommended standard is accepted in a 
decree issued by the minister responsible for telecommunications, and this is validated by the European 
Commission. Independent experts are often consulted during the development of the technical project or the 
writing of opinions on often contradictory conclusions.
Th e broadcasters often seek to inﬂ uence technical decisions recommended by the CSA in order to maintain 
their positions and reduce the negative eﬀ ects of further opening the market. Th e closeness of the Bouygues 
Group (TF1) to President Sarkozy was highly discussed as one of the controversies during the launching of 
the six new digital channels in 2011. At that time, the Minister of Industry wished to impose on those new 
180. D. Kessler, “La radio numérique terrestre” (Digital terrestrial radio), 18 March 2011, at http://www.csa.fr/Media/Files/Radio/Autres-thema-
tiques/RNT-Rapport-David-Kessler (accessed 5 April 2013).
181. “La radio numérique terrestre en mauvaise passe” (Digital terrestrial radio not on a good path), L’Express, 7 September 2012, at http://www.lex-
press.fr/actualite/media-people/media/la-radio-numerique-terrestre-traverse-une-mauvaise-passe_1157597.html (accessed 7 September 2012).
182. Article 12 from the Law on Freedom of Communication 1986.
183. For example, see the report “Future of the DTT” by Michel Boyon, president of the CSA, August 2011, at http://www.csa.fr/Etudes-et-publi-
cations/Les-autres-rapports/Rapport-au-Premier-ministre-sur-l-avenir-de-la-TNT-Aout-2011 (accessed 29 January 2013).
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digital channels the DVB-T2/MPEG-4 standard, even though it was not compatible with French receivers 
in households. Th e standard was supposed to be adopted by the new channels but it was not implemented 
by TF1. In spite of the pressure on the CSA,184 the public interest prevailed and all channels were launched 
using the already existing standard (DVB-T/MPEG-2).
Th e European Commission also plays an important role as a gatekeeper. Directive 98/34185 requires EU 
member states to inform the European Commission about projects on the adoption of technical standards 
with their justiﬁ cation for such choices. In addition, the European Commission promotes certain standards to 
facilitate the construction of a single market (e.g. the mobile DVB-H standard for the development of mobile 
television in July 2007). In November 2010, the European Commission sent the CSA a notice186 demanding 
a return to the practice of transparency and non-discriminatory allocations: “Th e French mechanism of 
granting licenses to the three historical television channels, without the real free-competition procedure […] 
is not in line with EU law.”187 After this intervention, the plan was abandoned, and all candidates had to be 
treated equally in the call for applications.
5.2.2 Gatekeepers
Th e incumbent private television channels (TF1, M6, and Canal+) are trying to preserve their audience 
share during the process of digitization. Th e TF1 Group tried to force the CSA to change the status of the 
Info Channel (La Chaîne Info, LCI), an all-news channel owned by TF1, from the DTT paid option to 
free broadcast. However, after protests from Canal+ (the owner of i>Télé, another all-news channel) and the 
Next Group (the owner of the most popular non-stop news service BFMTV), the CSA refused the request.188 
Despite that unsuccessful operation, TF1 remains a signiﬁ cant player on the DTT market, as they own NT1 
and TMC (purchased in 2010). Canal+ (owned by the Vivendi Group) has bought Direct8 and Direct Star 
(from the Bolloré Group) to strengthen their free oﬀ er, and now owns eight diﬀ erent paid and free DTT 
channels. In the future, it will most probably be forced to sell one of its channels, as it is illegal to own more 
than seven digital channels within one group.189
184. La Tribune, 14 September 2011; Le Figaro, 13 September 2011; le Film Français, 14 September 2011.
185. Information procedures: technical standards and regulations on information society services, Directive 98/34/CE, European Commission, 
2005.
186. “Substantiated recommendation to the French Republic regarding Article 258 of the treaty for the functioning of the EU on the incompatibility 
of the criteria and procedures granting rights for the usage of the radio resources established by Article 103 of French Law no. 86-1067 from 30 
September 1986 regarding the freedom of communication modiﬁ ed by Article 4 of Directive 2002/77/CE and Article 5, point 2 of Directive 
2002/20/CE),” at http://www.economie.gouv.fr/ﬁ les/ﬁ les/directions_services/daj/publications/lettre-daj/2011/lettre109/avis-ce-29092011.pdf 
(accessed 29 January 2013) (hereafter “Recommendation to the French Republic”).
187. “Recommendation to the French Republic,” p. 4.
188. CSA, “Le CSA rejette les demandes de passage en clair sur la TNT de LCI et Paris Premier” (CSA rejects change of status for the channels LCI 
and Paris Premier), 6 December 2011.
189. G. Fraissard and D. Psenny, “D8, l’atout clair de Canal+” (D8, clear advantage of Canal+), 20 September 2012, at http://www.lemonde.fr/
culture/article/2012/09/19/d8-l-atout-clair-de-canal_1760772_3246.html (accessed 22 October 2012). 
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5.2.3 Transmission Networks
Th e distribution of spectrum resources belongs to the state and its three agencies: ANFr, CSA, and ARCEP.
French broadcasting and telecommunications transmission operators are not represented in these instances; 
therefore, they cannot intervene directly in the frequency allocation. Th ey have to be consulted for every 
signiﬁ cant change in frequency plans, but the decisions are taken independently and may be inﬂ uenced by 
economic and political issues as well as the current situation of national operators.
Th e broadcasting transmission network was gradually opened for competition in 1986 and 2005.190 Th e 
TDF Group remains, however, the main operator. Th e company was founded in 1975 within the framework 
of public service broadcasting and privatized in 2004 (with France Telecom/Orange among its shareholders). 
Th e TDF was responsible for the switch-over from analog to digital broadcasting and ensuring the necessary 
multiplexing. Th ey will also be responsible for the next step—the technical deployment of HD.
Mobile markets are more competitive. Th e dominant operators are both network and service operators. 
Virtual operators, licensed since 2006, can access these networks through unbundling. Th e operations and 
good practices in this market are monitored by the ARCEP.
5.3 Telecommunications
5.3.1 Telecoms and News
Th e audiovisual law does not allow audiovisual media companies to also be network operators. Th e creation 
of any type of television, including web television (aimed at a wide audience), must be reported to the CSA. 
However, the websites launched by the mainstream media forced them to collaborate with internet service 
providers and search engine operators, in order to maintain linking to their websites in high positions (e.g. in 
June 2006 the TF1 engaged in the Overblog, a UGC website, Overblog.com).191 Th ere were also agreements 
between portals and the media to promote the availability of information.
Only France Telecom/Orange seeks to invest in the content market, especially in mobile television. Th us, 
in 2008, it was granted television broadcasting rights for the football Champions’ League,192 in partnership 
with Canal+. Orange has also started to produce original content on its online portals, but ﬁ nally opted for 
partnerships with the traditional media, especially the state news agency, AFP. In 2012, Orange obtained 
190. Law of 30 September 1986 on broadcasting of private audiovisual channels; Law of 23 July 2003 on broadcasting of public audiovisual channels 
as application of the EU decree; Law of March 2005 on launching DTT.
191. “TF1 cherche sur internet le moyen de séduire un public plus jeune” (TF1 tries to seduce the young public), Le Monde, 2 May 2007.
192. “Droits du foot: trois lots pour Orange, à Canal+ le reste” (Concessions for football: three spots for Orange, the rest for Canal+), Le Figaro, 
7 February 2008, at http://www.leﬁ garo.fr/medias/2008/02/07/04002-20080207ARTFIG00345-droits-du-foot-trois-lots-pour-orange-a-canal-
le-reste.php (accessed 10 October 2012).
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for four years (2013–2016) the rights to broadcast football matches via its own mobile phone and internet 
services.
5.3.2 Pressure of Telecoms on News Providers
Th ere is no evident case of pressure by telecoms companies on news producers, journalists, or on the media 
in general. In the French news market, the information providers are not in competition with the network 
operators but rather with big online players, such as Google for the online market, or Apple for the equipment 
providers. Th e group of French publishers called ePresse Premium, including ﬁ ve French national dailies and 
three weeklies, tried to sign an agreement to create a “digitized kiosk”193 or “virtual newsstand” of the French 
press. Th e ePresse Premium Group has also started negotiations with Apple to introduce their content in a 
range of applications available via AppStore. Initially, the negotiations stalled as Apple demanded 30 percent 
of total revenues and refused to make information about the users of such applications available to the 
publishers.194 But this did not stop each of the group participants from signing a separate agreement with 
AppStore, accepting the proposed conditions. Finally, the “digital kiosk” became available via applications on 
Apple and Android.195
In October 2012, a new issue was raised regarding the Google search engine, which threatened the French 
(and European) media with banning links to their websites if the government introduced a law forcing the 
search engine to pay for linking to certain websites (as a part of copyright procedures).196 French editors say 
Google’s practices brought them losses of €1 billion (US$1.3 billion) from advertising between 2010 and 
2012 due to direct linking to their online content.197, 198
5.4 Assessments
After the digital switch-over and the deployment of DTT, the usage of broadcast frequencies corresponds to 
the social and economic necessities of the country. None of the public consultations has revealed any serious 
inequalities in the allocation processes or shortcomings in the frequency resources available in France.
Th e public interest is among the high priorities of all legislative acts regulating the activities of media 
broadcasters and telecoms operators. Th e public interest is guaranteed by the freedom of speech for all social 
193. “Le kiosque numérique e-presse s’agrandit” (Digital kiosk, expansion of the e-press), Libération, 6 April 2012.
194. Y. Eudes, “Apple et la presse pas si compatibles” (Apple and the press not that compatible), Le Monde, 14 December 2011, at http://www.lemonde.
fr/cgi-bin/ACHATS/acheter.cgi?oﬀ re=ARCHIVES&type_item=ART_ARCH_30J&objet_id=1177996&xtmc=apple&xtcr=4 (accessed 24 Oc-
tober 2012).
195. “Le kiosque numérique e-presse s’agrandit” (Digital kiosk, expansion of the e-press), Libération, 6 April 2012, at http://www.liberation.fr/me-
dias/01012400782-le-kiosque-numerique-e-presse-s-agrandit (accessed 29 October 2012).
196. R. Myles, “Google threatens to stop linking to French media websites,” 10 October 2012, at http://digitaljournal.com/article/335100 (accessed 
24 October 2012).
197. “Taxe Google,” 27 October 2012, at http://www.lexpress.fr (accessed 12 January 2013).
198. “La presse européenne tente l’union contre Google” (European press unites against Google), Le Monde, 27 October 2012.
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groups and representative organizations (trades unions or associations) as well as by the protection of the 
rights and interests of the consumers and users.
Th e CSA gets involved in public interest missions by supervising the programs granting air time to political 
parties (represented in the Senate or the National Assembly), trades unions, and professional organizations. 
Such programs are to be broadcast by public television and radio stations. Secondly, the CSA ensures the 
pluralism of information by allocating access to radio frequencies to various associations and organizations, 
even though their economic models may not be viable and do not guarantee their sustainability. Th ose radio 
stations, as media for the expression of ideas and guarantors of democracy, may be subsidized by special funds 
organized by the CSA.199 
Diﬀ erent mechanisms were launched to enhance consumers’ protection and ensure wider network access. 
Th e ARCEP has no prerogatives in this ﬁ eld. Th e Ombudsman for electronic communications (at that time 
mobile phones only) was appointed in 2003.200 His authorization has been expanded to cover any electronic 
communication since January 2007. However, the Ombudsman may participate only in commercial 
disputes—and not in the frequency allocation. Th e ARCEP has the ability to intervene to promote fair access 
to online services (voice, data). Th at is why it has forced operators to deploy mobile networks throughout the 
country, leaving no “white” or underserved areas, even if these are not proﬁ table.201 
Th e same constraints were imposed on the TDF for the large redeployment of frequencies in 1986 after 
opening audiovisual markets to private companies. Th e ARCEP monitors the quality of services and conducts 
a classiﬁ cation of diﬀ erent mobile operators according to various criteria, in particular the transmission rate 
of mobile networks. Th ese can vary widely depending on the operator and localization.202
 
199. Decree of 25 August 2006 on the application of Article 80 on the creation of subsidies funds from the Law on Freedom of Communication of 
30 September 1986.
200. Ministry of the Economy and Finance, “Téléphonie: quelle protection pour les consommateurs?” (Phone service: what kind of protection for 
the clients?), 5 July 2012, at http://www.economie.gouv.fr/cedef/telephonie-protection-des-consommateurs (accessed 29 October 2012).
201. See Annex to Decision No. 01-595 ARCEP, 19 June 2001, on territorial coverage of the mobile telephones. See also the ARCEP decision on the 
usage of the 800 MHz band, at http://www.ddm.gouv.fr/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=208 (accessed 22 May 2012).
202. ARCEP, “Qualité de service des réseaux mobiles” (Service quality for the mobile networks), 7 November 2011, at http://www.arcep.fr/index.
php?id=8571&tx_gsactualite_pi1[uid]=1443&tx_gsactualite_pi1[backID]=1&cHash=f9ebb8c667 (accessed 29 October 2012).
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6. Digital Business
6.1 Ownership
6.1.1 Legal Developments in Media Ownership
Th e main legal development in media ownership in the past ﬁ ve years has been Law no. 2009-669, voted 
in on 12 June 2009, known as the High Authority for Transmission of Creative Works and Copyright 
Protection on the Internet (Haute Autorité pour la Diﬀ usion des Œuvres et la Protection des Droits sur Internet, 
HADOPI) Law (see section 7.1.2),203 which intends to “optimize the dissemination and the protection of 
the creative content on the internet.” It also proposes measures to stimulate the spending of press owners 
on research and technological development. By exempting online news service companies from standard tax 
rules, Article 27 promoted the diﬀ usion and protection of creation on the internet. Decree no. 2009-1340 
of 29 October 2009 deﬁ ned the criteria required for a communication service to be recognized as an “online 
press service.” Th ese criteria state:
 the exemption of territorial economic contribution (see Articles 1458 and 1586 of the General Tax Code) 
and other facilities for online media mainly devoted to the provision of general and political information 
(see section 17 of Schedule 2 of the General Tax Code);
 provisions for investment under Article 39 bis A of the Code;
 grants or advances for development projects, which shall be obtained through the “aid funds for the 
development of online media services.”
6.1.2 New Entrants in the News Market
Th e ownership situation in France is very speciﬁ c and characteristic of the familial character of French 
business. At the beginning of the 21st century, the 15 wealthiest people in France included ﬁ ve with assets 
in the media industry: Bernard Arnault, François Pinault, Serge Dassault, Jean-Claude Decaux, and Francis 
Bouygues. An additional eight media owners (Pierre Fabre, Jean-Paul Baudecroux, the Hersant family, 
Elisabeth Badinter, Philippe Amaury, Claude Berda, Arnaud Lagardère, and the Seydoux family) were ranked 
among the wealthiest individuals and families in the country.204
203. See http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/aﬃ  chTexte.do;jsessionid=572FD05296342DAFE2848D59890826F6.tpdjo09v_1?cidTexte=JORFTEXT00
0020735432&dateTexte=20121026 (accessed 24 October 2012).
204. M. Benilde, “Médias français, une aﬀ aire de familles” (French media, a family business), Le Monde Diplomatique, November 2003, at http://
www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2003/11/BENILDE/10494 (accessed 29 October 2012).
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Some of these “media fortunes” stem from industrial sources and most were inherited. Th e French media 
market is rather consolidated, with a few large private players dividing the market between them as well as the 
large public television and radio providers (see sections 1 and 2). Th e changes in ownership that have taken 
place over recent years have largely involved the dominant players in the market. Bolloré Group (created in 
1822 and specializing mainly in transport and logistics) has invested recently in the new media technology. It 
is an owner of nonpaid journals (Direct Soir and Direct Matin). NextRadioTV Group is an owner of digital 
television channel BFMTV (24/7 news), radios BusinessFM and RMS, as well as 10SportHebdo (19 percent 
of shares) and Groupe01 (high-tech, thematic weeklies and monthlies). NRJ Group holds the most popular 
national and local radio channels and a digital television channel, NRJ12.
Some media owners also depend on public contracts in their current business:
 Serge Dassault, CEO of the press group Socpress, is also the CEO of Dassault Group, which sells ﬁ ghter 
jets to the French army.
 Francis Bouygues, CEO of the important private television channel TF1, is also the CEO of the Bouygues 
Group, a large construction company that signs many contracts with the French state.
 Arnaud Lagardère, CEO of Lagardère, is also one of the most important shareholders of EADS, the 
European aeronautic group.
In the main television market there are few foreign players. Harris Associates LP (United States) and JP 
Morgan Chase (United States) both hold 10 percent of shares in TF1. Bertelsmann (Germany) holds 48 
percent of shares in M6. Among the distributors of television platforms Vodafone Group (United Kingdom) 
holds 56 percent of SFR shares.
Radio distribution is divided into three sections: public radio (Radio France), commercial radios, and private 
radios of diﬀ erent associations. Among the public radio stations, there are: four national channels, three local 
channels, RFI (Radio France International), and RFO (Radio France Outre-mer). France has hundreds of 
commercial radio channels, both local and national. 
Th e newspaper industry, suﬀ ering from the ﬁ nancial crisis, has faced a few ownership changes. Th e most 
signiﬁ cant one was that of the Le Monde in June 2010 (the second largest national newspaper by circulation), 
which was bought by the left-wing businessmen Pierre Bergé, Matthieu Pigasse, and Xavier Niel (also an 
owner of Free, one of the main digital media distributors: see section 5), who invested between €80 and €120 
million (US$ 104–156 million) (this ownership change was said to be criticized by President Sarkozy).205
Th e year 2012 was also marked by the death of a legendary title of the French press: France-Soir. Th e newspaper 
was the most read newspaper among the French popular press until the 1970s, but had been losing readership 
205. “Rachat du Monde: Sarkozy a reçu le directeur du journal” (Sale of Le Monde: Sarkozy meets with the director of the daily), Le Nouvel Observa-
teur, 14 June 2010, at http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/article/20100611.OBS5366/rachat-du-monde-sarkozy-a-recu-le-directeur-du-journal.
html (accessed 29 October 2012).
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dramatically since the late 1990s. In January 2009, France-Soir was bought by the young Russian billionaire, 
Alexander Pugachev. After several unsuccessful changes, France-Soir was put into liquidation on 23 July 2012.
Regardless of many eﬀ orts to cut costs or update newspaper formats, the industry still suﬀ ers from ﬁ nancial 
problems. Editors facing competition from internet news provision and the free press are adding to the 
national journals regional and local editions (e.g. Ouest-France increased the number of its local editions from 
40 to 45 in 2010, and from 45 to 53 in 2011).206
Th e press industry has also adapted to the new challenges of online information provision. Th e Figaro Group 
has established a few well-known websites: Figaro.fr (whose content is partly reserved for subscribers), Sport24.
com, Explorimmo.com (online real-estate market website), and Cadremploi.fr (job market for managers). Le 
Monde has Lemonde.fr and Talents.fr (job oﬀ ers). Th e largest press providers have also launched their services 
for mobile phones with both paid and free access (e.g. Le Monde launched its service “100 percent digital” 
with a subscription for i-Phone, i-Pad, and internet devices).
20 minutes.fr is a ﬁ nancial success story in merging print and online journalism. It is the third-largest information 
website207 and the largest free-of-charge journal ﬁ nanced exclusively from advertising. In 2010, it announced 
an exceptional year with an income of €2.8 million (US$3.6 million) (growth of 6.4 percent in comparison 
with 2009). Its website service, until then in development and bringing losses, has registered small losses 
(€ 200,000 (US$ 260,433) in 2010 compared with €1.5 million (US$1.95 million) in 2009).208
Most French media are in a strong position, supported by the state in the public broadcasting sector, and 
linked to powerful groups in the private sector. Th is probably explains why there are very few new players on 
the market. However, the internet allowed for the creation of inﬂ uential pure players such as Mediapart and 
Rue89. Despite their online popularity, they have not succeeded as of yet to build prosperous commercial 
businesses. Th erefore, the pure player Rue89 was acquired by the Nouvel Observateur Group, which publishes 
the eponymous magazine.209 Among the pure players there are eight main news providers: Mediapart, Rue89, 
Lepost (partly owned by LeMonde)—all launched in 2007; e24 (partly owned by 20minutes); Slate (since 
2009); Arrêt sur images (owned by France 5 until 2007); Owni (stopped in December 2012), Atlantico 
(since 2011), Bakchich (launched in 2006, it also has a small paper edition); and Huﬃ  ngtonpost (aﬃ  liate 
site of the American original, successfully launched in 2012). 
206. AFP, “Le quotidien Ouest-France passe de 44 à 53 éditions papier en 2011” (Ouest-France daily grows from 44 to 53 regional editions in 2011), 
7 February 2011.
207. 20minutes.fr, “En janvier, 20minutes.fr consolide sa place dans le top 3 des sites d’info” (In January, 20minutes.fr strengthened its place among 
the top 3 information websites), 20 February 2012, at http://www.20minutes-media.com/tl_ﬁ les/client/PDF/CP%20pdf/CP%2020.fr%20
audience%20MNR%20FEV2012.pdf (accessed 29 October 2012).
208. “20minutes France a vécu une année 2010 ‘exceptionnelle’, ﬁ nit dans le vert” (20minutes France had an exceptional year in 2010 and ﬁ nishes 
in the black), Le Point, 23 February 2011, at http://www.lepoint.fr/bourse/20minutes-france-a-vecu-une-annee-2010-exceptionnelle-ﬁ nit-dans-
le-vert-23-02-2011-1298733_81.php (accessed 29 October 2012).
209. “‘Le Nouvel Observateur’ rachète Rue89,” Le Monde, 21 décembre 2012, at http://www.lemonde.fr/actualite-medias/article/2011/12/21/
le-nouvel-observateur-rachete-rue89_1621067_3236.html.
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6.1.3 Ownership Consolidation
Th e largest French media owners are believed to be among the closest friends of ex-President Sarkozy. Th is 
situation has provoked many comments and accusations of indirect inﬂ uence on journalists and on the 
content of newspapers and television programs. Among those considered to be good friends of the former 
French president are Martin Bouygues (part-owner of TF1, LCI, and Eurosport, a witness at Mr Sarkozy’s 
wedding in 1996 and the godfather of his youngest son, Louis); and Bernard Arnault (CEO of LVMH group 
and also a witness at Mr Sarkozy’s wedding. Th e media owners who are Mr Sarkozy’s supporters are known 
in France as “the musketeers.”210
In 2005, Mr Sarkozy (then a Minister of Internal Aﬀ airs) allegedly inﬂ uenced his friend Arnaud Lagardère 
(part-owner of Le Monde, Elle, Paris Match, Journal du Dimanche, and also owner of the Hachette publishing 
house) to ﬁ re the editor of Paris Match, Alain Genestar, who ran a front-page story about Cecilia Sarkozy, 
then his second wife, and her lover.211 Later, when Cecilia did not vote in the second round of the 2007 
elections, it was allegedly due to Mr Sarkozy’s connections that this story was never published.212 Th e well-
known satirists Stéphane Guillon and Didier Porte were reportedly ﬁ red from the state-controlled radio 
France Inter after being described by Mr Sarkozy as “insulting, vulgar and nasty.”213 Mr Sarkozy was also 
accused of opposing the sale of Le Monde in 2010 to the left-wing businessmen Pierre Bergé (who strongly 
supported the candidacy of Ségolène Royal in the 2007 presidential elections), Matthieu Pigasse, and 
Xavier Niel.214
Martine Gozlan, a journalist from the weekly Marianne, wrote in 2008:
We worry very much—because he controls a lot of magazines and television stations and 
you could see it in the last press conference, where there were 600 journalists and very 
few questions asked … It’s really a danger for our freedom of expression for our critical 
sense. It means that there is a kind of a court around him. It is the ﬁ rst time we see such a 
phenomenon.215
In 2010, Francois Bayrou (third in the presidential run of 2007) said in an interview for Le Nouvel Observateur 
that those with power in the country believe that the media should be under their inﬂ uence, which is 
210. “Guillon et Porte virés de France Inter, mais largement soutenus” (Guillon and Porte ﬁ red from France Inter but highly supported), Libération, 
23 June 2009, at http://www.liberation.fr/medias/0101643026-stephane-guillon-vire-de-la-matinale-de-france-inter (accessed 29 October 
2012) (hereafter Libération, “Guillon et Porte”).
211. K. Willsher, “How Nicolas Sarkozy inﬂ uenced French media,” Th e Guardian, 5 July 2010, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/jul/05/
nicolas-sarkozy-french-media (accessed 29 October 2012).
212. BBC, “Sarkozy strategy under scrutiny,” 17 January 2008, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7192638.stm (accessed 29 October 2012) (hereafter 
BBC, “Sarkozy strategy”).
213. Libération, “Guillon et Porte.”
214. H. Samuel, “Nicolas Sarkozy trying to ‘Berlusconise’ French media,” Th e Telegraph, 13 June 2010, at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world-
news/europe/france/7825017/Nicolas-Sarkozy-trying-to-Berlusconise-French-media.html (accessed 29 October 2012).
215. BBC, “Sarkozy strategy.”
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unacceptable. He believes that the rule of pluralism and independence was not fully respected.216 Mr Sarkozy 
often said to journalists: “I know well all the people who hire you.”217
A similar situation exists on the left of the political scene. Th e businessman Pierre Bergé, co-owner of the 
newspaper Le Monde, is also an open supporter of Ségolène Royal (a former candidate of the Socialist Party 
during the 2007 presidential elections, former life partner of President Hollande and still an inﬂ uential party 
ﬁ gure). Mr Bergé, who was also the president of the Friendship Association of Ségolène Royal, was paying 
the monthly rent of € 8,000 (US$ 10,417) for her oﬃ  ce until March 2011.218
Since the beginning of Mr Hollande’s presidency in 2012, there has been serious political debate about 
Matthieu Pigasse, an investment banker and a former top oﬃ  cial in the oﬃ  ces of Dominique Strauss-Kahn 
and Laurent Fabius during the late 1990s. Mr Pigasse became the owner of a magazine, Les Inrockuptibles, 
in 2010. In 2011, he was in the group of the three buyers of Le Monde. In July 2012, he nominated 
Audrey Pulvar (a former news presenter on France 3) as the new editorial director of the magazine Les 
Inrockuptibles.219 Privately, Audrey Pulvar was at that time the partner of Arnaud Montebourg, the current 
Minister of Industrial Renewal. In August 2012, the magazine Le Nouvel Observateur reported that Mr 
Pigasse (also a serving director of Lazard) had been chosen to advise the government on the establishment of 
the public investment bank.220 
6.1.4 Telecoms Business and the Media
Th e French telecoms market has a unique structure and diﬀ ers from that of any other EU country. Th e 
oligopoly in this market consists of three leading operators providing mainly the same services: Orange 
(France Telecom), Iliad (Free), and SFR. Th ey oﬀ er a bundle, technically a single package, which gives access 
to broadband, VoIP, Wi-Fi, and IPTV services. All oﬀ ers are similar in price (a basic service for €30 (US$39) 
in 2012). Since 2005 there have been a few moves in this market: in 2005 Tiscali sold its shares to Telecom 
Italia (which launched Alice), Neuf Cegetel bought AOL France in 2006 and Club Internet from Deutsche 
Telecom in 2007. SFR took over Tele2 in 2007 and gained control over Neuf Cegetel in 2008, and Iliad 
acquired Alice in 2008.221
216. “Le Monde: Bayrou denonce l’intervention du pouvoir” (Le Monde: Bayrou denounces the impact of power (KKM: governing power over the 
media)), Le Nouvel Observateur, 17 June 2010, at http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/article/20100617.OBS5666/le-monde-bayrou-fustige-une-
illustration-de-plus-de-l-intervention-du-pouvoir.html (accessed 29 October 2012).
217. R. Bacque, “Nicolas Sarkozy, vingt-cinq ans d’investissement dans les médias” (Nicolas Sarkozy, 25 years of investments in the media), Le Monde, 
23 February 2007, at http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2007/02/19/nicolas-sarkozy-vingt-cinq-ans-d-investissement-dans-les-medias_
869028_3224.html (accessed 29 October 2012).
218. LeJDD, “Royal, sans QG ﬁ xe à Paris” (Royal without a headquarters in Paris), 2 March 2011, at http://www.lejdd.fr/Election-presidenti-
elle-2012/Actualite/Pierre-Berge-arrete-de-payer-le-loyer-du-QG-de-Segolene-Royal-a-Paris-277265 (accessed 29 October 2012).
219. X. Ternisien, “Audrey Pulvar minimize le ‘malaise’ aux ‘Inrocks’” (Audrey Pulvar denies “malaise” in Inrocks), Le Monde, 19 July 2012, at http://
www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2012/07/19/audrey-pulvar-minimise-le-malaise-aux-inrocks_1735507_3234.html (accessed 29 October 
2012).
220. “Pigasse à la BPI: Audrey Pulvar dément tout conﬂ it d’intérêt” (Pigasse in BPI: Audrey Pulvar denies any conﬂ ict of interest), Le Nouvel Ob-
servateur, 4 September 2012, at http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/politique/20120904.OBS1177/pigasse-a-la-bpi-pulvar-dement-tout-conﬂ it-d-
interets.html (accessed 29 October 2012).
221. IHS Global Insight, Telecoms report, July 2011.
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Th e largest telecoms operator, France Telecom (FT), created as part of the Ministry of Telecommunication, 
has been a public-sector operator since 1991. In 2003, the changes to French corporate law allowed the 
French state to hold less than half of the shares. From 2004 to 2007 the French state reduced its stake to 27.3 
percent.222
Other players in the telecoms market are SFR, Iliad, Bouygues, and Completel. Th e ﬁ rst three concentrate on 
the residential market, while Completel specializes in providing internet services to businesses. We can also 
add Numericable, which is a small cable operator with around 1 million customers.
In 2009, private investors ﬁ led a complaint against France Telecom, citing excessive prices for the access to 
its ﬁ xed-line network. Analysts believe that this long-lasting dispute should be solved by the regulator before 
introducing next-generation networks.223
France Telecom’s Orange was the largest player with a 44 percent market share in 2009. It was followed by 
SFR (22 percent) and by Iliad (19 percent).
Each of these operators indirectly owns parts of diﬀ erent media outlets:
 Bouygues Telecom is a division of the Bouygues Group, which owns three television channels: TF1, 
NT1, and TMC;
 SFR is a part of the Vivendi Group, which owns three television channels: Canal+, Direct Star, and D8;
 Free is a subsidiary of the Iliad Group; Xavier Niel, its CEO, partly owns the important daily newspaper 
Le Monde;
 Orange oﬀ ers a speciﬁ c television broadcast to its 500,000 subscribers: “Orange Cinéma,” a ﬁ lm and 
television series channel mostly oriented toward entertainment genres.224
6.1.5 Transparency of Media Ownership
Th e question of media ownership transparency in France is an occasional reason for heated public debate. 
Each time this debate raises the problem of the lack of information available to the public about the conﬂ icts 
of interests among the media, the political actors, and the main press owners.
In 1997, the journalist Serge Halimi published a short book, Les nouveaux chiens de garde (Th e new watch-
dogs), which accused some prominent French journalists of serving the interests of their media owners and 
their politician friends.225 Th e book, reissued in 2005, was an editorial success; it was adapted into a ﬁ lm in 
222. IHS Global Insight, Telecoms report, July 2011. 
223. IHS Global Insight, Telecoms report, July 2011.
224. P. Gonzales, “HBO ou la guerre des droits continue entre Canal+ et Orange” (HBO or the rights war continues between Canal+ and Orange), 
Le Figaro, 26 October 2012, at http://blog.leﬁ garo.fr/gonzales/2012/10/hbo-ou-la-guerre-des-droits-continue-entre-canal-et-orange.html 
(accessed 29 October 2012).
225. S. Halimi, “Les nouveaux chiens de garde” (Th e new watchdogs), Liber-Raison d’Agir, Paris, 1997.
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2011, and sold 250,000 copies in 2012.226 Since 2008, Mr Halimi has been the editorial director of Le Monde 
Diplomatique monthly (where he sometimes writes about media ownership transparency).227
In France, editorial independence is hardly discussed in the context of media ownership concentration. 
Th erefore, public debate is poorly informed and often verges on conspiracy theory.228
In 2012, some independent media, most of them left-oriented, performed substantive work in informing the 
public about the existence of the conﬂ icts of interest in media ownership (a n on-exhaustive list):
 Th e French association Action-Critique-Médias (ACRIMED),229 based on the model of the U.S. 
association F.A.I.R.,230 oﬀ ers a volunteer-powered database of information and articles on its website 
about the supposed consequences of media ownership.
 Th e online publication Mediapart regularly publishes analyses of the conﬂ icts of interest in the French 
media landscape.231
 Th e right-oriented website Atlantico also informs its public about the conﬂ ict of interests between the 
left-oriented Government and some media owners.232
6.2 Media Funding
6.2.1 Public and Private Funding
French advertising agencies are split into two main groups: monomedia (mainly focussed on billposting and 
small surfaces) and plurimedia (dealing with many diﬀ erent media providers). Th e largest advertising agencies 
focus on their funding roots: TF1 Publicité and France Télévisions Publicité on television, NRJ Global on 
radio, Lagardère Publicité on the press.
Th e year 2009, a crisis year, brought a loss of 12.6 percent for the advertising market. However, in 2010 there 
was already a growth in revenues of 3.9 percent year on year.233 In 2011, advertising spending increased by 
1.9 percent year on year to €31 billion (US$ 40.36 billion).234
226. See http://www.lesnouveauxchiensdegarde.com (accessed 29 October 2012).
227. M. Benilde, “Patrons de presse en campagne” (Press owners on campaign), Le Monde Diplomatique, September 2011, at http://www.monde-di-
plomatique.fr/2011/09/BENILDE/20958 (accessed 29 October 2012).
228. P. Bouquillion et al., “À propos des mouvements récents (2004–2005) de concentration capitalistique dans les industries culturelles et média-
tiques” (Apropos the recent changes (2004–2005) in capitalist concentration in the culture and media industries), Le Temps des médias 2006, 
No. 6, pp. 151–164.
229. See http://www.acrimed.org (accessed 29 October 2012).
230. See http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=100 (accessed 29 October 2012).
231. L. Mauduit, “La gauche, les médias et les conﬂ its d’intérêt (II)” (Th e left, the media, and conﬂ icts of interest, part II), Mediapart, 20 July 2012, 
at http://www.mediapart.fr/journal/economie/190712/la-gauche-les-medias-et-les-conﬂ its-d-interet-ii (accessed 29 October 2012).
232. Atlantico.fr, “Aﬀ aire Lazard: Audrey Pulvar dément tout conﬂ it d’intérêt et attaque Le Nouvel Obs” (Lazard case: Audrey Pulvard rejects all 
accusations of conﬂ icts of interests and attacks Le Nouvel Obs[ervateur]), 4 September 2012, at http://www.atlantico.fr/pepites/aﬀ aire-lazard-
audrey-pulvar-dement-tout-conﬂ it-interets-et-attaque-nouvel-obs-471192.html (accessed 29 October 2012).
233. Xerﬁ 700, Régies publicitaires, market analysis (Advertising companies, market analysis), April 2011.
234. Institute of Advertising Research and Study (Institut de Recherches et d’Etudes Publicitaires, IREP), “Le marché publicitaire française en 2011” 
(Report 2011: Th e French advertising market), 15 March 2012, at http://www.irep.asso.fr/_ﬁ les/marche_publicitaire/IREP_MPF_2011.pdf 
(accessed 29 October 2012).
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Recent years have brought new challenges to the advertising market: digitization forced adjustments to new 
forms of advertising, such as catch-up television, podcast radio, and online videos, as well as the emergence 
of new types of outlets such as search engines, social networks, and microblogging. It has also heralded new 
laws on, for example, advertising online, privacy, and data protection.
In 2009, the decrease in advertising spend was the highest since 1949 (the beginning of data collection by the 
Institute of Advertising Research and Study (Institut de Recherches et d’Etudes Publicitaires, IREP) and France 
Pub). Th e crisis brought further changes to the advertising market: a fall in prices, rationalization of general 
budgets for advertising in companies, gains of the “new” media in market share, decrease of advertising in 
the traditional media sector. Advertisements have to be prepared for a presence “on 360 degrees and for 365 
days”235 (in many places using diﬀ erent marketing tools).
Figure 6.
Advertising spend in traditional media, 2005–2010
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Source: Xerﬁ 700, Régies publicitaires, market analysis (Advertising agencies, market analysis), April 2011 
Since 2005, the only important growth in advertising expenditure is observed within the online advertising 
market. In 2010, e-advertising represented almost €2.8 billion (US$3.6 billion, compared with €1 billion 
(US$1.3 billion) in 2005). In the worst moment of the ﬁ nancial crisis, when advertising in the traditional 
media fell by 8.6 percent, only the online market noted a growth of 2.6 percent. Almost one-third of 
e-advertising is generated by sponsored links. Th e crisis was milder in the television advertising market. With 
the increasing viewership time (+7 minutes) in 2010 and economic recovery, the television market gained 
235. Jean-Marie Dru, president of TBWA Worldwide, according to Xerﬁ 700.
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11.2 percent in revenues (though they were still lower than before 2007). In 2004, online advertising on 
television web platforms constituted 2 percent of turnover and grew in 2010 to 5 percent.
After a peak of revenues in 1999/2000 two traditional media outlets—the press and radio—are steadily 
losing advertising market share. Th is leads to a vicious circle: less advertising means less money for journalists 
and development, which means smaller audiences, which means fewer advertisers.236
Table 20.
Net advertising expenditure, breakdown by sector (€ million (US$ million)), 2005–2010
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Television 3,313 
(4,314)
3,495 
(4,551)
3,617 
(4,709)
3,476 
(4,526)
3,094 
(4,028)
3,441 
(4,480)
Press: magazines 1,542 
(2,007)
1,527 
(1,988)
1,478 
(1,924)
1,417 
(1,845)
1,161 
(1,511)
1,249 
(1,626)
Press: national dailies 358 
(466)
362 
(471)
331 
(431)
316 
(411)
260 
(338)
217 
(282)
Radio 836 
(1,088)
848 
(1,104)
805 
(1,048)
779 
(1,014)
710 
(924)
881 
(1,147)
Internet (without sponsored links) 240 
(312)
348 
(453)
460
(598)
516 
(671)
482 
(627)
507 
(660)
Source: Xerﬁ 700, based on data from IREP
Private radio stations are ﬁ nanced from advertisements, while the public stations rely predominantly on 
license fee revenue and state-administered funds (Fonds de soutien à l’expression radiophonique, FSER). Th e 
FSERs are aimed primarily at community radio stations, and in 2008 the amount of such subsidies stood 
at €25.8 million (US$33.5 million). Certain products cannot be advertised on the radio, such as alcohol 
products, cigarettes, or online gambling.
In 2010, the two main private television channels, TF1 and M6, shared 62 percent of the total television 
advertisement market. Th ey both took advantage of the narrowing available space on the France Télévisions 
channels, after the 2008 government decision to eliminate advertising on public channels after 8 p.m. Th ese 
two private channels had undergone a catastrophic year in 2009 in advertising because of the economic crisis. 
“Th ere has been a structural reconstruction of the advertising market, which has gradually taken up value,” 
according to Xavier Guillon from France Pub (Hersant Media Group).237
Th e most dynamic television advertising market is located on the digital terrestrial television (DTT) platform. 
Th e new commercial free-to-air channels saw revenues grow positively (31 percent) between 2009 and 2010. 
However, this growth rate was lower than during the launch of the new DTT channels: 2007 (+100 percent) 
and 2008 (+89 percent). Th e cumulative revenues of all the new commercial free-to-air channels reached 
236. J. Juice, “Life after 30-second spot,” Adweek Books, 2005, at http://www.lifeafter30.com/synopsis.php (accessed 29 October 2012).
237. Laurence Girard, “Moindre progression des dépenses publicitaires” (Slower growth in advertising spending), Le Monde, 1 October 2010.
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€ 451 million (US$ 587 million) in 2010, an increase of more than €107 million (US$ 139 million) compared 
to 2009.238
Table 21.
Revenues of TV stations from advertisements, 2009–2010
Sales revenues, 
€ billion (US$), 2009–2010
Change (%), 
year on year
Advertising market share 
in 2009 (%)
TF1 1.5* (1.9) 8.5 42
M6 0.67* (0.87) 10.7 20
France Télévisions (all channels) 0.4** (0.5) 25.7 7
Canal + 0.13** (0.16) 3.2 3
Digital terrestrial television n/a n/a 18
Cable TV n/a n/a 10
Notes: * 2010; ** 2009; n/a: not available
Source: Xerﬁ 700 Report TV, August 2010
France Télévisions (FT) is facing a diﬃ  cult situation following the loss of an important part of its advertising 
revenues, which is only partly oﬀ set by state grants. Successive France Télévisions CEOs have asked for an 
increase in the license fees to balance their budgets, but such requests are persistently rejected by politicians 
who do not want to risk a potentially unpopular decision. Th e € 125 (US$162) license fee per household will 
increase by €6 (US$7.8) in 2013.239 Since 2012, the public broadcaster has faced an additional challenge: its 
subsidies may be cut due to the overall budgetary diﬃ  culties of the French state and the consequent austerity 
measures.
Th e fee that funds public television has hardly increased since 2002. Upon adoption of the 2009 Broadcasting 
Act under the presidency of Mr Sarkozy,240 the parliamentary majority was opposed to any increase. Proponents 
of a fee increase argue that the amount remains low compared with that of neighboring countries. France 
Télévisions has also faced a decline in advertising revenues (a loss of €50 million (US$65 million) in 2012). 
Th e government of Jean-Marc Ayrault has proposed introducing a tax for television sets in second homes. 
Th is would have generated an additional €150 million (US$ 195 million), of which two-thirds would go to 
France Télévisions. Th e project was, however, dropped. According to public oﬃ  cials, France Télévisions is 
likely to suﬀ er from strong cuts in 2013, in a bid to comply with the deﬁ cits reduction plan imposed by the 
Ayrault government.241
238. CSA, “Bilan ﬁ nancier 2010 des chaînes gratuites et payantes” (Financial balance 2010 for free and paid channels), 16 December 2011, at http://
www.csa.fr/Etudes-et-publications/Les-bilans/Les-bilans-des-chaines-de-television-publiques-et-privees/Bilan-ﬁ nancier-2010-des-chaines-
gratuites-et-payantes (accessed 29 October 2012).
239. E. Barretta, “Filippetti conﬁ rme la hausse de six euros de la redevance” (Filippetti conﬁ rms an increase in the license fee of €6), Le Point, 21 
October 2012, at http://www.lepoint.fr/chroniqueurs-du-point/emmanuel-berretta/ﬁ lippetti-conﬁ rme-la-hausse-de-six-euros-de-la-redevance-
31-10-2012-1523437_52.php (accessed 29 October 2012).
240. Vie Public, “La reforme de l’audiovisuel public de 2009” (Public audiovisual reforms in 2009), 9 December 2010, at http://www.vie-publique.
fr/politiques-publiques/politique-audiovisuel/reforme-audiovisuel-public-2009 (accessed 29 October 2012).
241. M. Vergès, “La diète imposée à France Télévisions provoquera ‘des dommages’” (Regime imposed on France Télévisions will incur damages), 
Le Monde, 24 October 2012, at http://www.lemonde.fr/actualite-medias/article/2012/10/24/economies-a-france-televisions-remy-pﬂ imlin-tire-
la-sonnette-d-alarme_1780229_3236.html (accessed 29 October 2012).
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Table 22.
France Télévisions budget, breakdown by source of revenues (€ million (US$ million)), 2005–2010
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
License fee 1,796
(2,338)
1,834 
(2,388)
1,879 
(2,446)
1,945 
(2,532)
2,412 
(3,140)
2,472 
(3,218)
Advertising and sponsorship 780 
(1,015)
834 
(1,086)
823 
(1,071)
618 
(804)
430 
(559)
485 
(631)
Sales revenues 2,727 
(3,551)
2,853 
(3,715)
2,927 
(3,811)
2,750 
(3,580)
3,034 
(3,950)
3,140 
(4,088)
Net result 23 
(29)
13 
(16)
22 
(28)
–78 
(–101)
19 
(24)
12 
(15)
Source: France Télévisions Financial Reports Results for 2005–2010
In 2010, the newspaper industry still had not recovered from the crisis of 2009, with a decrease of revenues 
of 9.5 percent for the national press and 4.6 percent for the regional press. Th is decrease was mainly caused 
by the decline in advertising revenues (which typically constitute 40 percent of the budget) and a constantly 
falling readership (see section 1).
In 2008, 37 percent of national press income was derived from advertisements, 36 percent from selling 
individual print copies, 21 percent from subscriptions, and 6 percent from classiﬁ ed listings. For the regional 
press the numbers were: 28 percent from advertising, 36 percent from selling dailies, 23 percent from 
subscriptions, and 13 percent from classiﬁ eds. Th e general tendency in the revenue structure of the press 
industry in 2008 was as follows: subscriptions grew (from 11 percent in 1990 to 22 percent), while daily 
sales of copies fell from 41 percent to 36 percent, and revenue from advertising fell from 48 percent to 42 
percent since 1990.242
An important event, called “Etats Généraux de la Presse,” took place in autumn 2008 between the 
government and French press owners.243 In 2009, President Sarkozy summarized the lessons of the 2008 
meeting: the government should ﬁ nance a three-year plan to get the press out of the current crisis, as well 
as enable it to overcome the transition to digital publishing.244 Signiﬁ cant funding was allocated to this 
plan: € 278 million (US$ 362 million) was invested in 2009, € 418 million (US$ 544 million) in 2010, 
€ 422 million (US$ 549 million) in 2011.
Th ese funding measures, assured by HADOPI, were supposed to help publishers to endure the pressures 
of digitization, to change their attitudes and consider themselves rather as owners of “online news services” 
than “press news.” Th e advantageous regime for “online news service” companies had been complemented 
by signiﬁ cant funding to help print media improve their online activities. Th e success of these measures is 
rather questionable. A report from the Ministry of Culture and Communication about the deployment of 
242. Xerﬁ , “Press national and regional report,” July 2010.
243. Ministry of Culture and Communication, “Les Etats généraux de la presse écrite” (General Conditions of the Printed Press), 16 June 2010, at 
http://www.ddm.gouv.fr/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=175 (accessed 29 October 2012).
244. See http://www.droit-medias-culture.com/Etats-generaux-de-la-presse-suite.html (accessed 29 October 2012).
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these public funds assessed that they were mostly spent on ﬁ nancing expenses related to the printed versions 
of the newspapers; only a small part was invested in the transition to digital publishing.245 Commentators 
explained that press owners were preoccupied with the survival of the paper editions rather than launching 
online platforms.246
Table 23.
Direct state aid to the press, 2009–2011
Title Direct aid direct for each issue distributed, 
€ (US$)
Yearly aid (mean for 2009–2011), 
€ (US$)
L’humanité 0.48 (0.62) 6,761,434 (8,804,523)
La Croix 0.32 (0.41) 9,988,388 (13,006,560)
Télérama 0.29 (0.37) 9,411,822 (12,255,774)
Le Nouvel Observateur 0.29 (0.37) 7,800,161 (10,157,120)
Libération 0.27 (0.35) 9,908,617 (12,902,685)
Pèlerin 0.24 (0.31) 2,849,399 (3,710,396)
L’Express 0.23 (0.29 6,232,242 (8,115,426)
Challenges 0.22 (0.28) 2,384,145 (3,104,557)
Le Point 0.20 (0.26) 4,501,245 (5,861,377)
Le Monde 0.19 (0.24) 18,465,277 (24,044,894)
Le Figaro 0.17 (0.22) 17,217,154 (24,419,628)
Elle 0.16 (0.20) 3,413,233 (4,444,603)
Aujourd’hui en France 0.15 (0.19) 9,331,562 (12,151,262)
Les Echos 0.15 (0.19) 4,513,559 (5,877,412)
Paris Match 0.14 (0.18) 5,151,418 (6,708,012)
Télécâble Satellite Hebdo 0.10 (0.13) 3,390,880 (4,415,495)
Télé 7 Jours 0.10 (0.13) 7,279,547 (9,479,193)
Source: Cour des comptes, Annual report 2013, p. 647, at http://www.ccomptes.fr/Publications/Publications/Rapport-public-
annuel-2013 (accessed 15 February 2013). (Here we present a section of the table published in the oﬃ  cial report)
In February 2013, the Court of Auditors (La Cour des comptes) reported that state subsidies to the press in 
2009–2011 exceeded €5 billion (US$6.5 billion).247 Th e report criticizes this aid in very strong terms, calling 
245. “Rapport de la Commission de contrôle du Fonds d’aide à la modernisation de la presse quotidienne et assimilée d’information politique et 
générale” (Report by the Commission on Funds for Modernizing the Print Press), Decree no. 99-79 of 5 February 1999, Article 13, “Aid in 
2008–2009,” at http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/114000126-rapport-de-la-commission-de-controle-du-fonds-d-aide-
a-la-modernisation-de-la-presse#book_sommaire (accessed 29 October 2012).
246. D. Medioni and V. Truﬀ y, “Crise de la presse: comment fut loupé le virage du numérique” (Press Crisis: How the Change to Digital Failed), 19 
January 2011, at http://www.mediapart.fr/journal/economie/130111/crise-de-la-presse-comment-fut-loupe-le-virage-du-numerique (accessed 
29 October 2012).
247. See http://www.ccomptes.fr/Publications/Publications/Rapport-public-annuel-2013 (accessed 15 February 2013).
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for radical reform.248 It says that this aid neither helps to arrest the fall in circulation nor encourages reform 
on the scale needed, for example the development of new online strategies.
6.2.2 Other Sources of Funding
Television channels in France have four249 main funding sources:
 payments directly from the audience (consisting of subscription payments and pay-per-view content);
 license fees paid by the audience, collected through taxes, and redistributed by the state;
 advertising and sponsorship;
 other sources, such as product reselling, support from organizations, e.g. the Society for the Funding 
of the Cinematic and Audiovisual Arts (Société pour le ﬁ nancement de l’industrie cinématographique et 
audiovisuelle, SOFGICA) which supports the cinematic and audiovisual arts).
General television channels in France represent diﬀ erent types of ﬁ nancing. Commercial channel revenues 
(TF1 and M6) come almost exclusively from advertising income. Public channels are mainly ﬁ nanced through 
license fees (which also sponsor Radio France and the National Audiovisual Institute). License fee incomes 
are distributed as follows: 67 percent to France Télévisions, 19 percent to Radio France, 8 percent to Arte, 
and 7 percent to other parties. Th ematic channels (e.g. sports, travel) are ﬁ nanced in part from subscriptions 
(though subscriptions are paid to television distributors and not to television stations directly) and partly 
through advertising.
In 2009, the state increased its television subsidies by 19 percent (after disallowing advertising on public 
television after 8 p.m.). Th ese subsidies increased in 2010 by a further 3 percent.
In 2008, President Sarkozy initiated a national debate on the “state of the press,”250 where four main topics 
were discussed: the future of journalism, technical issues (printing, transport, and distribution), changes 
brought by the internet, and the press and society (how to deliver what readers want) (see section 6.2). As a 
result, some actions were undertaken by the government; among the most important were the granting of 
annual subsidies of € 200 million (US$ 260 million) for three years, subscription subsidies for young readers, 
creating a status for online editors, and increasing support to develop online information delivery.
Th e French state is prominently involved in helping the press to overcome the crisis in readership. It has 
established ﬁ nancial help for small retailers to sell printed copies in their shops and cafés. In July 2008, there 
was an agreement between the press industry and the national postal service relating to the cost of delivering 
248. X. Ternisien, “La Cour des comptes juge les aides à la presse écrite peu eﬃ  caces” (Court of Auditors judges the aid to the press to be inef-
ﬁ cient), Le Monde, at http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2013/02/12/la-cour-des-comptes-juge-les-aides-a-la-presse-ecrite-peu-eﬃ  caces_
1830699_823448.html (accessed 15 February 2013).
249. Xerﬁ 700, Television report, August 2010.
250. See www.etatsgenerauxdelapresseecrite.fr (accessed 29 October 2012).
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the press (ﬁ xed for the period 2009–2015). Lastly, the state budget has allocated a yearly subsidy for press 
delivery (€ 242 million (US$ 315 million) in 2009, which will decrease to € 180 million (US$ 234 million) 
by 2015).251
In order to compensate for the end to advertising on France Télévisions channels after 8 p.m., the government 
has seriously reduced the budget of public broadcasting (see section 6.2.1). Indeed, a tax established in 2009 
by the previous government to compensate for the loss of advertising on public television after 8 p.m. was 
censured by the European Commission. 
In 2009, Parliament voted through a 0.9 percent tax on telecoms operators’ turnover. Th is delivered some 
€ 370 million (US$ 481 million) to the state budget. Telecoms and internet providers complained to the 
European Commission, which—concerned about internet development in Europe—found that the tax was 
unfair. Its ﬁ nding applied to Spain’s reform of public service television, as well as to France. In support of 
this ﬁ nding, the Commission relied on a 2002 directive that aimed to open the telecommunications market 
up to new operators by ensuring that taxation could not become a ﬁ nancial barrier for any newcomer to the 
industry. Th e Commission explained that taxes on operators “must be directly related to covering the costs 
of regulating the industry.” Th ese taxes shall not fund public broadcasting. Th erefore, the government has set 
aside €1.3 billion (US$1.6 billion) in its 2013 budget for a possible refund of this tax.252 
6.3 Media Business Models
French television includes four distinct economic models:
 France Télévisions: free-to-air public television funded from license fees, state aid, and some advertising 
revenue.
 Private free-to-air channels, TF1 and M6, relying on advertising income.
 Private subscription channels, such as Canal+ (part of the Vivendi Group), with 12 million subscribers 
paying on average €36 (US$46) per month.
 ARTE France was created by ARTE (Association Relative à la Télévision Européenne), a European 
Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG) created on 30 April 1991,253 and comprising ARTE France and 
ARTE Deutschland TV GmbH. ARTE France operates almost exclusively with funds from French and 
German license fees.
251. Xerﬁ 700, Presse quotidienne nationale et régionale (Press national and regional report), July 2010.
252. E. Ercolani, “Budget 2013: le gouvernement provisionne 1,3 milliard sur la taxe opérateurs” (Budget 2013: Government provisions €1.3 billion 
from tele-operators tax), L’Informaticien, at http://www.linformaticien.com/actualites/id/26497/budget-2013-le-gouvernement-provisionne-1-
3-milliard-sur-la-taxe-operateurs.aspx (accessed 21 February 2013).
253. See http://www.arte.tv/fr/arte-g-e-i-e/2153580,CmC=2196658.html (accessed 29 October 2012).
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Legacy channels, facing the loss of audience followed by a drop in advertising revenues, are trying to establish 
themselves among the unpaid and paid digital terrestrial channels. In 2010, TF1 (Bouygues) bought TMC 
and NT1 from the AB Group for € 192 million (US$ 250 million). To ﬁ nance this purchase, TF1 and M6 
sold their shares in Canal+ to the Vivendi Group (TF1 sold its shares for € 744 million (US$ 968 million) in 
2009 and M6 for € 384 million (US$ 500 million) in 2010). 
In a bid to improve their ﬁ nancial situation, some television channels are taking advantage of the deregulation 
of the online gambling market. TF1 created EurosportBet and EurosportPoker, Canal+ is associated with 
English Ladbrokes, and M6 with Mangas Gaming (BetClick for betting and EverestPoker for gaming), since 
renamed the BetClic Everest Group. 
6.3.1 Changes in Media Business Models
Digitization brought three signiﬁ cant changes to the media business models of the audiovisual sector. First, 
the development of a digital terrestrial network allows operators to oﬀ er 18 free or almost free channels 
and nine paid channels on a single distribution platform. Th is has intensiﬁ ed competition for advertising. 
New channels have begun to make substantial gains against incumbents. TF1, which averaged a 32 percent 
audience share in 2005, had less than 24 percent in 2011 after the arrival of DTT. Similarly, France 2’s 
viewership decreased from 20 percent in 2005 to 15 percent in the same period.254 Th erefore, three private 
channels, TF1, M6, and Canal+, each bought one or two other channels to avoid losing their overall share 
of the advertising market.255
Th e second major change is the arrival of free and paid television channels through ADSL. In 2009, ADSL 
became the primary medium for paid television channels. Th e distribution of content via telecoms networks 
heralds the massive arrival of new operators, which are mainly internet service providers and mobile operators 
(such as Orange or SFR). Th ese new entrants are confronted with incumbent television services. Th is 
transformation in the media landscape changed many things for French consumers: it led to data exchange, 
interactivity, and the purchasing of bundled services. It has also catalyzed the emergence of new services: 
VoD, Podcasts, and triple-play oﬀ ers. Confronted by the success of these services, the current Ministry of 
Digital Economy has been working on a new tax for ADSL television. Th is new “tax on television services,” 
adapted to the optional television subscription system proposed by ADSL operators, should help to ﬁ nance 
the National Film Center (Centre National du Cinéma et de l’image animée, CNC).256
254. G. Dutheil, “La TNT a bousculé le paysage audiovisuel” (DTT has changed the audiovisual landscape), Le Monde, 30 November 2011.
255. J. Gabszewicz and N. Sonnac, L’industrie des médias à l’ère numérique (Th e Media Industry in the Digital Era), Editions La Découverte, Paris, 
2010.
256. C. Ducourtieux, “Nouvelle taxation en vue pour les oﬀ res ‘triple play’” (Probable new taxes for the “triple play”), Le Monde, 3 October 2012, at 
http://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2012/10/02/nouvelle-taxation-en-vue-pour-les-oﬀ res-triple-play_1768728_3234.html (accessed 29 
October 2012).
M A P P I N G  D I G I T A L  M E D I A     F R A N C E9 0
6.4 Assessments
Th e 2012 presidential election saw the defeat of Mr Sarkozy. During the campaign, the incumbent president 
and his political allies regularly complained about the so-called “hate campaign” of French journalists against 
them.257 It is very diﬃ  cult to judge the veracity of such statements, expressed during the fever of a presidential 
campaign. However, such comments invite some reﬂ ections about the political and economic structure of 
the media in France.
Th e news media largely survive thanks to state subsidies. Th e state ﬁ nances public service broadcasting and 
the press. Th e French laws assign the right to regulate the commercial break quotas for private channels.258 
Th e CSA decisions, which are often in tune with those of the head of state, authorize the acquisition of radio 
frequencies and television channels.259 Th erefore, the good poll results attributed to Mr Hollande during the 
2012 campaign may have led many journalists and media owners to promote—or to spare from scrutiny, at 
the very least—the most probable winner.
Th e new president has recently made a strong promise to the French press: that Parliament will probably soon 
vote on a proposed tax to be levied against search engines that publish information without the authorization 
of the information sites. Th is tax would be ﬁ rst imposed on Google.260 Th e proﬁ ts of this tax would probably 
be paid to the French press owners, a decision that would eventually increase the dependency of the French 
press on political power.
Even though no prominent French politicians own media outlets in France, the close ties between political 
and media elites have led to comparisons with the “Berlusconization” of the Italian media.261 Th is is reﬂ ected 
in the apparent inﬂ uence that President Sarkozy exerted over the media through his closest friends owning 
or partly owning the most inﬂ uential traditional media (television and press). As described above, the French 
media market is characterized by a heavy state presence through state-owned media (such as public television 
or radio outlets with large market shares) or through entangled state regulation or aid. Th us, the possibility 
of state (or political) intervention in the media remains strong. Some commentators on the evolution of the 
French press even argue that this collusion between the state and media owners is the main problem of the 
French press today. 
257. L. Joﬀ rin, “Haro sur les journalistes” (Blame on journalists), Le Nouvel Observateur, 15 April 2012, at http://autantenemportelevent.blogs.
nouvelobs.com/archive/2012/04/14/haro-sur-les-journalistes.html (accessed 29 October 2012).
258. “Tf1 et M6 introduisent une deuxième coupure pub” (TF1 and M6 will introduce the second cut (in ﬁ lms and magazines) for publicity), Le 
Nouvel Observateur, 13 March 2009, at http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/medias-pouvoirs/20090310.OBS8135/tf1-et-m6-introduisent-une-
deuxieme-coupure-de-pub.html (accessed 29 October 2012).
259. CSA, “Achat par TF1 des chaînes NT1 et TMC” (Purchase of the NT1 and TMC channels by TF1), 29 September 2009, at http://www.csa.fr/
es/Press-area/Communiques-de-presse/Achat-par-TF1-des-chaines-NT1-et-TMC-le-CSA-emet-un-avis-favorable-assorti-de-reserves (accessed 
29 October 2012).
260. L. de La Raudiere, “Google et la presse: François Hollande, taxer Google ne résoudra pas le problème” (Google and the press: François Hollande, 
taxing Google will not solve the problem), Le Nouvel Observateur, 31 October 2012, at http://leplus.nouvelobs.com/contribution/677999-goo-
gle-et-la-presse-francois-hollande-taxer-google-ne-resoudra-pas-le-probleme.html (accessed 29 October 2012).
261. H. Samuel, “Nicolas Sarkozy trying to ‘Berlusconise’ French media,” Th e Telegraph, 13 June 2010, at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world-
news/europe/france/7825017/Nicolas-Sarkozy-trying-to-Berlusconise-French-media.html (accessed 29 October 2012).
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According to the professor of journalism and author Jean Stern, the worst problems aﬄ  icting the French press 
can be traced to the fact that the owners’ principal interests usually lie in other sectors. Jean Stern suggests 
that the state subsidizes press employers and distributors excessively, without scrutinizing the use to which 
this public money is put.262 According to this author, this lax attitude—which is intended to avoid politically 
expensive conﬂ icts with the industry—has delayed the implementation of the main project relating to the 
“state of the press” (see section 6.2): identifying viable economic models to encourage media owners to 
refocus their newsrooms on online journalism. 
Jean Stern’s observation about the immobility of the ruling circles among the French press is accurate. Since 
1945, the French press has beneﬁ tted from cartel-like privileges. Unionized printers, distribution companies, 
and politicians probably all have had an interest in preserving the status quo and this helps to explain the 
slow pace of migration to digital platforms. However, other factors probably also contribute. Digitization was 
supposed to help new actors to be independent from the large traditional media industry, but very few news 
companies can claim to have established a viable online business model. 
In 2013, French pure-player news sites can be grouped into three broad categories.263 Th e ﬁ rst category 
consists of small webzines powered by small semi-professional teams. Hundreds of these teams beneﬁ t from 
the low publishing costs on the internet to provide news and opinions. Some of these sites repay their 
development costs through online donations and advertising, but the teams that feed them with news are 
mostly volunteers. Th is niche market with relatively low online ratings does not represent the future of the 
press. 
Th e second category of news sites comprises the few signiﬁ cant sites that are also ﬁ nanced through advertising 
revenues, while paying professionals to supply them with information (see section 6.1.2). Th ese sites (such as 
Atlantico, Owni, Rue89, Backchich, LePost, e24, and Huﬃ  ngtonpost) are not proﬁ table. Sites that are not 
backed by a media company seem to suﬀ er more than the others. One of these little sites—Owni, which is a 
branch of a small business group called “22 mars”—ceased activity on December 2012. Backchich went into 
receivership on 26 January 2011 and reopened on 24 June 2011. Sites that are owned by a paper press group 
are used as digital editions of paper products. One of these—Rue89—has been bought by an important 
French news group, which combines its web activities with those of Rue89. Another such site, e24, an 
economics site, is owned by the free national newspaper 20 minutes, which belongs to the Norwegian group 
Schibsted; journalists from e24 regularly feed the economic pages of 20 minutes. 
It is striking that media groups that publish paper editions have succeeded in acquiring pure players, while pure 
players who tried to spin oﬀ  printed magazines from their web production failed to make them economically 
viable. Backchich and Rue89 both tried to publish news magazines with the main articles from their websites; 
262. Jean Stern, Les patrons de la presse nationale, tous mauvais (Th e Bosses of the National Press are all Bad), La Fabrique, Paris, 2012.
263. For more information, see Éric Dagiral and Sylvain Parasie (eds), “Presse en ligne” (Online Press), Réseaux 160–161 (2–3, 2010).
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the scale of losses forced them to stop.264 In a diﬀ erent economic conﬁ guration, LePost and Huﬃ  ngtonpost.
fr are backed by Le Monde and Huﬃ  ngtonpost.com, respectively. As they mostly publish opinion pieces by 
unpaid volunteers, and operate with a skeleton paid staﬀ , these sites are cheaper to operate than the genuine 
information online sites, which have to pay journalists for content. 
Th e third group comprises specialized news websites accessible only to subscribers. Slate, Arrêt sur Images, 
and Mediapart oﬀ er political information, stories, and opinions for a fee of between €40 (US$52) and €100 
(US$ 130) per year. Two of these sites are proﬁ table: Arrêt sur Images265 and Mediapart.266 Th e staﬃ  ng levels 
of these sites are not comparable with those of a national newspaper or any television channel. Th eir business 
model is not applicable to large media groups.
In this situation, it is diﬃ  cult to criticize the inertia of French media publishers for their slow migration 
online. French newspapers publish for a francophone community that does not exceed 100 million people, 
while the anglophone community can be counted in billions. Under these conditions, the choice of the 
second category of publishers to oﬀ er their online content for free amounts to losing money in order to 
get a foothold in cyberspace, in the hope of some future advantage. Th is strategy is unaﬀ ordable for all but 
the major players, as well as controversial, and is not followed by all actors. Th e satirical weekly Le Canard 
Enchaîné, which sells 500,000 copies and remains proﬁ table without advertising, has no website. 
At the time of writing, the ﬁ rst and third economic models appear to be the most viable. Th ey are based on a 
relationship of trust with the reader, evidenced by subscription, punctual crowd funding, and demonstrable 
editorial independence. Th is strong connection with readers seems to be the most eﬀ ective way to maintain a 
lasting relationship with an audience that has, otherwise, hundreds of available sources oﬀ ering approximately 
the same free content.
 
264. For example, the site Rue89 loses €300,000–€500,000 (US$ 390,650–US$ 651,084) per year, probably a little less without the magazine. See 
“Rue89 ferme la page de son mensuel papier” (Rue89 closes its paper monthly edition), Latribune.fr, at http://www.latribune.fr/technos-medias/
medias/20120312trib000687801/rue89-ferme-la-page-de-son-mensuel-papier.html (accessed 21 February 2013).
265. “We are still beneﬁ ciaries in 2011: €51,082 proﬁ t from €1,097,534 of sales (...). Over four years have passed since the creation of the site, ﬁ scal 
year 2009 was the only negative one. So this conﬁ rms that our (very) small business is sustainable.” Daniel Schneidermann, CEO of Arrêt sur 
Images, 17 April 2012, at http://www.arretsurimages.net/forum/read.php?4,1220120,1220120 (accessed 21 February 2013).
266. “Launched in March 2008 by Edwy Plenel and former journalists of Le Monde, the site has beneﬁ tted from its scoops on the Bettencourt aﬀ air 
in 2010: it would have won more than 55,000 subscribers, and declared a proﬁ t of 500,000 euros in 2011 for a 5 million euros turnover.” 
Delphine Cuny, “Les nouveaux éditeurs d’information en ligne toujours déﬁ citaires” (New information online publishers are still deﬁ cient), 
La Tribune, 30 January 2012, at http://www.latribune.fr/technos-medias/internet/20120130trib000681234/les-nouveaux-editeurs-d-informa-
tion-en-ligne-toujours-deﬁ citaires.html).
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7. Policies, Laws, and Regulators
7.1 Policies and Laws
7.1.1 Digital Switch-over of Terrestrial Transmission
7.1.1.1 Access and Aﬀ ordability
Th e overall legal framework of the terrestrial transmission to digital switch-over was ﬁ rst established by the 
Law on the Modernization of Audiovisual Broadcasting and the Television of the Future of 5 March 2007267 
(hereafter the Law on the Modernization of Audiovisual Broadcasting), which amended the 1986 Law on the 
Freedom of Communication.268 In line with recommendations of the EU Council from December 2005, it 
provided that analog broadcasting should be switched oﬀ  no later than 30 November 2011. Several provisions 
of the law aimed to ensure “continuity of television services,” which means that all citizens should have a 
means of receiving digital terrestrial television (DTT) at the time of the phase-out of analog broadcasting.
It was ﬁ rst decided that the extension of the DTT territorial coverage should precede the phase-out of analog 
signals. Th e 2007 Law required that DTT national channels cover 95 percent of the French population before 
analog signals could be switched oﬀ . Free historical television channels were to comply with this requirement 
in order to be allowed to keep their licenses for ﬁ ve years longer, and new DTT national channels were 
encouraged by a decree269 to commit themselves to the same obligation. Th e scheme adopted by the CSA on 
10 July 2007 to extend DTT coverage between 2008 and 2011 required that DTT covers at least 91 percent 
of the population of each department270 for the historic free-to-air national channels, and 85 percent for other 
national channels before analog signals could be switched oﬀ .
Second, all viewers had to have digital reception equipment at the time of shutdown of analog broadcasting. 
For this purpose, new buildings had to be equipped to receive DTT. Television sets and recorders sold to 
the public from March 2008 were to incorporate an “adapter for the reception of digital terrestrial television 
267. Law no. 2007-309 of 5 March 2007 on the Modernization of Audiovisual Broadcasting and the Television of the Future, Journal oﬃ  ciel, 7 March 
2007, p. 4347; all laws are available at http://legifrance.gouv.fr.
268. Law no. 86-1967 of 30 September 1986 on Freedom of Communication.
269. Decree—application of Law no. 86-1067 of 30 September 1986, relative to Article 97, Journal oﬃ  ciel, 11 May 2007, p. 8583.
270. France is administratively divided into 27 regions and 101 departments. 
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services.” Th e law also provided for the payment of subsidies to those who could not aﬀ ord set-top boxes 
(STBs) or digital television sets.271
A national communication campaign relayed in the national and local media was to be organized to inform 
consumers about the timing, terms, and consequences of the phase-out of analog broadcasting. Th is mission, 
as well as the distribution of subsidies, was entrusted to a public interest group (Groupement d’intérêt public, 
GIP) consisting of the historical private and public channels of analog television (TF1, France Télévisions, 
M6, Canal+, ARTE).
Mandated by the law to ensure “the continuity of reception of television services by viewers,” this group 
(called “France Télé numérique”) was created in 2007.272 It established a website to inform citizens about 
digital switch-over,273 and organized seven television advertising campaigns that reached 97 percent of the 
French population. A regional information campaign was also organized in the local media and 25,000 
information points were installed, especially in municipalities. A printed guide to digital switch-over was 
distributed to 30 million households.
To improve DTT territorial coverage and “ﬁ ght the digital divide,” a law from 17 December 2009 completed 
the legislative framework established in March 2007.274 Th is second text mandated the CSA’s powers of 
enforcement over editors and local authorities to ensure a minimal DTT coverage in each department. It 
also established ﬁ nancial compensation for territorial communities (e.g. municipalities) that would ﬁ nance 
the installation of a new DTT transmitter or other equipment to ensure DTT reception. Th e 2009 Law 
ﬁ nally provided for the establishment of free technical assistance for the elderly (people over 70 years) and 
people with a disability.275 Responsible for this assistance, France Télé numérique trained more than 50,000 
technicians to help people connect their adapters and set DTT channels in some 466,000 homes. 
“Achieving digital switch-over by 2012” and “allowing all French people to receive new television services” 
were objectives of the digital economy development plan Digital France 2012, published on 20 October 
2008. In line with the national scheme (approved by the prime minister on 22 December 2008276 and 
updated in 2009)277 to stop analog broadcasting and switch to digital, switch-over started in Coulommiers 
(Seine-et-Marne) on 4 February 2009.
271. Th ese subsidies are detailed in section 7.1.1.2.
272. Order to conﬁ rm the creation of the group France Télé numérique,  Journal oﬃ  ciel, 27 April 2007, p. 7510.
273. See http://www.tousaunumerique.fr.
274. Law no. 2009-1572 of 17 December 2009 concerning the Fight against the Digital Divide, Journal oﬃ  ciel, 18 December 2009, p. 21825.
275. Decree no. 2010-546 of 26 May 2010 relating to Household Technical Assistance to Provide Television, Journal oﬃ  ciel, 27 May 2010, p. 9603.
276. Order to approve the national plan to stop analog broadcasting and to make the switch-over to digital broadcasting, Journal oﬃ  ciel, 23 December 
2008, p. 19747.
277. Order of 26 March 2009 completing the national plan to stop analog broadcasting and make the switch-over to digital broadcasting, Journal 
oﬃ  ciel, 27 March 2009, p. 5459; Order of 23 July 2009 to conﬁ rm the revision of the national digitization plan and make the switch-over to 
digital broadcasting, Journal oﬃ  ciel, 24 July 2009, p. 12365.
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7.1.1.2 Subsidies for Equipment
To ensure the continuity of analog terrestrial television reception after the digital switch-over for all citizens, 
the government established various subsidies for the most disadvantaged social categories and people living 
in areas not covered by DTT.
Th e Law on the Modernization of Audiovisual Broadcasting from 5 March 2007 provided for the establishment 
of an assistance fund for low-income households exonerated from contributing to public broadcasting and 
living in areas covered by DTT. Th is fund was to cover all or part of the costs necessary to adapt or change 
reception equipment to receive DTT. A government decree278 stated that it would subsidize either the 
purchase of digital adapters (up to a limit of €25 (US$32)) or the adjustment of television antennas (up to a 
limit of € 120 (US$ 156)).
For people living in areas not covered by DTT, the Law from 17 December 2009 created another fund to 
subsidize the purchase and installation of equipment to maintain free television reception, such as satellite 
dishes. Based on the principle of territorial equity, this subsidy for DTT reception (ﬁ xed by the 2010 Decree279 
to a maximum of € 250 (US$ 325)) was granted to all households without any means testing; France Télé 
numérique was to receive the requests for subsidies and distribute them. 
7.1.1.3 Legal Provisions on Public Interest
Public interest is not expressly deﬁ ned by the legal framework, but digital switch-over is itself considered to 
be a public interest operation. Several legal provisions are aimed at protecting the public interest.
In the digital licensing process, as in the preceding analog era, the CSA must take into account “the interest 
of each project for the public,”280 with regard to safeguarding pluralism, the diversiﬁ cation of operators, and 
preservation of free competition. In DTT licensing, the CSA is also to consider “the need to provide services 
likely to meet a wide audience and to encourage a rapid development of DTT.”281
Apart from that, the implementation of the digital switch-over has been entrusted to a GIP, France Télé 
numérique, which brought together incumbent broadcasters, with a view to ensuring “the continuity of the 
reception of television services by viewers.”282 Th e Law on the Modernization of Audiovisual Broadcasting also 
provided that one or several GIPs (other than France Télé numérique) could be created to permit, under the 
same conditions, the phase-out of analog broadcasting in overseas departments and territories (Guadeloupe, 
Guyana, Martinique, Réunion, and Mayotte). At the time of writing, no other GIP has been created.
278. Decree no. 2009-1670 of 28 December 2009 relating to assistance to ensure the continuity of television reception diﬀ used by terrestrial analog 
channels, Journal oﬃ  ciel, 30 December 2009, p. 22766.
279. Decree no. 2010-993 of 26 August 2010 relating to assistance to ensure the continuity of television reception diﬀ used by terrestrial analog 
channels in areas without digital coverage, Journal oﬃ  ciel, 28 August 2010, p. 15692.
280. Article 29 from the Law on Freedom of Communication no. 86-1067 of 30 September 1986.
281. Article 30-1 from the Law on Freedom of Communication no. 86-1067 of 30 September 1986.
282. Article 100 from the Law on Freedom of Communication with the modiﬁ cations of the law of 17 December 2009.
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Priority rights to use DTT frequencies have also been granted to channels with public service missions283 
(France Télévisions, Audiovisuel extérieur de la France, ARTE, and the Parliamentary Channel) to allow 
them to have the resources needed to accomplish these tasks in the general interest.284 Th e government 
has made use of this right to obtain DTT frequencies for public channels in terrestrial digital broadcasting 
(2002), as well as high-deﬁ nition (HD) television and personal mobile television (2008).
7.1.1.4 Public Consultation
Th e Law on the Modernization of Audiovisual Broadcasting from 5 March 2007 provided that a national 
scheme to stop analog broadcasting and switch to digital would be approved by the prime minister after 
a public consultation organized by the CSA.285 Th is consultation took place from 11 December 2007 to 
4 February 2008 in order to collect the positions of all stakeholders involved in the phase-out of analog 
broadcasting and digital switch-over.286 Fifty-eight questions were asked about the timing and terms of the 
switch-over and the way the public should be informed and supported. Th e CSA received 80 contributions 
from diﬀ erent stakeholders: services editors, electronic communication operators, professional organizations, 
technical broadcasters and industrialists, associations of local councilors, local authorities, and publicly owned 
establishments and individuals. Th e synthesis of this consultation287 and the recommendations formulated by 
the CSA288 were used as a basis for the development of the aforementioned national scheme approved by the 
prime minister on 22 December 2008.289
Another public consultation about the digital dividend290 was launched on 3 April 2008 by the Commission 
for the Digital Dividend (Commission du dividende numérique, CDN)291 and the Strategic Committee for 
Digitization (Comité stratégique pour le numérique, CSN).292 On 23 July 2008, the Commission published its 
conclusions and recommendations for the adoption of a national scheme to reuse the frequencies freed up by 
283. Oﬃ  ce for Media Development (Direction du développement des médias, DDM), “Right for the priority usage of the frequencies for the public 
services,” 14 May 2012, at http://www.ddm.gouv.fr/article.php3?id_article=1311 (accessed 19 October 2012).
284. Article 26-II from the Law on Freedom of Communication with the 2009 modiﬁ cations.
285. Article 99 of the Law on Freedom of Communication with 2009 amendments.
286. CSA, “Le CSA lance une consultation publique pour préparer le basculement vers la diﬀ usion numérique” (CSA launches a public consultation 
to prepare switch-over to digital broadcasting), 11 December 2007, at http://www.csa.fr/Espace-Presse/Communiques-de-presse/Le-CSA-lance-
une-consultation-publique-pour-preparer-le-basculement-vers-la-diﬀ usion-numerique (accessed 19 October 2012).
287. CSA, “Synthèse des contributions à la consultation publique sur l’arrêt de la diﬀ usion analogique et le passage au tout numérique” (Synthesis 
of the contributions to the public consultation on the stopping of analog broadcasting and the switch-over to digital broadcasting), 15 April 
2008, at http://www.csa.fr/Etudes-et-publications/Les-dossiers-d-actualite/Synthese-des-contributions-a-la-consultation-publique-sur-l-arret-de
-la-diﬀ usion-analogique-et-le-passage-au-tout-numerique (accessed 22 July 2012).
288. CSA, “Contribution du CSA pour l’établissement d’un schéma national d’arrêt de la diﬀ usion analogique et de basculement vers le numérique” 
(Contribution of the CSA for the establishment of a national scheme to stop analog broadcasting and switch to digital), 15 April 2008, at 
http://www.csa.fr/Etudes-et-publications/Les-dossiers-d-actualite/Contribution-du-CSA-pour-l-etablissement-d-un-schema-national-d-arret-
de-la-diﬀ usion-analogique-et-de-basculement-vers-le-numerique (accessed 19 October 2012).
289. Order of 22 December 2008 to approve the national plan to stop analog broadcasting and switch to digital broadcasting, Journal oﬃ  ciel, 23 
December 2008, p. 19747.
290. See http://archives.dividende-numerique.fr.
291. Created by Law no. 2007-309 from 5 March 2007.
292. Created by Decree no. 2006-502 from 3 May 2006.
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the end of analog broadcasting. Th is scheme was approved by the prime minister on 22 December 2008,293 
and amended in 2011.294
Th e prime minister is allowed to take decisions on this issue, under rights granted by Parliament. Th e Law 
on the Modernization of Audiovisual Broadcasting from 5 March 2007 provided that a national scheme to 
reassign the spectrum freed up by the end of analog broadcasting would be prepared by the prime minister’s 
oﬃ  ce, after consultation with the CDN. Th e project proposed by the prime minister did not include frequency 
allocation. It only identiﬁ ed which frequencies would be allocated by the CSA and ARCEP, both of which 
are independent administrative authorities (see section 7.2.2). Th is division of responsibility in respect of 
frequency allocation minimizes the risk that the process will be politicized. Th e CDN was created by law (5 
March 2007) to oversee the decisions made by the prime minister. Th e CDN includes four members from 
the Lower Chamber of Parliament and four senators, appointed by their respective assemblies.
As provided by the 1986 Law on Freedom of Communication modiﬁ ed in 2007, many other public 
consultations were organized by the CSA before the launching of calls for applications to select national or 
local DTT channels, HD and personal mobile television services or digital radio broadcasters. 
7.1.2 The Internet
7.1.2.1 Regulation of News on the Internet
Until 2004, there was no speciﬁ c regulation of news on the internet: online news was regulated by the same rules 
as news in traditional media, either print or audiovisual. In 2004, a new Law for Trust in the Digital Economy 
(LCEN) was introduced295 coupling together various EU directives. It introduced a “double click” rule for 
online commerce (the requirement to consent twice to ﬁ nalize a purchase) and spam regulation (the advertising 
goal of an e-mail has to be clearly notiﬁ ed, and the recipient can refrain from receiving it at any time).
As far as news regulation is concerned, the LCEN asserts that “electronic communication to the public is 
free.”296 It means that freedom of expression applies to the internet, as to other media. But the LCEN also 
provides that penal oﬀ enses punishable by the 1881 Law on Freedom of the Press apply to the internet. In other 
words, online defamations, insults, racist or sexist statements and comments are punishable as they are in print 
or audiovisual media. Th e rights to privacy and presumption of innocence also apply to internet content. All 
messages published on a website, a blog, or a Facebook page are judicially punishable if they breach the law. 
Th e LCEN establishes a speciﬁ c regulation for the right of reply on the internet which takes into account the 
network’s interactivity. Every person named or designed in an online service is allowed to exercise the right 
293. Order of 22 December 2008 to approve the national plan to stop analog broadcasting and switch to digital broadcasting, Journal oﬃ  ciel, 23 
December 2008, p. 19747.  See http://archives.dividende-numerique.fr (accessed 3 February 2013).
294. Order of 23 June 2011 for the revision of the national plan of re-usage of the free frequencies available after digital switch-over, Journal oﬃ  ciel, 
25 June 2011, p. 10793.
295. Law for Trust in the Digital Economy no. 2004-575, 21 June 2004, Journal oﬃ  ciel, 22 June 2004.
296. Article 1 from the Law for Trust in the Digital Economy, Journal oﬃ  ciel, 22 June 2004, p. 11168.
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of reply unless the service provides another means to formulate one’s remarks. Th e availability of a comment 
function somewhere on a website is not suﬃ  cient to fulﬁ ll the right of reply. In order to be considered as a 
reply, a message should always be published in the same place as the initial message, or be accessible from 
it.297 A Decree from 24 October 2007 on the online right to reply requires that the person involved can make 
observations “directly,” meaning that someone who reads the initial message should have the opportunity to 
read the reply at the same time.298 
Since 2004, online journalists are considered as professional journalists with the same status as those employed 
in the print and audiovisual broadcasting media. It means that the Journalist Professional Statute Act, passed 
on 29 March 1935 (and now included in the French labor code), regulates the professional status of online 
journalists, their contracts, wages, and identiﬁ cation cards. According to this code, journalists can resign 
regardless of their contract and with the right to dismissal indemnities if there is a change of ownership or 
editorial line of the media they are employed in.
Th e HADOPI Bill (see section 6.1.1), adopted in June 2009,299 ensured that online press services have 
the same obligations as print media and are entitled to the same state subsidies. In the copyright ﬁ eld, the 
HADOPI Law, slightly amended by the constitutional court and supplemented in October 2009 by a second 
law, the so-called “HADOPI 2 Law,”300 established a “graduated response” procedure based on a warning and 
sanction mechanism. After two warnings from the HADOPI, it authorizes the disconnection of those who 
repeatedly illegally download copyrighted content. Th e implementation of the penalty has to be preceded by 
an independent court ruling. Th e law was highly criticized by operators and customer groups, who cited the 
necessity to “spy” on web utilization. Th e bill is also not favored by EU authorities.301
7.1.2.2 Legal Liability for Internet Content
Th e liability for internet content in respect of penal oﬀ enses (punishable by the 1881 Law on Freedom of the 
Press) rests with the author or the publication director.
According to the LCEN, which implements the EU’s Electronic Commerce Directive,302 intermediary internet 
service providers have no “general obligation to monitor the information which they transmit or store, nor 
a general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity.” Access providers are 
297. TGI Paris, ord. réf., 19 November 2007, CNP Assurances c/UFC Que Choisir, Legipresse, December 2007, No. 247.III.265.
298. Decree no. 2007-1527 of 24 October 2007 for the right to respond within online public communications and application of Article 6 from the 
Law for Trust in the Digital Economy, at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr (accessed 21 February 2013).
299. Law no. 2009-669 of 12 June 2009 on the Diﬀ usion and Protection of Authors’ Rights on the Internet, Journal oﬃ  ciel,13 June 2009, p. 9666, 
at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/aﬃ  chTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000020735432&categorieLien=id (accessed 12 January 2013).
300. Law no. 2009-1311 of 28 October 2009 on the Criminal Protection of Literary and Artistic Property on the Internet, Journal oﬃ  ciel, 29 October 
2009, p. 18290, at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/aﬃ  chTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000021208046&categorieLien=id (accessed 12 January 
2013).
301. IHS Global Insight, Telecoms report, July 2011.
302. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in 
particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, Oﬃ  cial Journal of the European Communities 178, 17 July 2000, at http://eur-lex.europa.
eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2000:178:0001:0001:EN:PDF (accessed 12 January 2013), pp. 1–16.
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not liable for the content posted by the users to whom they provide access if they do not have control over 
content. Hosting providers are not liable for the information posted by a hosted service, except when the host 
has knowledge about illegal information and does not take any action to remove or to disable access to it.
Liability for internet content rests with the author or the publication director, depending on the infringement 
involved in the case. Th e author or poster of a message is responsible for its content except when penal 
oﬀ enses punishable by the 1881 Law on Freedom of the Press are concerned. For this kind of infringement, a 
Law from 29 July 1982303 provides a special regime of liability—the so-called “cascading liability.” Successive 
responsibility of three diﬀ erent actors (the publication director, author of the oﬀ ending message, and provider 
of the site) can be involved. Th e primary liability rests with the publication’s director, if she/he could have 
knowledge of the oﬀ ending message. If it is impossible to identify the publication director, the author of the 
message will be liable for its content. If neither the publication director nor the author is found, the third 
responsible actor is the site host.
In 2009, the HADOPI Law introduced an exception to this “cascading liability” rule for messages posted by 
internet users in comments sections and the like. Th e publication director cannot be liable for UGC if she/he 
does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or information, or acts expeditiously to remove or to disable 
access to the information upon becoming aware of its illegality. In this case, liability rests with the author.
Th is liability regime does not aﬀ ect the performance and independence of the news media. On 8 February 
2010 the Loppsi2 Law was introduced. It was criticized for its Article 4 (allowing a webmaster to block a 
website if it contains child pornography, without an oﬃ  cial court warrant), which is treated as censorship of 
the internet.304 It also regulates the issue of “identity theft” (with penalties of up to one year in prison and a 
€ 15,000 (US$ 19,532) ﬁ ne).
7.2 Regulators
7.2.1 Changes in Content Regulation
Th e CSA is the only French regulation authority actually in charge of regulating media content.
In 1982, a new law was introduced whereby the public monopoly on television broadcasting was abolished 
and a regulatory institution, the High Authority of Audiovisual Communication (Haute Autorité de la 
Communication Audiovisuelle, HACA), was established. It was replaced by the National Commission for 
Communication and Liberties (Commission Nationale de la Communication et des Libertés, CNCL) in 1986. 
It was again replaced by the CSA by the Law from 17 January 1989. Th e CSA exists to protect the liberty of 
303. Article 93-3 of the Law no. 82-652 of 29 July 1982 on Audiovisual Communication, at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/aﬃ  chTexteArticle.do?-
cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000880222&idArticle=LEGIARTI000020740559&dateTexte= (accessed 12 January 2013).
304. G. Deleurence, “Filtrage, mouchards: le project de loi Loppsi 2 adopté par le Parlement” (Filtering and sneaks: Loppsi2 law passed by Par-
liament), 9 February 2011, at http://www.01net.com/editorial/528008/ﬁ ltrage-mouchards-le-projet-de-loi-loppsi-2-adopte-par-le-parlement 
(accessed 22 July 2011).
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broadcasting communication. Th e body is to distribute the broadband frequencies and give permission for 
radio and television broadcasting. It is responsible for allocating terrestrial, cable, and digital frequencies; it 
gives its opinion on new laws concerning audiovisual issues; and regulates the relations between producers and 
distributors. It is also responsible for ensuring pluralism of expression and competition and has enforcement 
powers to penalize broadcasters if regulations are violated. It also presides over the radio sector, regulating 
competition issues and the distribution of frequencies, and presiding over changes to radio categories (e.g. 
diﬀ erent broadcasting levels: national, local, etc.).
Th e 1992 Decree introduced changes in the broadcast of advertising, sponsoring, self-promotion, and television 
markets.305 It conﬁ rmed the general rules that should be respected within those sectors: the principles of 
non-discrimination, rights of people and goods, environmental protection, etc. When advertising on public 
broadcasting channels was restricted in 2009, private channels were allowed to have additional advertising 
breaks during programs and to broadcast longer advertising blocks (6–9 minutes with a limit of 216 minutes 
per 24 hours).
Th e decrees from 2001 and 2003306 obliged television channels to contribute to audiovisual and cinema 
productions. In 2009, the obligation to adopt programs to meet the needs of disabled people and for catch-
up television was introduced.
Since 1989, the CSA’s competencies have been much expanded. In 2004, the LCEN Law extended the 
regulation exerted by the Council to internet television and radio. Th e 1986 Law amended by the Law 
from 5 March 2009 implementing the EU Audiovisual Media Services Directive307 now allows the CSA to 
regulate on-demand audiovisual media services, especially VoD and catch-up television. Th is development 
has increased internet regulation without weakening traditional linear content regulation.
In 2006, the Law on Authors’ Rights and Related Rights in the Information Society created the Authority 
for Technical Regulation (Autorité de régulation des mesures techniques, ARMT) in order to ensure that Digital 
Rights Management (DRM) systems comply with exceptions to copyright.308 But this authority disappeared 
in 2009 with the establishment of the HADOPI, which was responsible for controlling internet provision 
and property rights. Th e ﬁ rst HADOPI Law from 12 June 2009 gave the HADOPI the powers both to warn 
online infringers and to cut internet access for people who repeatedly illegally download copyrighted contents. 
305. Decree no. 92-280 of 27 March 1992, on Article 27 of the Law of 30 September 1986 on Freedom of Communication and on General 
Principles on Advertising and Sponsorship, Journal oﬃ  ciel, 28 March 1992, at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/aﬃ  chTexte.do?cidTexte=JORF-
TEXT000000346165&dateTexte=&categorieLien=id (accessed 12 January 2013).
306. Ministry of Culture and Communication, “La reforme du régime de contribution des éditeurs de services de télévision à la production d’œuvres 
audiovisuelles” (Reform of the system of contributions of television broadcasters in audiovisual production), 2 August 2010, at http://www.ddm.
gouv.fr/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=183 (accessed 22 July 2011).
307. Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by 
law, regulation, or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services 
Directive), European Union Oﬃ  cial Journal L 095, 15 April 2010, pp. 1–24, at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=O-
J:L:2010:095:0001:0024:EN:PDF (accessed 12 January 2013).
308. Law no. 2006-961 of 1 August 2006 on authors’ rights and related rights in the information society (DADVSI), Journal oﬃ  ciel, 3 August 2006, 
p. 11529.
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But the French Constitutional Court considered that the HADOPI’s ability to proceed to disconnection was 
contrary to the freedom of communication, and thus unconstitutional.
Th e HADOPI 2 Law was introduced (see section 7.1.2.1) to give this power of sanction to a judge. Th e 
HADOPI is still in charge of the warning mechanism, but the penalty of disconnection is to be decided by 
a judge. Th e HADOPI can address electronic warnings to internet users who illegally download contents 
protected by intellectual property rights, but it has no enforcement powers in respect of illegal downloading. 
Deprived of its most controversial function, namely the ability to cut internet access from people who illegally 
download content protected by intellectual property rights, the HADOPI may be reformed or abolished by 
the new majority PS government.
In 2007, the question of creating a regulation authority for the internet (e.g. Commission nationale de déontologie 
des services de communication au public en ligne or Commission nationale de déontologie du numérique) was 
much debated in France. Within the framework of the Digital Plan for 2012, the establishment of a National 
Council for Digitization (Conseil national du numérique, CNN) was suggested. Th e goal was to gather within 
a single body various commissions or committees established over the last two decades to deal with speciﬁ c 
issues related to the information and communication technologies sector.309
Th e CNN was intended to have three goals: to provide strategic guidance, to host discussions with service 
providers and operators about charters and good practices, and to monitor how regulations were respected. 
In February 2011, a report by Pierre Kosciusko-Morizet, a well-known online entrepreneur, suggested limiting 
the CNN to a forecasting and advisory role, for two main reasons. First, it appeared that the various missions 
assigned to the CNN by the “Digital France 2012” plan were no longer provided by the state. All the previous 
commissions or committees that were to merge to create the CNN had disappeared, because they had been 
dissolved or had not been renewed. Since the FDI was dissolved in 2010, mediation and dispute resolution 
have been provided by professional bodies and consumer associations. Charters of good practice imposed by 
the state have often been ineﬀ ective.
Second, most actors in the digital economy who responded to the public consultation, held before Mr 
Kosciusko-Morizet wrote his report, were against the creation of a regulatory institution with the power to 
adopt standards and control internet content. Th ey considered that there were already many legal standards 
applicable to the internet and charters of good practice should be voluntarily adopted and controlled by 
professional organizations.
309. Th ese include: Committee for Anonymous Telematics (Comité de la télématique anonyme, CTA), High Council for Telematics (Conseil supérieur 
de la télématique, CST), Internet Rights Forum (Forum des droits de l’Internet, FDI), Internet Advisory Council (Conseil consultatif de l’Internet, 
CCI), Strategic Council for Technologies on Information (Conseil stratégique des technologies de l’information, CSTI), and the Committee for 
Coordination of Sciences and Technologies of Information and Communication (Comité de coordination des sciences et technologies de l’informa-
tion et de la communication, CCSTIC).
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310. See http://www.cnnumerique.fr.
It was concluded that the CNN should advise the public authorities when drafting regulations, and it should 
not be involved in any regulatory activity. Th e report stresses that the CNN must not control the way in 
which operators and providers comply with regulations or implement good practices and charters of good 
conduct.
Contrary to the FDI, the CNN should not act as a mediating body in litigations or disputes between providers 
and consumers. Th is report clearly reﬂ ects the view of a number of internet service providers, who consider 
self-regulation better than public regulation. Finally, according to a decree by the president on 29 April 2011, 
the CNN is not an actual regulator of the internet.310 Comprising 18 members selected for their expertise in 
the digital economy, it is an advisory body responsible for giving its opinion on draft regulations. But it has 
no power to control or sanction internet content.
7.2.2 Regulatory Independence
In France, all the institutions regulating the digital environment (CSA, CNIL, ARCEP, and HADOPI) are 
considered by law as “independent administrative authorities” (Autorité Administrative Indépendante, AAI). 
Th is status means that the state, the government, and political parties should not interfere in the activities 
of these authorities where public freedoms are involved. Th is independence is theoretically ensured by the 
composition of the regulators and the status of their members.
As far as the CSA is concerned, its members cannot be dismissed or reappointed. Th ey should not have any 
elective mandate, public job, or other professional activity. Th ey are not allowed to work for private or state-
owned companies involved in the media (audiovisual, cinema, publishing, or advertising) or to get money 
from them. To avoid any external pressure on the institution, members of the CSA must not divulge any 
conﬁ dential information obtained in the course of their work, and they are not allowed to talk publicly about 
the activities of the regulator. CSA employees are obliged to keep all information conﬁ dential.
However, its independence from the state is questionable, since its nine board members are nominated by 
political bodies: the President of the Republic (who nominates three members), the President of the Parliament 
(three members), and the President of the Senate (three members). As it is, the board was nominated (albeit 
at diﬀ erent times) by center-right governing party representatives.
Furthermore, the AAI’s budget, as that of any administrative body, is decided by the government and voted 
by Parliament. Th e impending squeeze on public funding of regulators threatens to limit their independence 
and capacity for action. Th e new government, which is not in favor of the HADOPI, recently decided that 
funds allocated to this authority would be reduced by one-third in 2013.
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7.2.3 Digital Licensing
Th e system of licensing is governed by the Law on Freedom of Communication from 30 September 1986, 
and was amended in 2007 and 2009 in order to include digital licensing. Public channels have a priority 
right to use DTT frequencies due to their public service mission. Either analog or digital licenses are granted 
to private channels by the CSA. Th e licensing process starts with a call for applications procedure, which 
is supposed to ensure transparency and impartiality. Th is procedure is sometimes preceded by a public 
consultation organized by the CSA. Th e law also provides certain criteria that the CSA has to apply while 
considering applications.
In the analog era, the CSA’s function was to allocate broadcasting permissions, taking into consideration 
whether the project met the required conditions regarding preserving pluralism, the diversity of operators, 
and free competition. Th e CSA also had to take account of the candidate’s experience in broadcasting, the 
funding basis, and the prospects for exploitation and development. Th e same criteria apply to digital licensing. 
However, in 2007 and 2009 speciﬁ c requirements for DTT, high-deﬁ nition (HD) and personal mobile 
television were added. In DTT licensing, the CSA takes into account the commitments of the applicant 
in terms of geographical coverage; production and distribution of French and European audiovisual and 
cinematographic works; services that are likely to reach a wide audience and encourage a rapid development 
of DTT; and the promotion of free services.
As far as HD television is concerned, the CSA must promote previously authorized DTT services and take 
into account the commitments of the applicant in terms of the production and broadcast of HD programs. 
Licenses for personal mobile television services are granted in consideration of the commitments of the 
applicant in terms of: production or distribution of French and European audiovisual and cinematographic 
works; program oﬀ er; geographical coverage; and the quality of reception.
Since 2001, the CSA has launched many and various calls for license applications and delivered licenses 
to private societies (commercial channels) for national DTT channels (2001, 2004), HDTV (2007) and 
personal mobile television (Télévision Mobile Personnelle, TMP) services (2007), and local DTT channels. In 
2004, six licenses granted by the CSA for national DTT services were cancelled by a judge.311 But the fairness 
or transparency of the licensing process was not questioned (see section 7.3.2). Th e six companies involved 
in the licensing process (MCM, Canal J, Sport+, i>Télévision, Ciné-Cinéma Câble, and Planète Câble) were 
controlled by the CanalPlus Group. Th is group already held a DTT license, and the 1986 Law limited to ﬁ ve 
the number of licenses that could be delivered to the same person or company. Th e six licenses had thus been 
granted in violation of anti-concentration rules and therefore had to be cancelled.
311. Council of State (Conseil d’Etat), 20 October 2004, No. 260898.
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7.2.4 Role of Self-regulatory Mechanisms
Th ere is no press council in France despite the eﬀ orts of the ﬁ rst French Journalists Trades Union, which 
was created in France in 1918. In the same year, the Trades Union of Journalists (Syndicat des Journalistes), 
which later became the National Trades Union of Journalists (Syndicat national des journalists, SNJ) adopted a 
charter of French professional journalists (reviewed in 1938). Th ere are in addition a few other trades unions 
for journalists: the National Union of Journalists (Syndicat national des journalistes, SNJ-CGT), the Union 
of the Syndicate of Journalists (Union syndicale des journalistes, CFDT), the General Union of Journalists 
(Syndicat général des journalistes, SGJ-FO), and the Union of Journalists (Syndicat des journalistes, CFTC). 
But they are more involved in defending the employees’ material interests than in ethics and self-regulation 
issues.
Employers are associates of the National Federation of the French Press (Fédération Nationale de la Presse 
Française, FNPF), which deals with common issues involving the media industry (negotiations with 
employees, with providers of technology and materials, and with press distributors such as La Poste). In 
the 1990s, some of its members—the National Federation of the Specialized Press, the Trades Union of 
the Daily Regional Press, and the Trades Union of the Weekly Regional Press (Fédération Nationale de la 
Presse Spécialisée, Syndicat de la presse hebdomadaire régionale, Syndicat de la presse quotidienne régionale)—
adopted codes of good practice. Th e Forum of Journalists’ Consortia (Forum des sociétés de journalistes)312 was 
created in 2005; it now numbers around 33 members. Since 2006, the Association for establishing the Press 
Council Association (Association de préﬁ guration d’un Conseil de presse en France, APCP) has been ﬁ ghting for 
legitimization as the oﬃ  cial self-regulatory institution of the press in France.
Since 1994, many print and audiovisual media outlets have adopted individual codes and charters of good 
practice, but only a few of them (Le Monde, France Télévisions, France 2, France 3, Radio France, RFI) 
have ombudsmen. Th e French press ombudsmen club that was created in June 2006 currently has only 10 
members. In 2010, the daily newspaper Le Monde adopted a new charter of ethics and established an Ethical 
Committee to control its implementation.
With digitization, most of the traditional media outlets adopted new charters for their internet sites or added 
speciﬁ c dispositions in their existing charters to deal with online information and the use of social media. 
A few of them, like the state-owned AFP, adopted speciﬁ c codes in respect of these areas. Th e pure players 
grouped belonging to the Trades Union of the Independent Online Information Press (Syndicat de la presse 
indépendante d’information en ligne, SPIIL) also have had codes of ethics since 2009. In March 2011, the SNJ 
replaced the 1918 Charter with a “Charter of Professional Ethics.” 
Finally, an Information Ethics Observatory (Observatoire de la Déontologie de l’Information, ODI) was created 
in September 2012. Th is institution has 20 members from professional organizations, press companies, and 
civil society organizations. It aims to contribute to raising awareness of the importance of ethics in the 
312. See http://forumsdj.free.fr (accessed 12 January 2013).
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collection, formatting, and dissemination of information. It will collect and examine facts dealing with both 
breaches of ethics and “good practices” in order to analyze reasons for poor performance, and promote good 
practices.  
7.3 Government Interference
7.3.1 The Market
In France, the role of the state is very visible in all media sectors, and not only through regulation. Th e state 
provides subsidies to the print media. In television, public channels have one-third of the audience and public 
broadcasters maintain a dominant position within radio. Th e state is also extending its power over television 
through to new regulations that practically allow the President of the Republic to name the president of the 
main public broadcaster France Télévisions. 
Th e ban on commercial advertising on public television channels has made France Télévisions more reliant 
on state subsidies and favors private media owners who have capitalized on the freed-up advertising pool. Th e 
private media owners were good acquaintances of the powerful governing party (UMP, 2002–2012) members 
and the previous French president (before the 2012 elections).313 Th e relations between politicians, media, 
and journalists still remain intertwined following the 2012 change in the presidential and parliamentary 
majority (see section 6.1.3).
 
7.3.2 The Regulator
In France, there have been no cases of digital regulators abusing their power so far. Even if in 2004 the 
CSA illegally delivered broadcasting licenses for national DTT services to six companies controlled by the 
CanalPlus Group (MCM, Canal J, Sport+, i>Télévision, Ciné-Cinéma Câble, and Planète Câble), it could 
not have been considered as abusing its powers. Th e licenses were cancelled by the Council of State (Conseil 
d’Etat), since they were in violation of anti-concentration rules.
All the decisions of the CSA—especially licenses and sanctions—are likely to be challenged in court by 
the interested parties. Judicial intervention is the best guarantee against abuses of power by the regulatory 
authorities.
7.3.3 Other Forms of Interference
Th e independence of the CSA from the political authorities is questionable, but the body is not suspected 
of extra-legal pressure on the digital media. At the same time, there is no evidence for any other forms of 
interference from government.
313. K. Willsher, “How Nicolas Sarkozy inﬂ uences French media,” Th e Guardian, 5 July 2010, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/jul/05/
nicolas-sarkozy-french-media (accessed 10 March 2013). 
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7.4 Assessments
Th e overall framework of the digital switch-over is globally responsive to the challenges of digitization. Public 
interest has been taken into account in the global process and legal provisions have ensured equal access to 
DTT for almost all French citizens.
Despite criticisms of the CSA in terms of its dependence on political authorities, the licensing process 
implemented by the regulator ensures transparency and fair economic competition. Th e only case when 
licenses were granted in violation of anti-concentration rules was sanctioned in court.
Interference in media markets by state authorities has increased signiﬁ cantly over the past ﬁ ve years. Th is 
change should be attributed more to audiovisual public sector reform than to digitization. Th e Law of 5 
March 2009 gave the President of the Republic the power to nominate the presidents of all public sector 
bodies and banned advertising on public channels from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m.314 Th is increased France Télévisions’ 
dependence on state subsidies, although it does not imply direct state intervention in editorial content.
Th ere has been a signiﬁ cant increase in public consultation with respect to new media technologies. As a 
regulation authority, the CSA has always used public consultation in the analog context. It often organized 
public consultations on debated topics such as the deﬁ nition of audiovisual works (2002) or on digital radio 
(2005). Th e importance of such consultations has increased with digitization. Th e 2007 Law on Freedom of 
Communication315 also imposed the organization of public consultations to prepare the digital switch-over 
and the allocation of digital broadcasting licenses. Th e CSA is to organize a public consultation when licenses 
granted to radio or television broadcasters are “likely to change signiﬁ cantly the relevant market.”
“Developing the production and supply of the digital content” was the second priority of the development 
plan for a digital economy (Digital France 2012) published on 20 October 2008. DTT has trebled the 
number of national channels available free of charge316 (see section 1.3.1.4).
Th e Law on the Modernization of Audiovisual Broadcasting (2007) is to promote the development of the 
number and variety of programs with high image and sound quality, as well as to encourage pluralism and 
creativity. Preserving pluralism and the diversity of operators is among the priority goals for fulﬁ lling the 
CSA’s rule of “the interest of each project for the public.” Another goal is to deliver the largest program oﬀ er 
possible when evaluating applications for HDTV or personal mobile television licenses. 
314. Law no. 2009-258 of 5 March 2009 concerning audiovisual communication and the new public service of the television, Journal oﬃ  ciel, 
7 March 2009, p. 4321.
315. Article 31 from Law no. 86-1067 of 30 September 1986 on the freedom of communication with the 2009 modiﬁ cations, at http://www.
legifrance.gouv.fr/aﬃ  chTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006068930  (accessed 12 January 2013).
316. CSA, “Les chaînes hertziennes terrestres” (Th e terrestrial Hertzian channels), at http://www.csa.fr/Television/Les-chaines-de-television/Les-
chaines-hertziennes-terrestres (accessed 25 January 2013).
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8. Conclusions
8.1 Media Today
Th e complete switch-over to digital terrestrial broadcasting, the arrival of pure-player online news sites, and 
the spread of social network platforms are among the most important changes in the media environment 
during the last few years.
Th e pure players and the UGC websites have allowed for greater expression of those voices not aired by 
the mainstream media. Today, news spreads ﬁ rst in the new media, gets publicity, and then becomes the 
“topic of the day” in more traditional coverage (such as the evening news bulletin or the paper edition of 
the newspapers). However, in societies with information delivered 24/7, claims of “being ﬁ rst” with a news 
story are very diﬃ  cult if not impossible. Constantly updated online news has changed the media landscape 
and news delivery for ever, in France as elsewhere. What may, however, be exceptional about France is the 
persisting strong attachment of diﬀ erent social groups to reading or listening to the more in-depth analysis of 
political and social issues provided by legacy media and online media alike.
Television, radio, and newspapers are having to adopt hypermedia strategies in order to keep pace with 
technological developments. One strategy is to be present on all available platforms: via television and radio 
sets, but also on websites, social network proﬁ les (with Facebook being the most popular), and micro-blogs 
(with Twitter being the most popular), or via applications available on smartphones.
It is questionable whether the traditional and new media news outlets have established distinct and innovative 
agenda setting, as the news agencies (AFP, Reuters), press conferences, or press releases still constitute the 
main news sources for most of them. Due to its almost unlimited capacity, online platforms voice more 
diverse content. Its general impact, however, is not measurable. Moreover, changes to journalism practice 
have raised concerns about the quality of news content in the digital media. Time pressures often do not 
permit journalists to verify sources or the news itself.
Blurry relations between media, their owners, and political power are quite emblematic of the French media 
system. Strong dependence on the owner, whether state or private (see section 6), causes questions to arise 
about journalistic standards and independence, as well as political impartiality. 
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Digitization has brought signiﬁ cant changes in the services oﬀ ered to French consumers. It has facilitated 
more interactive television services with catch-up television or VoD. Th e introduction of new players into the 
mobile broadcasting market (Free) was one of the most important developments. It signiﬁ cantly lowered the 
prices of the mobile services available and popularized the usage of internet “on the go” with 3G (and soon 
4G) services.
8.2 Media Tomorrow
Th e coming years are likely to herald the creation of new digital television channels dedicated to more 
specialized audiences. However, this will probably not bring another drastic change in the audience share of 
the traditional television channels. Th e revolution will be probably more in the area of technology, with 3D 
television sets, more catch-up television, interactive programs, and VoD services oﬀ ering wider choice and 
ﬂ exibility to viewers. Th e introduction of ﬁ ber optic internet cables and 4G technology will facilitate high-
speed connections and raise the reception quality.
Th e growth of internet penetration will induce an even stronger emphasis on hypermedia strategies. 
Traditional media providers will be even more present on all possible technological and service platforms, 
especially via mobiles. Terrestrial broadcasting and the press are being challenged by new technology and 
communication tools; however, these same tools will also oﬀ er—by force of the ever-increasing popularity 
of mobile phones and tablets—new opportunities to connect with wider audiences and make more content 
available to the public. 
Traditional media will have to base their storytelling more intensively on the co-creation of news by both 
professional and non-professional journalists. Stories will no longer be in a single format, but will be available 
via video, in written texts, as short notes on microblogs, and commented on blogs and on social networks. In 
order to retain and build audiences, the media may wish to reward their community members (e.g. on social 
networks) who can help in disseminating advertisements about programs via viral marketing.
Th e business model of the media will depend on recovery from the general economic crisis. However, it may 
not be possible for operators to lower their prices even further.317 Th ey will probably place more emphasis 
on the quality and scope of services (e.g. mobile services in standard television and telephone oﬀ ers, more 
international television channels, or a greater choice of ﬁ lms on demand). Th e return of advertising revenues 
and higher sales of physical copies may stop print titles disappearing from the market. However, the future 
of the press lies probably within online business models. 
317. As of 2013, a four-service bundle (television, broadband, ﬁ xed-line, and mobile phone) is proposed for example by Free for less than €30 
(US$39) a month.
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